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ABSTRACT
The Impact of User Control and Transparency in App Design on Privacy
Concerns and Behavior of Mobile App Users
by
Arwa Mohsen Alawajy

Advisor: Prof. Raquel Benbunan-Fich
Mobile apps have unprecedented access to sensitive personal information. The increasing commodification
of mobile-user data motivates us to explore the vital role of app developers in protecting users’ privacy.
This dissertation examines the privacy of mobile app users from the perspective of HCI. According to
Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory, people believe they own their personal information
and have the right to control how or with whom they share this information. In practice, individuals manage
their privacy system and the boundaries between the public and private domain. Users make privacy
disclosure decisions according to their individual characteristics and the perceptions of the contextual
factors where the request to disclose is initiated. With such a theoretical framework and a customized
mobile app developed for this study, a lab and online experiment were conducted to compare the impact of
two design elements derived from the key concepts of CPM: app transparency and user control, and their
interaction, on users’ privacy concerns and their disclosure decisions. Findings show that user trust
perception on a new mobile app is influenced by her/his control over disclosure decisions and influenced
by the level of transparency about the app privacy practices pertaining to their disclosed information. The
study shows as well when the app forces users to disclose personal information, a high level of intrusion
perception is triggered. Both trust and intrusion perceptions have significant impact on user’s privacy
concerns. The results of this study can assist HCI researchers in developing a more comprehensive
understanding of privacy-related perceptions and behavior of mobile app users, which can lead to better
mobile interface designs that aim to protect user’s privacy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Previous studies have shown that users lack an adequate understanding of how much of their
personal data is collected, access, or shared by the applications installed in their smartphones (e.g.,
Hatamian, 2020; Ramokapane & Rashid, 2019; Van Kleek et al., 2017; Pennekamp et al., 2017). These
applications typically have advertising libraries and analytic tools embedded by developers in application’s
code to monetize the app and analyze its usage. Such a limited mental model of mobile app’s performance
prevents users from properly assessing the risks associated with information disclosure behavior and
making informed decisions. Currently, mobile phone users live in a “leakage age” where a substantial
volume of information about them is being stored and sold to third-parties such as advertising companies
or marketing researchers (Shklovski et al., 2014; Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Zhang-Kennedy et al.,
2016; Hung et al., 2015; Van Kleek et al., 2017).
One example of such companies is Flurry, a big analytic and ad company that most app developers
use to track user data. The company proudly published on its website that the size of mobile users’
information it has is about two terabytes of data from 2.8 billion app sessions per day (Shklovski et al.,
2014). Moreover, a few years ago, Apple and Google, who control the most significant share of the apps
market, purchased Quattro Wireless and AdMob moving towards more personal data exploitation (Kelley
et al., 2011). These acquisitions have encouraged new business models that rely on obtaining data from
smartphone users to emerge in the market in the name of providing more personalized services and relevant
ads. Another recent example is Google’s acquisition of Fitbit data and devices (health and fitness
smartwatch). With this deal, Google obtained the Fitbit community data, which currently has more than 29
million active users (“Google Completes Fitbit Acquisition,” 2021). This growing commodification of user
data by application designers is worth examining to find ways to provide more control over the personal
data being leaked either to the service provider itself or its third-parties.
We are particularly interested in the vital role mobile apps designers can play in mitigating users’
fears and concerns regarding their privacy by providing advanced privacy settings and transparencyenhancing tools, thus encouraging more users to adopt innovative mobile apps. There is a fundamental need
to prevent manipulative interface designs that result in over-sharing and user personal information
distribution without explicit consent. When users are aware of mobile apps’ potential privacy threats,
developers will feel the pressure to designing apps with privacy practices that align with user preferences.
The primary focus of the current research is to investigate whether mobile app design influences users’
privacy concerns and their disclosure behavior.
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will lay the foundation and define the key
terminology in the area of privacy in mobile apps. Also, Chapter 2 will present the literature review process,

1

with details about the search strategy which includes journals’ names and keywords used to identify relevant
articles. In Chapter 3, the theoretical and experimental aspects of the literature review will be presented by
briefly stating the employed theories, and the experimental methods researchers apply to understand user
privacy-related behavior in the context of mobile apps. Chapter 4 will synthesize and discuss the main
findings of the reviewed articles to develop a more inclusive perspective of the fragmented literature that
looks both at user and designer role in mobile apps privacy. Chapter 5 will describe the characteristics of
the mobile app developed for this study, along with detailed justifications for the key design decisions.
Chapter 6 will present the empirical user testing components, including the research questions, theory,
hypotheses development, research model, methodology, and the preliminary results of the pilot study.
Chapter 7 will describe the results of the data analyses of the empirical study. The closing chapter,
Chapter 8, contains a thorough discussion of the results, their implications, and suggestions for future work.

2

Chapter 2: Definitions and Literature Review Search
This chapter introduces concepts that are important to understand the various dimensions of the
topic of this dissertation. The first section gives a general overview of HCI as a field of research and defines
terms related to privacy and mobile apps. These terms include privacy paradox, privacy attitudes and
behavior measures, location-based apps, information disclosure, data leakage, and app permissions. These
terms will be subsequently used throughout the dissertation. The second section reports the details about
the process and the scope of the search. The list of the selected journals and proceedings is presented.
Following that are the key terms used to define mobile apps privacy within these journals and proceedings,
along with the articles obtained from the search process.

2.1

Definitions of Key Concepts

2.1.1

Human-Computer Interaction
Human-computer interaction studies how humans interact with computational artifacts. According

to ACM, Association for Computing Machinery, HCI can be defined as “a discipline concerned with the
design, evaluation, and implementation of interactive computing systems for human use and with the study
of major phenomena surrounding them” (Hewett et al., 1992). This definition indicates that HCI is an area
of research where two sides in communication are examined: the human side, which includes knowledge
in social, psychological, cognitive science, and communication theories, and the computer side, which
includes technologies in interface design, programming languages, and operating systems (Hewett et al.,
1992). Human–machine interaction (HMI), man-machine interaction (MMI), or computer-human
interaction (CHI) are all commonly used synonyms for HCI.
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the field, researchers with diverse backgrounds contribute to
enriching the HCI literature. For instance, the computer scientists’ point of view is about interface design
and application development, the psychologists’ view is about user cognitive processes while the
sociologists adopt social methods, such as ethnography, to understand user requirements (Hewett et al.,
1992).
In this dissertation, we adopt the computer science view of HCI because HCI practitioners are
uniquely suited to examine app design’s impact on user privacy-related decisions. We believe in the wellestablished principle in HCI which indicates that the way the interfaces are designed shapes user behavior
by the cues and affordances embedded in the design. However, HCI literature has some useful privacy
principles and standards that could aid HCI practitioners in designing mobile applications considering user
privacy concerns (Iachello & Abowd, 2008), and these principles are constantly evolving to accommodate
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new technology developments and regulations. This evolution presents an opportunity to make potential
contributions to further research in this area.

2.1.2

Privacy
Three of the primary disciplines in which privacy, as a significant research topic, contributes to the

literature by a wealth of scientific efforts are law, social studies, and information systems (Mamonov &
Benbunan-Fich, 2015). Accordingly, the concept of privacy has diverse, sometimes conflicting facets
depending on the lens through which the idea is viewed (Iachello & Hong, 2007).
On the one hand, from a legal point of view, the original definition of privacy is “the right to be
left alone” (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015). This notion of privacy has evolved to be a crucial part of
many constitutions in modern countries, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the US 4th
Amendment (Iachello & Hong, 2007). On the other hand, Social Philosophy defines privacy as either a
principled or communitarian value. The principled view regards privacy as a fundamental right of humans,
while the communitarian one focuses on society’s benefits at large even if they conflict with individual
interests (Iachello & Hong, 2007).
Understanding how individuals conceptualize privacy is useful to interpret their behavior as the
person’s mental model of privacy shapes their behavior in privacy-related incidents (Stark et al., 2016). The
remaining emphasis of the section is on information privacy, which is the focus of this dissertation.
Privacy definitions vary across disciplines as well as within a particular one. In the Information
Systems literature, five main privacy concepts have been commonly employed. The first notion was
developed by Westin, who conceptualizes privacy as the individual ability to control personal information
disclosure to others (Dogruel et al., 2017; Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015; Keith et al., 2013). Second,
and similar to Westin’s, is Murphy’s expression of privacy as “the control of information concerning an
individual’s person” (Iachello & Hong, 2007).
Third, drawing from the concept of personal space, a boundary around a person, Altman (1975) has
developed another definition of privacy as a dynamic social regulation mechanism of private boundaries.
In such a regulatory process, a person selectively adjusts access to their personal information through
perpetual actions of concealment and disclosure. Crossing these boundaries is often not permitted and
causes a privacy violation that results in anxiety and uncomfortable feelings or goes further to reduce
interaction (Shklovski et al., 2014; Stark et al., 2016; Barkhuus, 2012; Iachello & Hong, 2007).
Fourth, to complement Altman’s theory, Nissenbaum (2004) has integrated context-dependent
social norms in his conception of privacy. According to his contextual integrity theory, no aspect of human
life is not governed by certain information flow norms. Thus, individuals often attempt to keep what is
perceived as private information private in compliance with the contextual standards. These norms might
4

be ethical, cultural, or moral values (Stark et al., 2016; Barkhuus, 2012). Putting this definition in the
domain of smartphones, nearly every mobile app developed is for achieving a specific task and runs within
a specific context that controls user disclosure behavior.
The last notion of information privacy worth mentioning is Smith et al. (1996). They defined four
key dimensions of information privacy: a) collection of personal information: concern that is a great amount
of data regarding a person’s background, personality, and actions are being accumulated; b)unauthorized
secondary usage: concern that using the collected personal information for other purposes than the initially
stated one; c) error in processing personal information: concerns that protections against accidental or
deliberate errors in personal information are inadequate; and d) improper access to personal information:
concerns that personal information is readily available to unauthorized people. The ability to control these
practices reduces individual concerns about information privacy (Smith et al., 1996; Pentina et al., 2016;
Bergström, 2015; Keith et al., 2013).

2.1.2.1 Privacy paradox
In the information privacy literature, a phenomenon related to individual online behavior is known
as “privacy paradox.” This paradox presented in numerous studies suggests that there is a discrepancy
between an individual’s stated privacy concerns and her/his actual behavior (Dogruel et al., 2017; Nguyen
et al., 2016; Keith et al., 2013; Shklovski et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2013). In other words, when users are
online, they do not always act rationally about their information disclosure. Instead, they tend to disclose
an extensive amount of personal data while simultaneously affirming the importance of information
privacy. Although there is much scientific evidence in support of the privacy paradox (Dogruel et al., 2017;
Pentina et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016; Bergström, 2015; Keith et al., 2013; Watson et al., 2015; Shklovski
et al., 2014; Keith et al., 2013), several researchers have criticized and tried to find alternative explanations
for such phenomenon. For instance, some researchers argue that lowering the accuracy of the information
provided lessens the mismatch between the expressed concerns and the actual behavior. People express
high worries for their private information and, thus, conceal the true information and reveal instead
inaccurate data in an attempt to protect their privacy (Keith et al., 2013; Bettini & Riboni, 2015). Less
accurate information is less sensitive. Another explanation of the privacy paradox is related to a
methodological fault whereby researchers use specific instruments for measuring individual privacy
concerns and then use different ways to measure user behavior. The inconsistency between the employed
tools for measuring privacy attitudes and privacy-related actions might contrast dissimilar constructs and
result in an apparent paradox.
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2.1.2.2 Privacy attitudes and behavior measures
People vary considerably in their perceptions of information privacy. Understanding such
individual differences contributes to building systems that comply with their mental models of privacy and
increasing individuals’ awareness to safeguard their personal information.
Ample scientific efforts have been made to segment people according to their privacy attitudes.
The most commonly cited work is Westin’s index (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). Based on people’s
responses to Westin’s survey, they are categorized into three groups: Fundamentalist with high privacy
concerns, Pragmatists with medium concerns, and Unconcerned with low concerns (Watson et al., 2015;
Henne et al., 2013; Iachello & Hong, 2007; Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). Westin’s survey examines
attitudes towards the use of personal information by organizations particularly. Thus, the survey results’
interpretation should align with its original context (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005).
Another attempt to profile people is by using the Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) scale
developed by Smith et al. (1996), in which the construct of privacy is measured by using four subscales:
improper access, secondary use, errors, and collection (Smith et al., 1996; Fodor & Brem, 2015; Keith et
al., 2013). Some researchers claim that the CFIP scale was developed to assess user privacy concerns in
offline settings and that privacy attitudes are different in online contexts (Fodor & Brem, 2015; Iachello &
Hong, 2007; Buchanan et al., 2007).
Therefore, Malhotra et al. (2004) have presented the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns
(IUIPC) framework. Rather similar to the CFIP, privacy in IUIPC scale consists of three dimensions, or
subscales: collection, awareness, and control, which entirely measure overall online privacy concerns
(Fodor & Brem, 2015).
The most recent segmentation index to measure privacy-related attitudes and behaviors is from
Buchanan et al. (2007). The scale consists of 16 items for privacy-related attitudes (Privacy Concern) and
12 items for privacy behaviors (General Caution and Technical Protection). The difference between this
scale and the previous ones is that this is intended for use on the Internet and extends the facets of
information privacy it measures.
All four measures: Westin’s index, CFIP, IUIPC, and Buchanan et al. scales, are presented in
Appendix A.

2.1.3

Mobile Applications
The widespread adoption of mobile devices with rich communication capabilities, high-resolution

cameras, and GPS (Global Positioning System) presents an opportunity for developers to enrich these
devices with a variety of innovative software applications called mobile applications (a.k.a. apps). A mobile
app is a small, task-focused, and executable program operating on a mobile device and can be installed on
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a user device either by purchase or for free (Kelley et al., 2013). A plethora of applications for mobile
platforms are primarily available on the two most prominent app markets: Google Play Store for Android
operating system and Apple App Store for iPhone, and both markets feature more than two million apps in
each according to the recent statistics (“Number of Available Applications in The Google Play Store,”
2020; “Number of Apps Available in Leading App Stores,” 2020). These markets offer various types of
mobile apps that create unique combinations of functions for smartphone users, such as productivity
(document editors), entertainment (games), extensions of sociability (social network apps), and locationbased services (maps). Also, due to pervasive use of smartphones and rapidly evolving sensor technologies
embedded in them, these devices are no longer accessories. Still, they have become intrinsic to people’s
daily life as tools for organizing, projecting, and constructing the self (Shklovski et al., 2014).
In the world of smartphones, a given mobile app can be classified according to its design as either
a native or a hybrid app. On the one hand, a native app is when the software is programmed and designed
to be deployed in a specific mobile platform which is different than a mobile web app that is a website
designed with interfaces re-adjusted to fit the small screens of smartphones. On the other hand, a hybrid
app is software designed to run on multiple mobile systems using JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. Both types
can integrate the device features into the app functionality, and both can be downloaded from app stores
(Buchanan et al., 2007).
There is no scientific categorization of mobile apps (Frey et al., 2017). Therefore, for the aim of
this review, mobile applications will be categorized according to their purpose into four types: social
network apps, location-based apps, games, and others. Each type is briefly discussed in the following
sections.

2.1.3.1 Social network applications
One popular type of mobile applications is the Social Networking Site (SNS) applications. The
primary feature of these apps is that they allow the user to create a continuously updated personal profile
and share it with a group of contacts. The user might, in turn, follow back her/his contacts and view their
frequently updated profiles (Verduyn et al., 2017). This kind of apps is experiencing notable growth in the
number of users who are not only young adults but also older people (Verduyn et al., 2017). Among the top
popular mobile social networking apps in the US are Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, with more than
196, 121, and 81 million monthly users, respectively according to (“Most Popular Mobile Social
Networking Apps,” 2019).
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2.1.3.2 Location-based services (LBSs)
Location-based services, LBSs, are a type of mobile applications that detects where a user device
is located and provides her/his with the ability to share such information online (Wang & Lin, 2017). With
the advent of location sensing technologies that are often featured in smartphones, a user device’s location
has become a significant piece of information in context-aware computing, such as finding the closest
restaurant in a city or checking the weather. Such context-aware services add an element of convenience to
smartphone users.
Location-based apps can be broadly categorized into three types (Bettini & Riboni, 2015;
Knijnenburg et al., 2013). The first type is designed to provide personalized services such as tourist apps
or navigation apps. The second type is based on the “check-in” mechanism often implemented in either a
stand-alone application such as Foursquare or embedded in social network sites such as Facebook Places
where people broadcast their locations to a list of friends in their social network. Instead of actively sharing
the location by the user, the third type of location-based apps is based on continuous reporting of the
location to a server with no user intervention. Examples of these applications are friend finder and traffic
conditions monitoring services (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Lindqvist et al., 2011).

2.1.3.3 Mobile games
Mobile games are downloaded games designed to be played in handled devices such as mobile
phones or tablets (Jeong & Kim, 2009). These games such as puzzles, cards, or word games are mainly
designed to fit the small screens of smartphones or tablets. The main feature of a mobile game is in its
context. There are no social motivations or specific services the user could gain from playing a mobile game
but entertainment value. That creates a unique nature of mobile interaction different from other types of
apps. Some games have network functionalities that allow the player to download updates, upload their
scores, or share progress with her/his contacts in social networks. The context of such games is slightly
different than the ones with no network capabilities in which the social drivers might shape along with other
factors user interaction with the networked mobile game.

2.1.3.4 Others
This category of apps includes all the apps that are not classified under the three previously
mentioned types. Examples of such apps are m-banking apps that help the user to make financial
transactions using smartphones, m-commerce apps that allow the user to buy or sell goods or services
through smartphones and healthcare and well-being apps that usually require data collecting body-worn
sensors to monitor patients or to monitor fitness-related parameters (Bettini & Riboni, 2015).
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2.1.4

Privacy and Mobile Applications
All personally identifiable information (PII) that, if revealed, could be traced back to a specific

individual is considered sensitive and should be protected (Gasson et al., 2011). Thus, a privacy violation
occurs when an association between personal information and individual identity is obtained without
explicit personal consent (Bettini & Riboni, 2015). In the realm of smartphones, analyzing and aggregating
basic data of mobile phones such as its database (contacts, calendar events, photos), its sensors
(accelerometer, GPS), or its hardware specifications (International Mobile Equipment Identity “IMEI,”
SIM card ID), could reveal sensitive information about the user including ethnicity, religion, political views,
health information or sex orientation (Pentina et al., 2016; Kisekka et al., 2013; Gasson et al., 2011; Hung
et al., 2015; Micinski et al., 2017; Tan et al., 2014; Ismail et al., 2015). The next sections introduce concepts
and definitions about privacy issues in the world of mobile apps.

2.1.4.1 Information disclosure
Information disclosure refers to the voluntary act of releasing personal information and make them
accessible to certain entities. In the context of mobile applications, throughout the interaction with a mobile
app, users may voluntarily exchange personal information with an app provider to communicate with or to
obtain particular services. The voluntary nature of information disclosure indicates that the user has the
discretion to either conceal or divulge their personal information (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015).

2.1.4.2 Application permissions (privacy features)
Smartphones follow a specific mechanism to safeguard a user device from unauthorized access to
its resources such as Internet access and camera or its data such as a user geophysical location or photos.
The security model used in the two main mobile platforms, Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS (“Global
Mobile OS Market Share,” 2018), is based on a permission control system where each granted permission
provides the app with a privilege to access certain data or to have control over a certain resource or feature.
Most of these permissions are crucial elements for the application functionality (Dogruel et al., 2017; Hung
et al., 2015; Baarslag et al., 2016; Kelley et al., 2013).
The app development environment for the two platforms differs substantially in the way these
permissions are presented. For Android users, such permissions are listed at the installation time of the app
(install-time permission). The user then decides whether to proceed with installing the app on their devices
(Van Kleek et al., 2017; Micinski et al., 2017). For iOS environment, on the other hand, after installation,
the user is alerted by a dialog box at the first time the application requests to access the device resources
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(run-time permission) (Finnis et al., 2012; Benenson et al., 2013; Tan et al., 2014; Ismail et al., 2015;
Pennekamp et al., 2017). The default settings for iOS deny access unless the user explicitly approves the
access request (Angulo et al., 2015).
In iOS and Android starting from Version 6 only (Micinski et al., 2017; Baarslag et al., 2016; Ismail
et al., 2015), users can subsequently modify these settings on a per-feature basis either by revoking certain
permissions for a specific app or re-granting others (Angulo et al., 2015; Pennekamp et al., 2017). For
example, if a user grants Internet access for an installed game, they can later revoke this permission while
playing, when they think there is no need for network access, and then re-enable the permission later when
there is a need for upload or download certain game features (Hung et al., 2015).

2.1.4.3 Data leakage
Data leakage or information leakage occurs when installed mobile applications in an unauthorized
way process or transfer data from user smartphones to third-parties or servers other than the installed app,
such as advertisers or governmental agencies (Pentina et al., 2016). Most of the business models of mobile
applications rely on the exploitation of user data, particularly when the application is “free.” When the app
is free to download and use, users often “pay” with their data to subsidize the cost of the app through
targeted advertisements (Tan et al., 2014; Harbach et al., 2014). Installed apps with granted permissions
could easily derive a considerable amount of sensitive information. For instance, some applications can
detect and share the presence of other individuals, browsing history, user current and past visited locations,
and other sensitive information (Pentina et al., 2016; Bettini & Riboni, 2015). Typically, this data exchange
happens without user awareness. Several researchers have shown that most people are surprised and feel
their privacy is breached by such a practice (Micinski et al., 2017; Shklovski et al., 2014). The ineffective
communication between smartphone users and service providers about collection, use, sharing practices of
user data, and the potential risks causes a mismatch between user expectations and app providers’ current
practices. This phenomenon is known as asymmetric or incomplete information in the privacy literature
(Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Shih et al., 2015).
To allow applications access to user data and simultaneously alleviate user privacy concerns, data
sharing must be made with explicit user consent. This will give users a sense of control over their personal
data (Shih et al., 2015).

2.1.4.4 Security vs. privacy
Although information privacy and information security are used interchangeably, it important to
distinguish between the two. Numerous reviewed papers use information security and information privacy
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as synonyms (Pentina et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016; Bergström, 2015; Kisekka et al., 2013; Kelley et
al., 2013; Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Buchanan et al., 2007; Alharbi et al., 2014; Tan et al., 2014; Chang et
al., 2016; Ismail et al., 2015). However, a few of them (Iachello & Abowd, 2008; Bettini & Riboni, 2015;
Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016; Iachello & Hong, 2007) differentiate between the two terms. For the sake of
clarity, a distinction between information security and information privacy is introduced.
According to Kissel (2013), information security is the protection of the data from unauthorized
access to provide availability, integrity, and confidentiality. Anti-virus software, encryption techniques,
firewall are examples of information security practices. On the other hand, information privacy could be
simply defined as the appropriate use of personal data according to the terms of service (TOS), which is a
tool to regulate the use of provided personal data. In (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015), a security breach
is described as unauthorized access to data regardless of the access purpose or whether personally
identifiable data is compromised, while privacy breach is described as collecting personal data about an
individual for a different purpose than the purpose agreed upon or the purpose stated.
It could be inferred that information privacy concerns about the processing of personal data while
information security does so for data in general, and information security practices can be seen as the means
to achieve the end goal, information privacy.

2.1.4.5 Trust
The privacy literature has emphasized that trust is a crucial factor that can lower privacy concerns
and, thus, influence user behavior (Bergström, 2015; Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Wang & Lin, 2017).
Trust is defined as the individual believes that a specific other will not misuse their personal information
and, in a discretionary situation, will be able to act for their best interest (Fodor & Brem, 2015; Beldad &
Kusumadewi, 2015; Wang & Lin, 2017). Thus, if the user feels that the service provider is collecting
personal data unnecessarily, the trust will be reduced, and privacy concerns will increase (Fodor & Brem,
2015). Both trust and privacy concerns influence user behavior.
In interactions characterized by uncertainty, user trust plays its role clearly in defining their
behavior. According to that, another definition of trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based on
positive exceptions towards the future behavior of another party (Buchanan et al., 2007; Wang & Lin,
2017).
The previous sections briefly explained all the key terms used to review the literature of privacy in
the context of mobile apps.
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2.2

Literature Review Search
This review examines the progress that has been made to understand privacy issues in the context

of mobile apps. While this topic is multi-disciplinary, we primarily focus on the research literature in HCI.
The presented work is based on a survey spanning more than a decade (from Jan 2007 to Dec 2020) of
published academic articles in HCI journals and the main conference in HCI.

2.2.1

Selected Journals and Proceedings
To define the scope of the search, only the most influential and topic-related HCI Journals are

reviewed. In addition to the selected journals, the proceedings for ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing Systems (CHI) have been included in the search area as well.
Since exploring the impact of user privacy concerns on information sharing behavior in the context
of interactive mobile apps involves examining the design of the app interfaces and understanding the mobile
nature of such an interaction, we included two specialized journals: Computer Standards and Interfaces
and Pervasive and Mobile Computing covering the same time frame.
For comparison, Table 1 briefly lists the journals with their corresponding h-index1 and the chosen
conference. Details about the selected articles from HCI journals, CHI conference, and the two specialized
journals are presented in Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix D, respectively.

2.2.2

Keywords
Selecting the proper keywords to explore a certain topic is a vital element of a successful search.

The main keywords used here were “privacy,” “mobile applications,” “mobile apps.” After the initial
review of the articles, we have undertaken further searches by looking for “mobile services,” “security,”
“trust,” “Information disclosure,” “app permissions,” “leakage/leak,” “privacy features,” and
“LBS/location-based services” to include all the other relevant papers in the specified journals. All of these
terms were previously defined in the first part of this chapter.
We focused our search on articles related to mobile apps in general without narrowing the domain
to any specific type of apps. Hundreds of hits were obtained from this search strategy. After reviewing the
abstracts of these articles, only those that were relevant were retained. To be relevant, the article has to
examine privacy issues and mobile apps from a conceptual or empirical perspective. We excluded studies
focused on a single app but included those with the more general approach. Examples of article’s subject
that excluded from further consideration include data mining of privacy concerns to predict m-commerce
1

H-index is a well-established measure of a journal quality developed by Hirsch in 2005. If a journal has an h- index value of y
means the journal has y publications that have all been cited at least y times (Hodge & Lacasse, 2011).
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activities (Eastin et al., 2016), the effect of privacy concerns on Snapchat use (Lemay et al., 2017), and
reducing privacy risks associated with wearable glasses (Peng et al., 2017). These articles deal with contextspecific apps, which limit their findings.

Table 1: Resources included in the Review
#

Journal Name

H-index2

HCI Journals
1

Computers in Human Behavior

155

2

Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems

120

3

International Journal of Human-Computer Studies

116

4

IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems

115

5

ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction

84

6

Interacting with Computers

78

7

Behaviour and Information Technology

71

8

Human-Computer Interaction

67

9

International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction

62

10

Foundations and Trends in HCI

22

11

International Journal of Mobile Human Computer Interaction.

15

Conference
12

ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems

177

Specialized Journals
13

Computer Standards and Interfaces

60

14

Pervasive and Mobile Computing

60

Then, we extended the review process to include recent articles published in 2018-2021. In this
review, we included more specific terms that reflect the current dissertation work. Using the same resources
listed above, we searched for “privacy,” “mobile apps,” “design,” “cues,” “transparency,” “control,”
“interface,” “perceived control,” “perceived trust.”
For this literature review, the sample consists of 61 articles discussing various aspects of user
privacy and their disclosure patterns during their interaction with mobile apps. Analysis and details of these
articles are presented in the next chapter.

2

All of the h-index values are from (“SCImago Journal & Country Rank,” 2020)
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Chapter 3: Theoretical and Experimental Perspectives
This chapter first provides, in a nutshell, the classic theories employed to understand user privacyrelated interaction with mobile apps. Next, it introduces the experimental aspects of each article by
analyzing the selected methods used to address the corresponding research questions. Then, the chapter
concludes with the main challenges faced by researchers who attempt to study privacy issues, particularly
in mobile interaction.

3.1

Theories
An overview of the most common theories used in the examined papers is outlined in this section.

The reader should be aware that there are many other than the mentioned theories such as Fogg’s behavior
model (Caraban et al., 2019), motivation and opportunity as determinants theory (Henke et al., 2018),
information transmission theory (Harbach et al., 2014), and social exchange theory (Keith et al., 2013) that
were rarely considered in more than one article. Because these theories are not commonly used in the field
of privacy in mobile applications, they were excluded from this summary. In the subsequent sections, five
popular theoretical frameworks related to our domain of search are briefly discussed: Privacy Calculus,
Technology Acceptance Model, Psychological Contract Theory, Uses and Gratification Theory, and
Elaboration Likelihood Model.

3.1.1

Privacy Calculus
Privacy Calculus is considered the most useful framework in contemporary privacy literature. It is

based on a trade-off approach which frames information disclosure decision as tradeoffs between perceived
benefits and perceived risks (Dogruel et al., 2017; Pentina et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016; Keith et al.,
2013; Knijnenburg et al., 2013). The concept of privacy calculus suggests that users weigh potential risks
against potential benefits and behave in a way to maximize positive outcomes and minimize the negative
consequences. Therfore, the actual disclosure behavior relies on the dominance of either interests or
concerns. Figure 1 presents the core of the Privacy Calculus theory. The perceived benefits incorporate,
among others, usefulness, personalization, timeliness, and convenience. In the social media context,
benefits additionally include perceived enjoyment, self-presentation, and relationship maintenance (Pentina
et al., 2016). In contrast, identity theft, concerns about misuse or sharing of disclosed information are
examples of the perceived risks user might have upon the decision of whether to protect (or reveal) personal
information in a particular context. For example, users may evaluate potential benefits such as customized
products offer but also consider potential risks such as identity theft when making information disclosure
decisions (Dogruel et al., 2017).
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Figure 1: Privacy Calculus Theory, Source: (Keith et al., 2013)

Dinev and Hart (2006) extended the model of privacy calculus theory by including trust as an
important factor influencing user intention to disclose personal information. In their work, they found that
trust plays a crucial role such that a higher level of trust lowers the perceived risks and thus encourages
users towards more disclosure decisions.
The problem with such a model is in its embedded assumption which presumes that individuals can
effectively identify risks and benefits and have strong beliefs about them (Dogruel et al., 2017; Pentina et
al., 2016). Uncertainty is often present in such interactions, and it affects the user’s ability to assign values
for benefits and risks to behave accordingly. Another possible reason for having difficulty in disclosure
decision-making is the inter-temporal property of privacy trade-offs. While the benefits associated with
revealing personal information are often immediate, the risks are often more distant in time or ambiguous
(Dogruel et al., 2017).

3.1.2

Technology Acceptance Model
Another dominant theory employed to explain individual behavior towards new technology is

Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis et al., 1989). The model proposes that two main factors
influence a user decision about whether to use a certain technology namely: perceived usefulness and
perceived ease-of-use (Fodor & Brem, 2015; Pentina et al., 2016; Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Tsai et al.,
2009). Perceived usefulness is defined as the degree to which users believe that this technology would help
them accomplish their tasks while perceived ease-of-use is defined as the degree to which users believe that
using this technology would be free from the effort (Davis et al., 1989). Trust has a positive influence on
perceived ease-of-use which could predict user adoption behavior (Buchanan et al., 2007).
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When a user is presented with novel technology, their acceptance could be predicted by the
perceived relative advantages the technology offers and the perceived effortless use. The model is depicted
in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The Technology Acceptance Model, Source: (Davis et al., 1989)

Despite its frequent use, TAM has been widely criticized. Some researchers argue that the model
relates usefulness and ease-of-use to technology adoption and neglects other issues such as group, social,
and cultural aspects that might have an impact on user adoption of technology (Bagozzi, 2007). This notion
has led to continuous revise and expansion of TAM resulting in modified and new models. For example,
the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) is one outcome of reexamining
technology adoption and expanding the original TAM.
In UTAUT model (Venkatesh et al., 2003), the four key constructs that determine user intention to
use technology and usage behavior are effort expectancy, performance expectancy, social influence, and
facilitating conditions (which directly predict user usage behavior). Effort expectancy is defined as the
extent of perceived convenience associated with using the system. Performance expectancy is the degree to
which users believe the system or product will help them attain gains in job performance. Social influence
is the degree to which a user perceives that important others believe that the user should adopt the new
system, and facilitating conditions is the extent to which the user perceives that technical and organizational
infrastructure required to use the intended system is available (Venkatesh et al., 2003; Iachello & Hong,
2007; Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015).
Also, UTAUT model incorporates four moderators: gender, age, experience, and voluntariness to
reflect dynamic influences, and to moderate the impact of the primary constructs. The model is shown in
Figure 3.
Like TAM, UTAUT has been criticized for using several independent variables to predict user
intention to use technology and others to predict the actual user behavior, and this distinction confuses those
who want to study technology adoption behavior (Bagozzi, 2007).
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Figure 3: Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology, Source: (Venkatesh et al., 2003)

In the context of privacy in mobile apps, technology adoption frameworks are related to the decision
to use a certain app, which may have certain advantages but also undesirable consequences.
The perceived risks or unwanted outcomes associated with using a certain technology come in
many forms, one of them is user information privacy concerns or the actual misuse of the provided
information. With perceived potential risks, the salience of trust as a predictor of technology adoption
increases, and trust would be irrelevant without risk (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015).

3.1.3

Psychological Contract Theory
The Psychological Contract Theory (PCT) postulates that all exchange relationships entail

unwritten expectancies that establish the basis of psychological contracts. A perceived breach of such
implicit expectancies triggers behavioral and attitudinal changes (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Mamonov
& Benbunan-Fich, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2016). Originally, this theory was developed to explain the
employee performance and turnover intentions in the work environment because researchers have found
that the formal employment contract has little predictive value of the employee behavior. Aside from the
organizational contexts, PCT has been applied to examine exchange relationships of different settings such
as virtual teams and online marketplaces (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015). For instance, in online
shopping, the fulfillment of the implicit terms of the psychological contract has a positive effect on users
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and increases their intentions of future transactions. In contrast, the perceived breach of such expectancies
increases the perceptions of risks and affects user behavior oppositely.
According to PCT, the four factors that affect the perception of a psychological contract breach are:
1) the magnitude of the breach negative consequences; 2) the causal attribution of the breach (whether it
happened due to misunderstanding or due to a purposely renege by the counterpart); 3) the fairness
judgments; and 4) the nature of the relationship between the two parties, whether it is relational that is
generally based on promises and agreements, or transactional that generally involves highly specific
exchange of resources (Schaupp, 2012; Morrison & Robinson, 1997).
Prior research has pointed out that the notion of psychological contract has an impact on technology
adoption and use. More specifically, a breach of privacy caused by smartphone apps could be seen through
the lens of psychological contract theory to identify the factors that affect user privacy perceptions and to
study the impact of privacy breach perceptions on continuing information exchanges (Mamonov &
Benbunan-Fich, 2015). Since privacy-related expectancies shape user disclosure behavior, the privacy
breach would cause a breach of the psychological contract between the user and the app.

3.1.4

Uses and Gratification Theory
In media research, Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT), was originally developed to explain the

appeal of certain media contents. It is a psychological communication perspective that emphasizes the selfperceived needs of individuals to use a particular medium and to understand the behaviors or attitudes
developed from such use (Rubin, 2009). These needs are determined by the psychological and social traits
of a person such as acquiring information or interacting with family and friends. The needs are the motives
for people to adopt a particular medium and through its use, they experience related gratifications. The
same media content is used for different purposes to satisfy different needs for different people (Rubin,
2009; Jere & Davis, 2011). The most frequently four motives found that predict a user’s decision to use a
particular medium are entertainment or diversion, information seeking or surveillance, personal identity,
and personal relationship/social interaction (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Jere & Davis, 2011). UGT is
based on the assumption that every individual consciously selects media and content to fulfill her/his certain
needs.
UGT as a framework for understanding media use and consequences has received various criticisms
including that UGT is an individualistic approach that makes it difficult to associate personal media use
with social influences. Another critical point is sought gratifications and the ones obtained are not
distinguishable in this theory (Rubin, 2009).
This perspective has been increasingly applied to various areas of media usage including the
Internet, social media, and mobile phone (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Lindqvist et al., 2011). In the
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context of privacy in mobile apps, this theory is applicable to examine what motives users have to reveal
their personal information to a particular mobile application. In other words, which of the user’s
gratifications are satisfied by disclosing sensitive information to a particular mobile app.

3.1.5

Elaboration Likelihood Model
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) is a general theory of information processing and attitude

change. It was developed to examine how people change their attitudes if they receive a persuasive message.
ELM postulates that individuals use either a central route or a peripheral route to process the information
presented to them. The change in attitude varies depending on which route the person utilizes. Attitude
changes from central processing often last for a long and it is resistant to future change while the change
from peripheral processing route results in a short-term effect and only temporary persuasion.
Consequently, attitude change resulting from centrally processing is more predictive of future long-term
behaviors than attitude change resulting from peripherally processing (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016;
Buchanan et al., 2007; Van Lange et al., 2011).
According to ELM, the route by which the information is processed is determined by individual
motivations and ability to elaborate on the message. When people are motivated to pay attention such as
the presented information that is personally relevant, their decision is more likely to be based on careful,
logical, and conscious thinking. Thus, the more compelling the arguments, the more persuasion can occur.
In contrast, when people have low or no interest in the subject being presented, their decision is more likely
to rely on superficial characteristics and cues that are less related to the issue and more related to the context
such as source expertise, attractiveness, the general impression of the message, the current mood of the
receiver. For instance, the more attractiveness the message, the more persuasion can occur. Likewise, the
ability to process the message including personal knowledge, her/his intellectual capacity, and the
opportunity to process the presented information determines the elaboration route. For example, noise in
the place where a person gets the persuasive message makes them distracted from thorough information
analysis and here the peripheral cues can be used in the process of persuasion (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016;
Buchanan et al., 2007; Van Lange et al., 2011). The schematic depiction of the model is shown in Figure
4.
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Figure 4: The Elaboration Likelihood Model, Source: (Van Lange et al., 2011)

On the continuum elaboration scale, processing at the low end corresponds to using peripheral
elaboration which involves less cognitive effort, while at its high end, it indicates a central elaboration with
more cognitive effort (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016; Buchanan et al., 2007).
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ELM has been applied to many fields including advertising, politics, and e-commerce. In the
context of privacy in mobile applications, this model can be applied to examine how the design of the app
user interface can influence users to engage in more or less revealing behavior. Put it differently; this model
might help to explore how the app setting, in general, can have effective persuasion elements to create an
attitude change about privacy-related concerns and decisions.
Table 2 shows the five theories mentioned in this section with the corresponding papers that use
them.
Table 2: Theories with the Corresponding Articles
Theory

Articles

Privacy Calculus

(Dogruel et al., 2017;
Pentina et al., 2016;
Nguyen et al., 2016;
Keith et al., 2013;
Knijnenburg et al., 2013).

Technology Acceptance Model

(Nel & Boshoff, 2017;
Pentina et al., 2016;
Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015)

Psychological Contract Theory

(Nguyen et al., 2016;
Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015)

Uses and Gratification Theory

(Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015;
Lindqvist et al., 2011)

Elaboration Likelihood Model

(Nel & Boshoff, 2017;
Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016)

3.2

Experimental Designs
With the need to design and evaluate mobile interactions in realistic environments comes the need

to select the proper conditions, scenarios, and research methods that serve the study goals. The research
methods employed in the reviewed papers vary considerably from using less complex methods such as a
survey to more complex ones such as implementing a field or “in-situ”3 experiment. The papers are broadly
categorized into five groups: experimental-based, survey-based, design science, case study, and thinkaloud. The pros and cons of each research method are briefly discussed next.

3

In-Situ is ‘on site’ Latin word which means the experiment is conducted in the natural or the original settings of the topic being
examined.
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3.2.1

Experimental research
The experimental research aims to identify the causal relationship between an independent variable

and a dependent variable. Three key components that define an experiment are treatments (conditions),
units (human subjects), and the assignment method (Lazar et al., 2010). The treatments refer to the different
techniques or procedures that the researcher wants to compare. Human subjects are the participants to whom
the researcher applies the treatments. The assignment method refers to how the subjects are assigned to the
experimental treatments (e.g., randomly). Experimental research could be implemented in laboratory
settings, online settings, or in real-world conditions. Articles adopting an experimental approach are
presented in the corresponding sections that follow next.

3.2.1.1 Laboratory experiment
A laboratory experiment is when the researcher applies the three principles of conducting
experimental research by inviting the participants to a lab and giving them instructions and tasks to perform
in a controlled setting.
Four of the reviewed papers on the topic of privacy in mobile apps chose to use the lab experiment
method (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016; Van Kleek et al., 2017; Kelley et al., 2013; Harbach et al., 2014).
The work of (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016) aims to understand whether education materials about mobile
security designed with visual-textual interactions are persuasive to improve user behavior. In (Van Kleek
et al., 2017; Kelley et al., 2013; Harbach et al., 2014), the subjects were asked to role-play selecting
applications using a simulated app store displayed in a survey-like instrument in (Van Kleek et al., 2017),
while in (Kelley et al., 2013; Harbach et al., 2014) the participants used actual cell phones to make their
selections. Employing smartphones as a part of an experiment investigating mobile apps increases the
ecological validity of the study. Mainly, these three studies try to answer research questions about the effect
of app transparency tools and app permissions display on user privacy-related decisions. Laboratory
experiment studies are summarized in Table 3.
Laboratory experiment provides the researchers with more control over the factors that might
intervene with the ones under investigation. However, experimenting in a lab might reduce the
generalizability of the outcomes due to the abnormal conditions where the experiment takes its place.

3.2.1.2 Online experiment
An online experiment, as its name implies, is when the researcher applies the three principles of
conducting experimental research online by inviting the participants to a webpage that presents the
conditions and measures. Using online platforms to run an experiment facilitates executing and monitoring
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the study by reaching a large number of subjects. However, the conditions of the study are often unrealistic
because an online experiment in the context of mobile applications often does not have a real executing app
and uses screenshots of the app instead to test particular hypotheses. Thus, the study outcomes of online
experiments lack a plausible level of ecological validity.
Table 3: Laboratory Experiment Studies
Paper

Research Questions/ Goals

Main Results

(Zhang-

Implementing and evaluating interactive comics

Comics improve understanding and motivate

Kennedy et al.,

addressing security topics based on persuasive

positive changes in security management behavior.

2016)

Principles.

(Van Kleek et

Whether revealing key data collection practices of

The privacy indicators do support people in

al., 2017)

smartphone apps may help people make more

making more confident and consistent choices,

informed privacy-related decisions.

informed by a more diverse range of factors,
including the number and nature of third-party
companies that
access users’ data.

(Kelley et al.,

How permissions and privacy could play a more active

By bringing app privacy information to the user

2013)

role in app-selection decisions.

when they were making the decision we could
assist users in choosing applications that request
fewer permissions.

(Harbach et al.,

Leveraging the rich set of personal data available on

Participants made more privacy-conscious choices

2014)

smartphones to communicate risks using personalized

when deciding which apps to install.

examples.

Several of the analyzed research efforts opt for this approach regardless of the previously
mentioned shortcomings. Estimating the value of perceived privacy for mobile users and their willingness
to grant privacy-related permissions for apps is investigated in (Dogruel et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2016;
Kelley et al., 2013; Tan et al., 2014). Comparing two permission interfaces of Android mobile system is
examined in (Moore et al., 2019). Identifying the factors that affect the severity of privacy breach perception
is examined in (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015). Examining the role of service personalization on user
engagement is analyzed in (Chen & Sundar, 2018). Eliciting user expectations about mobile resources use
by apps is the topic of (Micinski et al., 2017). Finding out how users set their location sharing preferences
is the research question of (Knijnenburg et al., 2013). In (Chang et al., 2016), the experiment aims to show
how the sharing norms can be altered by exposing the users to certain content. All of the preceding articles
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employed an online experimental method where the manipulations often take the form of exposing the
participants to hypothetical scenarios, screenshots of apps, or specific video contents. The interesting study
in this category is the work of (Keith et al., 2013), where the researchers ask the participants to use their
own mobile devices to reach an HTML-5 (web-based not a native app). The task is to customize the privacy
app features according to user preferences. The creative parts of this study are using an app that is seemingly
real and examining actual disclosure of private data such as personal information, social network accounts,
and sensor data such as a location that is commonly stored in their mobile devices. All of the studies that
use online experiments are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Online Experiment Studies
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

(Moore et al.,

Comparing the two permission interfaces of Android

Android 6 permission interface is recommended to

2019)

system.

help users learn the definition of each permission
while Android 5 permission interface is better in
identifying them.

(Chen &

Exploration of the role of personalization services and

Overt personalization positively affects perceived

Sundar, 2018)

information

control.

transparency

in

enhancing

user

engagements.

Perceived information transparency positively
promotes trust which negatively affects privacy
concerns and positively affects user product
involvement.

(Dogruel et al.,

Examining the impact of privacy defaults and expert

Compared to other app features, users highly value

2017)

recommendations on smartphone users' willingness to

privacy options.

pay

for

“privacy-enhanced”

features

on

paid

applications.
(Nguyen et al.,

How people value smartphone privacy protection.

2016)

Respondents were willing to make non-trivial
sacrifices for smartphone privacy protection.
Specifying the identity of an attacker collecting
information decreased the value of privacy
protection compared to not specifying the identity
of the attacker.

(Kelley et al.,

How permissions and privacy could play a more active

By bringing app privacy information to the user

2013)

role in app-selection decisions.

when they were making the decision we could
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assist users in choosing applications that request
fewer permissions.
(Tan

et

al.,

2014)

Examining how using strings of text to explain to the

Permission requests that include explanations are

user why access to the resource is needed affects

significantly more likely to be approved.

her/his behavior.
(Mamonov

&

Benbunan-

Examining factors affecting perceptions of privacy

Privacy breach perceptions vary according to the

breach among smartphone application users.

characteristics of the breach.

Fich, 2015)

Perceptions of misappropriation of financial
information are more distressing than perceived
misuse of geo-location data.

(Micinski et al.,

How different interactions with the UI affect users’

User interactions such as button clicks can be

2017)

expectations about whether an app accesses sensitive

interpreted as authorization, reducing the need for

resources.

separate requests.
Accesses which not directly tied to user
interactions should be separately authorized.

(Knijnenburg et

Evaluating the effectiveness of personalized security

Deployment of personalized security indicators

al., 2013)

indicators in the context of mobile applications.

decreased the phishing attack success rate.

(Chang et al.,

Testing the impact of norm-shaping design patterns on

A set of images change subjects’ personal views of

2016)

information divulging behavior.

appropriate information to share.
The shifts in perceptions significantly increase the
probability that a subject divulges personal
information.

(Keith et al.,

Proposing and testing a more realistic experimental

Only

a

weak

relationship

exists

between

2013)

methodology designed to replicate real perceptions of

information disclosure intentions and actual

privacy risk and capture the effects of actual

disclosure.

information disclosure decisions.

The relationship between information disclosure
intentions and actual disclosure is heavily
moderated by the consumer practice of disclosing
false data.

3.2.1.3 Field experiment
A field experiment is when the researcher applies the three principles of conducting experimental
research in-situ and often over a certain period of time. The main advantage of using such an approach is
that studying the problem in its naturally occurring settings increases the extent to which the study outcomes
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could be applied. Nevertheless, real-world settings are complex, and thus clear and precise results attained
from field experiments are always questionable due to the confounding factors that might affect the final
results.
For the reviewed papers, the period of the in-situ studies varies from only two days up to four
weeks. The procedure often involves the participants using their phones and either accomplish certain tasks
using a specific app and provide self-reports about the experience of using the app or monitoring
participants’ interactions with the app via deploying an app server that records logs for each participant to
be analyzed later. In app-permissions, (Almuhimedi et al., 2015) explores how and why users restrict
permissions for a given app while (Ismail et al., 2015) conducting a field experiment to find the optimal set
of app permissions that strikes an acceptable balance between app usability and user privacy preferences.
In Henke et al. (2018), the authors examine the decision-making process while downloading apps by
conducting a field experiment where participants used their own devices. In location-based services, two
studies examine the users’ concerns toward sharing location data with apps (Shih et al., 2015) or with
advertisers (Kelley et al., 2011). In changing privacy-related behavior, (Tsai et al., 2009; Almuhimedi et
al., 2015; Patil et al., 2015) ran a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of use feedback and nudges
mechanisms in user disclosure behavior. The field experiment of (Turner et al., 2019) examines the impact
of concurrent mobile notifications on user behavior. Another field experiment by (Patil et al., 2014) aims
to unpack the discrepancies users have between their in-situ choices and their pre-configured location
sharing settings. In reducing phishing incidents, (Marforio et al., 2016) examines the effectiveness of
personalized indicators to protect user privacy better using field experiment as well. In accurately assessing
user’s security awareness, the work of (Bitton et al., 2020) shows how to develop a framework from
behavioral data. From a design perspective, the work of (Iachello & Abowd, 2008) uses a field study to
propose a design method for designing an application that balances the benefits of the involved stakeholders
with the impact on their privacy. The field experiment studies are presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Field Experiment Studies
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

(Bitton et al.,

To accurately evaluate user’s security awareness in SE

Using both self-reported and behavioral data, the

2020)

attacks.

framework was able to generate an awareness
score that is highly correlated with the user’s
ability to mitigate SE attacks.

(Turner et al.,

To analyze how users respond to concurrent apps

The concurrent apps-notifications is existed and

2019)

notifications.

formed a stack of notifications that need to be
reviewed by the users.
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The arrival and presence of notifications can have
both positive and negative behavioral effects.
(Visuri et al.,

To understand how a user interacts with app

Users habitually ignore or dismiss app notifications

2019)

notifications and build a prediction model for

regardless of their perceived importance.

acknowledging upcoming notifications.

Automatically detecting unwanted notifications
should consider contextual sensing and notification
content.

(Henke et al.,

To understand how users process privacy information

privacy attitude in app download processes

2018)

while deciding which app to download

influences the usage of number as well as the type
of app permissions as decisional cues.

(Almuhimedi et

To evaluate the benefits of giving users an app

The two approaches are complementary and can

al., 2015)

permission manager and of sending them nudges about

each play a significant role in empowering users to

data collected by their apps.

control their privacy more effectively.

(Ismail et al.,

Finding the minimal sets of permissions that will

Usability scores for diverse users can be predicted

2015)

preserve the usability of the app for diverse users.

accurately, enabling suitable recommendations.

Understanding

Participants were more willing to disclose data

(Shih

et

al.,

2015)

what

affects

people’s

privacy

preferences in smartphone apps.

when no purpose was specified.
When a vague purpose was shown, participants
became more privacy-aware and were less willing
to disclose their information.

(Kelley et al.,

Whether or not users will adopt products involving a

Users have significant privacy concerns regarding

2011)

potentially invasive form of advertising and what sorts

sharing their locations with advertisers.

of protection should be given to users.
Users feel more comfortable and share more
information than with a simple opt-in/opt-out
mechanism.
(Tsai

et

al.,

2009)

Investigating feedback in the context of a mobile

Feedback is an important contributing factor

location sharing system.

towards improving user comfort levels and
allaying privacy concerns.

(Patil
2015)

et

al.,

Examining how feedback messages regarding accesses

The sense of privacy violation was heightened

to a physical user location affect user privacy concerns

when feedback was immediate, but not actionable.
Moderate delay feedback serves as a compromise
to minimize interruption and avoid an overly
alarming reaction to immediate feedback.
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(Marforio et al.,

Evaluating the effectiveness of personalized security

Deployment of personalized security indicators

2016)

indicators in the context of mobile applications.

decreased the phishing attack success rate.

Developing

Proportionality

Different design methods for privacy highlight

Method, a design method intended to aid HCI

different sets of issues and a combination of

practitioners in designing IT applications with complex

methods should be employed in a comprehensive

privacy implications.

design process.

Exploring the contextual factors that contribute to

Providing immediate feedback messages about the

creating the mismatches between user contextual

disclosure evokes a sense of oversharing and

choices and her/his location sharing settings.

contributes to creating the discrepancies. Delaying

(Iachello

&

Abowd, 2008)

(Patil
2014)

et

al.,

and

evaluating

the

the message and make it more actionable gives the
user control over location sharing decisions, and
thus increases sharing.

3.2.2

Survey-based research
A survey-based study consists of a well-defined and well-written set of questions administered to

a sample of participants. Several papers deploy surveys to collect data from users for various purposes. In
(Fodor & Brem, 2015; Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015; Patil et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2012; Wang & Lin,
2017), the survey instrument was used to examine how the perceived privacy concerns affect location-based
services adoption and use, and what other factors motivate people to share their locations. To obtain
participants’ privacy preferences, (Watson et al., 2015) used an online survey to investigate factors that
reduce the gap between the default settings and user privacy preferences. To examine the impact of context
on privacy concerns, (Ebert et al., 2020) used an online survey, and to study the effect of contextual cues,
the work of (Sundar et al., 2020) utilized an online survey to elicit user’s disclosure’s intention. The survey
was used as well in two other studies (Bergström, 2015; Henne et al., 2013) to broadly examine the sharing
behavior of private information in different contexts. It was also used in (Di Geronimo et al., 2020) to assess
user perception toward manipulative app interfaces. The survey in (Benenson et al., 2013) was deployed to
look at the differences in privacy-related attitudes and behavior between Android and iOS users. In
(Shklovski et al., 2014), the research question that the survey tries to address was whether a change in
downloading app behavior occurs after confronting the participants with leakage behavior of some apps.
The main benefit of choosing surveys as a data collection tool is its accessibility to a large number
of people at a relatively low cost. However, the main drawback of using surveys is the quality of the data
derived from them. Often, surveys provide researchers with high-level or aggregated data that makes it an
inappropriate tool for studying complex phenomena that need more in-depth data beyond simple
descriptions. To overcome this limitation, some studies like (Shklovski et al., 2014; Lindqvist et al., 2011)
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combined their privacy-related surveys with interviews to gain more insights about the topic. Also, survey
questions may be subject to misinterpretation depending on how the questions are designed and asked and
that makes it less suitable for participants whose backgrounds are diverse (Lazar et al., 2010). The surveybased studies are listed in Table 6.
Table 6: Survey-based Studies
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

Sundar et al.,

Understanding the mechanism of the contextual cues’

Interface cues are likely to be more successful in

2020)

effects on disclosure intentions.

influencing privacy decisions in the contexts that
are not suffused with competing cues.

(Ebert et al.,

Examining the effect of the context on privacy

Privacy concerns and information preferences are

2020)

communication.

only partially dependent on context.
It shows support to the hierarchy of privacy
concerns.

(Di Geronimo

Examining user perception towards Dark Patterns in

95% of the analyzed app contain one or more Dark

et al., 2020)

mobile apps.

Patterns.
Most of the time users could not perceive the
presence of malicious design.

(Fodor &

If, and how privacy concerns influence the adoption of

Privacy concerns have an impact on the behavioral

Brem, 2015)

LBSs.

intentions of users for LBS adoption.

(Beldad &

Examining the factors that influence the use of LBSs.

The use of LBSs is influenced by the benefits of

Kusumadewi,

using the app (impression management and

2015)

entertainment) and competence-based trust in LBS
and their trust in their LBS network members.
The impact of social influence on LBS use is
significant.

(Patil et al.,

Investigating the motivations, and practices of LSS

The main motivations for location sharing were to

2012)

users.

connect with one’s social circle, to project an
interesting image of oneself, and to receive rewards
offered for “checking in.”

(Tang et al.,

Exploring how different configuration styles affect

Location-sharing applications that support varying

2012)

users’ sharing preferences

levels of location granularities are associated with
less convoluted sharing rules, less likely to be
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negatively phrased, and can lead to more open
sharing.
(Wang & Lin,

Examining the effects of consumer quality perceptions

Information quality, system quality, and service

2017)

on their trust in LBSs.

quality were positively related to the perceived
trust. The perceived trust also correlated negatively
with perceived privacy risk, but positively with
continued usage intention.

(Watson et al.,

Investigating whether default privacy settings could

Using audience characterizations from community

2015)

be more customized to the preferences of users.

data to create default privacy settings can better
match user desired privacy settings.

(Bergström,

How privacy concerns are perceived in different

Privacy concerns as being very diverse and

2015)

online contexts.

dependent on the applications in question.

(Henne et al.,

Revisiting the discussion on location privacy is not a

Location was rated as the type of photo metadata

2013)

relevant problem for today’s users.

that poses the highest risk to privacy.

(Benenson et

Comparison of Android and iOS users.

Having an Android phone is positively correlated

al., 2013)

with being more privacy-aware.
Having an Android phone is positively correlated
with being more security-aware.

(Shklovski et

Investigating how smartphone users feel about data

Users felt their personal space had been violated

al., 2014)

access on their phones.

in “creepy” ways.

(Lindqvist et

How

location-sharing

Elements of fun, exploration, and coordinating

al., 2011)

applications, as well as how they manage their privacy.

with friends are among the main reasons why

and

why

people

use

people use location-sharing applications.
Some people choose not to check-in to a place as a
privacy protection measure.
(Pentina et al.,

Proposing and testing a conceptual model of private-

Mobile app users download apps that require

2016)

information sensitive mobile app adoption.

access to sensitive personal information to satisfy
their

informational

and

social

(but

not

entertainment) needs.
Perceived privacy concern does not influence
adoption or future use of private-information
sensitive apps.
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3.2.3

Design science research
In this category of papers, the final result of the study is designing security-enhancing mechanisms

that help users safeguard their privacy or designing guidelines to help HCI practitioners. In (Hung et al.,
2015), PasDroid is a tool developed for Android users to reveal the information flow of private data and
enable users to stop potential data leakages. For third-party applications, LoPSiL is a location-based policy
specification language proposed by the authors of (Finnis et al., 2012) to allow users to enforce their defined
policies on such applications and restrict their access to location data. The other category of design science
research is as in the work of (Renaud & Zimmermann, 2018), where the authors developed initial guidelines
for the ethical use of nudges that aim to influence users’ behavior. These guidelines help interface designers
in how to apply such a mechanism and in which context. To the same goal, the authors of (Caraban et al.,
2019) review the technology-mediated nudging literature to provide an understanding of the nudge’s
effectiveness and their ethical implications. More details about these studies are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Design Science Research
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

(Caraban et al.,

Analyzing the literature to understand why and how

Identifying 23 distinct mechanisms of nudging,

2019)

nudges affect user behavior.

grouped in 6 overall categories, and leveraging 15
different cognitive biases.

(Renaud &

Developing guidelines for using nudges by reviewing

Providing ethical guidelines for using nudges in

Zimmermann,

the principles used in psychological research.

designing interfaces that can be used by designer

2018)

and ethics review boards as well.

(Hung et al.,

Proposing mechanisms to track the use of sensitive

PasDroid can be deployed with an affordable

2015)

information by Android applications.

runtime overhead to help protect users against
malicious applications.

(Finnis et al.,

Implementing LoPSiL, a location-based policy-

2012)

specification language to ensure that downloaded

LoPSiL is found to be expressive and efficient.

mobile applications do not act maliciously.

3.2.4

Case studies
Case study research is when the researchers investigate in-depth a small set of instances within a

specific real-life context (Lazar et al., 2010). The goal of using case studies is to obtain a deep and narrow
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understanding of a given phenomenon. Focusing on a small set of cases often unveils details that are likely
to go unnoticed by other research methods.
Among the reviewed articles, (Gasson et al., 2011) is the only paper that employed case studies as
a research method in the context of privacy in mobile apps. The authors of the article studied four
participants who were tracked via GPS-enabled mobile phones for six weeks and their locations were kept
for further data mining. The study aims to create simple behavior profiles by examining to what extent other
private information about the participants can be derived from location data. The main conclusion of this
study is given in Table 8.
One of the advantages of using case studies as a research tool is that it needs only a few participants
(possibly as few as one). However, digging deep into concrete cases does not provide generalizable results
and this limitation makes case studies not a preferable option for some research.
Table 8: Case Study Research
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

(Barkhuus,

Profiling people based on the places they visit.

An enormous amount of information about the

2012)

individual is buried in the data available from
persistently tracking people.

3.2.5

Secondary data analysis
Secondary data analysis as a research method presented here is a study that involves analyzing

already collected data either new data that has not been studied before or data borrowed from other studies
used to answer different research questions. Both types require no direct contact with human subjects.
The first type of analysis uses new data as presented in the study of (Wang et al., 2016). The authors
analyzed enormous location-based questions posted on microblogs to better understand user behavior of
asking such questions. For a different purpose, the authors of (Alharbi et al., 2014) analyzed more than 4k
Android apps to check the inconsistencies between the apps’ public features and the code features that are
related to user privacy. Similarly, the work of (Tan et al., 2014) analyzed more than 4k Android apps to
examine the adoption rate by app developers of using purpose string in the permission request which
explains to the user why access to a mobile resource is needed. In notification design, the authors of (Zou
et al., 2019) analyzed 161 data breach notifications sent to consumers to assess the notifications’
effectiveness.
The second type of analysis uses data that has been collected and analyzed before for other
purposes. In this case, the researcher needs no data collecting instruments but focuses on testing new
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hypotheses using data obtained from other studies. The authors of (Kisekka et al., 2013) employed this
strategy by using online survey data collected by Pew Internet & American Life Project to examine the
factors that influence the extent of personal information disclosure by smartphone users. Also, the work of
(Barkhuus, 2012) uses this method as well to frame and discuss the notion of privacy as it is presented in
HCI studies. More details about these studies are given in Table 9.
It is worth noting that some of the reviewed articles combine data analysis method with an interview
to obtain more details about the issue being addressed such as in (Barkhuus, 2012; Wang et al., 2016).
Table 9: Data Analysis Studies
Paper

Research Questions

(Zou et al.,

Analyzing

2019)

notifications.

the

effectiveness

Main Results
of

data

breach

Most of the notifications are lengthy, requires
reading skills, and provide little information about
action’s urgency which negatively affects users’
protective decisions.
Recommendations for designing more usable and
informative data breach notifications.

(Wang et al.,

Analyzing what people, ask, why they ask, and the

Spatial restriction, subjectivity, interactivity, and

2016)

context when asking location-based questions.

propagation are the main motives to ask questions
based on people’s locations.

(Alharbi et al.,

Automatically identify inconsistencies in Android

The promise of applying comprehensive and

2014)

apps.

automated analysis techniques on Android apps.

(Tan et al.,

Examining how app developers are using purpose

The adoption rate of this feature by developers is

2014)

string in the permission request.

relatively small.

(Kisekka et al.,

Investigating the factors that influence the extent of

Use of smartphones to access the social networking

2013)

private information disclosure of Facebook mobile

app, the use of multiple social networks, and being

phone users.

female

decrease

the

likelihood

of

private

information disclosure.
Investigating the differential impact of age on

Usability problems increase the likelihood of

the extent of private information disclosure.

information disclosure by older adults.

(Barkhuus,

How HCI studies have approached the notion of

Privacy concerns are not easily measurable.

2012)

privacy, often as a quantifiable concept.

The articulated privacy concerns were less visible
among the participants.

33

3.2.6

Think-aloud research
Two of the examined studies (Baarslag et al., 2016; Angulo et al., 2015) used the think-aloud

protocol to gather data. Think-aloud is a technique to assess higher-level thinking processes that ask the
participants to talk out loud while performing a given task. The participant’s verbal report is then recorded
for further analysis. This technique is mainly used for usability testing; however, it might be employed for
various research goals. In (Baarslag et al., 2016), the think-aloud protocol was used to examine user
interaction with interface featuring a negotiation strategy for setting app permissions, while in (Angulo et
al., 2015) the protocol was used to evaluate the usefulness of visualizations embedded in Data Track (a
transparency app).
Although it is an effective research tool to elicit user thoughts particularly during privacy-related
decisions, making the requirement to think out loud might create unnatural settings for the users and affects
the validity of the results. Some people are not familiar with verbalizing their thoughts while they are
working on a task. That occurs partially due to the individual or cultural differences between the
participants.

To support the inferences derived from think-aloud data, other research methods are

recommended to be combined with the protocol such as a follow-up interview or an exit survey. The main
results of think-aloud studies are given in Table 10.
Table 10: Think-aloud Studies
Paper

Research Questions

Main Results

(Baarslag et al.,

What happens when permission settings are more

Negotiating consent results in higher user

2016)

discretional at install time.

satisfaction than the typical take-it-or-leave-it
setting.

(Angulo et al.,

Evaluating the effectiveness of a transparency tool

There is a critical need for increased transparency

2015)

consisting of tracing lines that connect a user disclosed

of the data collected implicitly or inferred from the

personal attributes to the service to which these

analysis.

attributes have been disclosed.

3.2.7

Multiple methods

As each single research method is inherently limited, researchers often apply more than one method
to overcome the limitations any single one has. When the selected methods yield different kinds of data
(qualitative and quantitative), the researchers achieve the concept of “data triangulation.” Because they mix
two kinds of data, they would be able to explain the problem under focus from various standpoints.
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A number of the reviewed articles take ‘multiple methods’ research direction to provide richer
conclusions about the topic being addressed. For example, an interview is integrated with a field experiment
in (Marforio et al., 2016; Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Patil et al., 2015; Patil et al., 2014), is used with
Questionnaire (set of questions) in (Shklovski et al., 2014; Lindqvist et al., 2011), is mixed with data
analysis in (Barkhuus, 2012; Wang et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016), and it is used with lab study in (ZhangKennedy et al., 2016; Van Kleek et al., 2017).
In (Van Kleek et al., 2017; Harbach et al., 2014), the think-aloud protocol is mixed with a laboratory
experiment, and in (Tang et al., 2012) is mixed with the survey.

3.3

Challenges for the Study of User Privacy Concerns
In general, examining privacy-related issues in mobile app use requires a research plan chosen and

designed carefully to precisely address the research questions to increase the validity of the study outcomes.
It is quite a challenge to conduct a study on this topic because first, we need to examine user behavior in
real conditions, which can hardly be mimicked through survey questions or lab conditions. At the same
time, we need to avoid drawing participants’ attention to the security aspects under evaluation to grasp
more realistic interactions.
Second, we need to examine user privacy-related decisions regarding their real private data, not
fictitious ones, or based on hypothetical scenarios. We need to create a situation where the user can decide
what type of her/his real personal data to share.
Third, privacy attitudes and behavior are difficult to define and measure. Although many privacy
measures have been developed (see Appendix A for more details), they are for recording user stated
preferences, not her/his actual decisions. It is relatively easy to ask people about their intentions to disclose
private information; however, catching their actual revealing behavior is rather complex.
In the following, additional challenges of privacy studies are presented.

3.3.1

Privacy is a contextualized issue
People differ widely in their perception of privacy and in their tendency to disclose personal

information. Therefore, privacy is a highly subjective topic, and there is no ground truth for the level of
privacy that should be maintained (Pennekamp et al., 2017). Furthermore, each person has various personas
with dissimilar privacy attitudes and behaves according to the situation (Ebert et al., 2020; Sundar et al.,
2020; Watson et al., 2015; Iachello & Hong, 2007; Shklovski et al., 2014; Bettini & Riboni, 2015; Patil et
al., 2015). For instance, a piece of information that is socially admissible to share in a social network app
is not necessarily socially admissible for a health app or a game. These various, sometimes conflicting,
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situational roles of a person are hardly captured and modeled. The contextual factors explain the
discrepancy that often occurs between user contextual choices and her/his pre-specified sharing rules (Patil
et al., 2014). Hence, the design of interactive applications capable of understanding user behavior and align
with their ‘contextual’ privacy preferences is challenging (Watson et al., 2015). Interestingly, privacy
perception often adapts to changing social norms, such that privacy attitudes are not static and expected to
shift over time. This asserts the complexity of precisely defining privacy concerns and the highly contextdependent of information disclosure behavior (Shih et al., 2015; Barkhuus, 2012; Tsai et al., 2009).
Concealing or disclosing private information is a highly contextualized decision; therefore, if the context is
ignored, questions over the generalizability of specific results of a certain context are valid.

3.3.2

Methodological challenge: realism vs. experimentation
How to capture user privacy concerns is a challenge faced by HCI practitioners. Privacy-related

concerns and behavior are not easily measurable because it is difficult to implement a real data sharing
system to examine definite hypotheses about user privacy. Consequently, much of the research within the
field use system/app prototypes (incomplete version) to evaluate particular premises (Barkhuus, 2012).
However, the problem with using merely prototypes to assess privacy-related issues is the complicated
nature of privacy itself. Regardless of the details in prototype design and the characteristics of the user
sample, each app session is unique for the users, and each privacy-related decision is decided within a
certain context. System/app prototype is a useful tool to receive early preferences for potential data sharing.
However, it is possible to draw invalid conclusions about long-term usage as using prototypes does not
have a grounding long-term usage. In other words, using prototypes provides only a snapshot in time about
potential user behavior (Barkhuus, 2012; Iachello & Hong, 2007). Therefore, to examine privacy-related
hypotheses, the employed research method should be appropriately selected and designed.

3.3.3

Other challenges
In addition to the previously mentioned challenges, other aspects of privacy that contribute to its

complexity: conceptual, design, and interdisciplinary challenges.
Conceptually, privacy can be hard to rationalize. If you were able to use certain methods to
understand what privacy issues concerning a user, you might face the privacy paradox phenomenon in their
behavior (inconsistency between stated concerns and actual behavior). The ambiguity in privacy definition
makes the behavior of individuals unpredictable (Watson et al., 2015). Few studies are deploying welldefined methods to anticipate people’s privacy preferences necessary to be embedded in systems (Iachello
& Hong, 2007).
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From a design perspective, there are no obvious guidelines about what level of privacy a system
should offer to gain a wide-scale adoption. Therefore, no end-to-end solution exists to build a system/ app
that respects individual privacy. Although data protection legislation such as US Privacy Act and EU
General Data Protection Regulation are well developed to grant individuals their right to information
privacy, turning these high-level frameworks into actionable design solutions is yet a challenge (Iachello &
Hong, 2007).
Besides, approaching the topic of individual information privacy involves being familiar, to some
extent, with various areas of research because privacy literature is scattered throughout multiple disciplines,
including law, computer science, marketing, social science, and management of information systems. It is
hard for any discipline to claim ownership of information privacy topic. Thus, it is a daunting task for HCI
researchers who want to examine all the information privacy-related issues due to the diversity of the
research domain (Smith et al., 2011).
This chapter shows that no particular theories or research methods are applied to answer research
questions related to privacy. Each context is unique, and therefore, it needs careful analysis to find the
appropriate theories on which the research could lean and find the proper research method that could
contribute to expanding our knowledge in such an area. The more research methods employed, the more
credibility and validity of the results.
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Chapter 4: Discussion of Literature Review Findings
This chapter begins with an overview of the motives influencing users to adopt a mobile app. Then,
to set a comprehensive view of privacy in mobile apps, the results of the reviewed articles are classified
into two subsections: user and designer. The former section analyzes results about how user characteristics,
the general understanding of mobile app privacy, and the individual’s perception of privacy breach affect
the resultant behavior. The latter section is concerned with results discussing the implications of app design
components on user privacy-related behavior both at app installation and app usage time.

4.1

Motivations for Adopting Mobile Applications
Before the developer embarks on the implementation of a mobile app, s/he should first consider

what needs are satisfied by apps that require access to personal information. Being aware of general user
motivations assists in adjusting the app design to fit these needs and subsequently promotes its adoption.
The adoption of apps that require permission to access user location, camera, address book, social
media contacts, etc. is broadly influenced by informational and social needs and not by entertainmentrelated benefits (Pentina et al., 2016; Patil et al., 2012; Lindqvist et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016; Tang et
al., 2012). However, this result is partially in conflict with the work of (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015).
According to their conclusion, entertainment-related and not informational-related benefits have their
significant impact on downloading and using location-based services (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015). This
conflict could be attributed in part to the cultural characteristics of the samples employed in the two groups
of studies. While most of the studies used either the US or Chinese sample, (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015)
uniquely used students from 6 universities in Indonesia.
Another key characteristic that people value for choosing an app is when it offers a platform for
impression management (self-presentation). This feature is present in social network apps where users share
their personal information to craft an image and create a personal brand about who they are (Patil et al.,
2012; Lindqvist et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2016). Because personal information disclosure is prevalent in
this kind of apps, embedding location services in the social-context app would promote more information
sharing of location. This disclosure would be motivated by needs that are often satisfied by using the two
types of apps, social network, and location-based services (Tang et al., 2012).
Additionally, another factor that determines the adoption of new apps is the advice and opinions of
others (e.g., friends or influential people). It has been shown that the opinions of one’s peers have a
significant impact on user’s behavior, either deciding to adopt the new app or to continue using it (Tsai et
al., 2009).
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Paid apps are more likely to have a higher adoption rate compared to the free ones as they have no
advertising libraries that often increase the number of resources requested by the app (Tan et al., 2014).

4.2

End User

4.2.1

Individual characteristics
Although privacy concern levels about unwanted disclosure of personal data are universally high,

users have different privacy concerns, particularly for information that is considered less sensitive. Hence,
do the unique characteristics of a user such as personality traits, age, cultural and political background have
an impact on differentiating information disclosure levels between individuals? Understanding the human
factor is a crucial part of any HCI research and specifically in our attempt to understand the nature of
interaction that occurs between the user and the mobile app concerning data disclosure.
Although particular personality attributes, specifically extraversion and agreeableness4, play a role
in heightening the perceived benefits obtained from using a mobile app without consideration of user
cultural or national environment, they lack a significant impact on the perceived privacy concern, as stated
in (Pentina et al., 2016). The work of (Pentina et al., 2016) examines the personality differences between
Chinese and American participants and concludes that the personality aspects have no obvious association
with revealing behavior. However, those who are risk-takers (a characteristic of their personality is highrisk propensity) were found to exhibit low levels of concern for information privacy (Wang & Lin, 2017).
Moreover, trust propensity (in others) was found to be an essential factor explaining privacy concerns
among people using digital media and applications. People with high trust in others express lower concerns
for the misuse of their personal information than those with lower trust. The more people trust others, the
less privacy concern they have when using applications (Bergström, 2015).
Concerning user age, Kisekka et al. (2013) and Keith et al. (2013) found that there is no significant
difference between older and younger mobile users concerning their decision to disclose personal
information. However, older users often tend to make non-trivial sacrifices regarding mobile performance
for gaining mobile privacy. They prefer an encrypted smartphone to a regular one even if the former one
has a longer processing time (slow speed) (Nguyen et al., 2016). Another difference between the two
segments of people is that the app usability affects their disclosure attitude differently. When the app has
usability problems, older adults become unable to control their privacy and, thus, disclose more (Kisekka
et al., 2013).
Another potential factor influencing the attitude towards mobile privacy is the cultural and political
background of individuals. National culture is associated with differences in information privacy behavior,

4

Big Five personality traits is a model commonly used to describe people personalities and categorize them in more broad
dimensions namely: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism.
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as confirmed in (Henne et al., 2013; Wang & Lin, 2017). For instance, American and Indian users vary in
their attitudes toward divulging location data. While Indian people are often less privacy concerned and
more comfortable sharing street-level location data, US people exhibit higher privacy concerns and often
restrict the granularity of location information to only city-level data (Henne et al., 2013). Regrading
political orientation, although the self-identified liberals often express higher concerns towards information
privacy, particularly in the area of social networking sites and m-commerce compared to conservative
people, the latter are more willing to pay for privacy-protected measures (Nguyen et al., 2016; Bergström,
2015). For instance, the work of (Nguyen et al., 2016) shows that users at the right of the political spectrum
(right-oriented) are more likely to pay for encrypted smartphones compared to those at the other extreme
(left-oriented). Moreover, conforming to social norms shapes an individual decision to reveal or conceal
personal information. However, users vary in the degree of compliance with these social rules according to
their community structure. The societal structure of the community influences user privacy-related
behavior. People who come from highly collectivistic countries tend to comply stronger than those who
come from highly individualistic countries (Beldad & Kusumadewi, 2015).
Specific to the context of social network apps, it has also been shown that people tend to share
more personal information when they use only one social network account. An increase in social network
involvement (having more than one account) has no impact on increased disclosing behavior (Kisekka et
al., 2013).
Another study also compared individualistic differences between Android and iOS users towards
mobile privacy. According to (Benenson et al., 2013), iOS users exhibit more trust in the app compared to
Android users, who are more likely to have a virus scanner app installed on their smartphones. As a result,
iOS users are found to be more comfortable with real-time location sharing.
From these findings, the designers of mobile apps should take into consideration the general
characteristics of the potential audience of their products and build them accordingly.

4.2.2

General mobile privacy understanding
Typically, people have little comprehension of the intrinsic value of the information they are asked

to provide or the cost of sharing such data. Very few people consider terms of service (TOS) or a privacy
policy that often accompanies other information about the app shown on the downloading page. Several
studies such as (Ebert et al., 2020; Shklovski et al., 2014; Hung et al., 2015; Benenson et al., 2013; Kelley
et al., 2013; Van Kleek et al., 2017; Harbach et al., 2014) have shown that most smartphone users know
little about when, how, and what information is being accessed by the installed apps. Although app
permissions in Android are listed on the downloading page before users decide to download, people have
a poor understanding of their meaning and often disregard these permissions (Moore et al., 2019; Kelley et
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al., 2013; Benenson et al., 2013). Even if they are aware of what the app accesses, controlling such
permissions after app installation is quite difficult because users cannot decide which permissions are useful
for app functionalities and which are not (Hung et al., 2015; Ismail et al., 2015). Normally, people prefer
apps that ask for fewer permissions as one way to counter their privacy concerns (Harbach et al., 2014).

4.2.3

Perception of privacy breach
How people perceive privacy in mobile apps is a key to understanding their behavior. People

behave according to the mental model they have of app actions on their private data. As mentioned earlier,
most users are not fully aware of when, how, and what information is being accessed, collected, shared,
and aggregated by the applications (Kisekka et al., 2013; Hung et al., 2015; Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016;
Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Angulo et al., 2015). Such privacy concerns about data access practices are
relatively higher than concerns about other app features such as its usability, convenience, and speed
(Nguyen et al., 2016). Another study (Dogruel et al., 2017) shows that users highly value app features
around privacy. Hence, designers should be aware of user perceptions towards privacy breaches. A violation
of privacy eventually affects their app usage, whether the breach was made by the application itself or by
third-party services, which are often embedded in the app. Knowing that would help developers drawing
boundaries for smartphone app operations about information privacy practices.
Since the perceptions of a privacy breach are not similar across users, designers need to understand
what factors influence user privacy perception. According to (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015), the type
of personal information collected by the app and the presence of a claim of rights are two key determinants
of how severe the perceived privacy breach is. For instance, misuse of user financial information causes
higher perceived privacy breach compared to the misuse of data about a user location (Mamonov &
Benbunan-Fich, 2015; Bergström, 2015). however, in location-based services, people have high privacy
concerns about broadcasting their locations (Tsai et al., 2009). It is possible to draw sensitive information
from the analysis of merely GPS locations over a short period, including place of residence, social status,
family life, religion (Gasson et al., 2011).
It is also shown in (Mamonov & Benbunan-Fich, 2015; Wang & Lin, 2017) that the presence of
legal contract between the app developers and the user stating the claims to use information partially reduces
privacy breach perception, increases user trust in app-services, and consequently affects her/his continuance
use of the app. If users feel that the app is unnecessarily collecting personal information about them, they
lose their trust in the app, and this could cause a negative impact on the app’s adoption (Stark et al., 2016).
What also contributes to mitigating privacy breach perception is that the data is not collected and forwarded
unless expressly authorized by the user (Dye & Scarfone, 2014). Privacy violation of an app could take a
deeper form by having a mismatch between its interface features and the actual app operations (code).
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Surprisingly, it has been found in a mobile game that the camera is activated in the code while there is no
indication in the user interface about the camera use. Undoubtedly, if known, this kind of violation would
increase the severity of perceived privacy breach (Alharbi et al., 2014).
The way users notify of the privacy breach has also an impact on how they perceive the incident.
For instance, using feedback messages varies the perception of the breach. When a feedback message is
delivered immediately, it evokes a much greater sense of privacy violation. However, a delay in delivering
such a message suppresses the privacy concerns and leads to the experience of a less severe privacy
violation (Patil et al., 2015). The work of (Zou et al., 2019) stresses the importance of the way privacy
breach notifications are delivered. It should be readable and have actionable choices to promote protective
actions.
Many people are concerned about information sharing practices of the app to third-parties (Fodor
& Brem, 2015; Shklovski et al., 2014; Kelley et al., 2011; Nguyen et al., 2016). The rate of including
freeware routines and libraries by app developers containing known malware in the app remains high (Dye
& Scarfone, 2014). In (Shklovski et al., 2014), users were “creeped out” when they were shown how much
leakage of their information occurs while using an app. Ads-libraries embedded in the app access certain
personally identifiable information such as the most recent and frequent visits to a specific physical place
such as post office and work location. Users prefer to miss a customized advertisement to continually
leaking their locations (Kelley et al., 2011). Being unaware of the identity of who handles personal
information elevates privacy concerns and consequently affects the adoption of the applications (Fodor &
Brem, 2015; Nguyen et al., 2016). App designers need to reform their sharing policies to match the user’s
mental model about the app use of their personal information.
In general, the privacy perception of mobile app users is based on various factors, including the
type of information collected, how sensitive it is, how long it will be stored, how it will be used, and with
whom it will be shared (Van Kleek et al., 2017). For this reason, when the user is provided with such
information, s/he will be able to make more informed privacy-related decisions. There is an essential need
for increased transparency of the data collected implicitly or inferred from analysis through implementing
tools that reveal app leakage practices. Privacy Leaks (Balebako et al., 2013), Data Controller Indicators
(Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2016), Data Track (Angulo et al., 2015), and PasDroid (Hung et al., 2015;
Pennekamp et al., 2017) are useful transparency mechanisms that notify the user either textually or visually
about the data leakage that is about to occur and the potential destinations of the leaked information. More
information about these tools is given in Table 11. These tools would improve user awareness of their
privacy disclosures and encourage them to choose apps with more reasonable data collection and sharing
practices. Such understanding of app practices would also push developers and third-party services to
reform the standards of mobile privacy.
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Table 11: Transparency Tools
Tool

Description

Privacy Leaks

Privacy Leaks app provides Android users with visualized interface about
the amount and types of information shared by smartphone apps (Balebako
et al., 2013; Pennekamp et al., 2017).

Data Controller

Data Controller Indicators is a tool that aims to help users at the time of an

Indicators

app-choice decision. It provides them with details about the kinds of data
sent by the apps to various organizations, information about each, and the
potential purpose of collecting this data by these entities (Van Kleek et al.,
2017).

Data Track

Data Track is a tool that provides users with an overview of their data
disclosures to various online service providers and allows them to access
and control this data stored at the services' sides (Angulo et al., 2015).

PasDroid

PasDroid is a security enhancement mechanism for Android platform that
reduces private data leakage by mobile apps by enabling users to decide
whether to allow or block outgoing data (Hung et al., 2015).

4.3

Influence of Design on User Behavior
Is there a role for an app developer to help users maintain their privacy and become more aware of

the app data distribution practices? The brief answer is yes. The developer can adjust user choices and assist
them in making more informed privacy-related decisions through embedding explicitly or implicitly certain
interface features (Sundar et al., 2020). From a design perspective, it is worth mentioning here two main
privacy concepts: privacy by design and privacy by default. Privacy by design (PbD) is the process of
inclusion of privacy requirements, as any other functional requirements, throughout the system
development life cycle, starting from the initial conception of a new IT system up to its realization.
Therefore, privacy protection according to this principle has its impact on IT product design and
implementation. Compliance with PbD includes user consent, the right to view/erase personal information,
privacy breach notification, limiting the use of personal information to the stated purpose, minimizing the
amount of personal data collected, and minimizing who has access (Hoepman, 2014). Privacy by default is
applying the strictest privacy settings once the product has been released to the public such that if the user
makes no change to her/his privacy settings, the product still achieves a higher level of privacy protection
(Noain-Sánchez, 2016).
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In the following sections, an overview of the conclusions of the reviewed articles about the various
design components that have their privacy-implications on the way the user interacts with a mobile app
before and following app installation.

4.3.1

On app selection behavior
App developers can intervene as early as the app installation phase when the user selects an app to

download. It is worth noting that there is a slight difference between Android and iOS app installation page.
In the former platform, the list of all permissions requested by the app is presented to the user as one package
before the user hits a download button. This permission mechanism is known as “take-it-or-leave-it”
because the user either accepts all of the permissions and can download and use the app or denies them and
cannot proceed with the installation process. In iOS, no specific permissions are presented before the users
launch the app after installation.
One design element that makes users more cautious while installing apps is bringing the
information about privacy settings to the main screen of the installation. Presenting this information clearly
along with other related details about the app such as ratings, size, and cost would make the user more
aware of app privacy implications (Kelley et al., 2013). It is very important also for the downloading page
to be effective is to identify and define all permissions requested by the app and deliver them in an
understandable way for users to help them make more informed privacy decisions (Moore et al., 2019).
Another effective designing element that could make users more risk-aware during installation is
including a personalized permission dialogue. For instance, if the app asks for photos access, the
personalized dialogue includes a real photo picked from the user device and visually presents the permission
with the photo, or if the app asks to access the phone camera, a personalized dialogue includes a real-time
picture taken by the user camera. Using concrete examples of the information at risk to convey the meaning
of the app permissions contributes to increase user attention and counter the habituation effect that often
causes most of the users to ignore the permissions part when downloading an app (Harbach et al., 2014).
An alternative permission approach to all or nothing (take-it-or-leave-it) currently used in Google
Play is using negotiation between user and app developer to reach an agreement about what accesses are
given to the app before installation. Giving users such flexibility in adjusting app permissions before
installation causes them to feel more in control over their data (Baarslag et al., 2016). In (Baarslag et al.,
2016), also the authors point out that the take-it-or-leave-it mechanism could be effective in particular
scenarios, such as if data sharing practices are not the main focus of user attention, but this is not the case
in the mobile app downloading process.
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4.3.2

On app usage behavior
After installation, certain interface characteristics can shape user’s privacy-related behavior and

affect their decisions. In the following, a brief overview of the most common design features that have been
shown to influence mobile app users is discussed. This overview covers feedback, app permissions,
permission granularity, nudges, personalized indicators, and app content to request information.

4.3.2.1 Feedback
Feedback is a design element that gives the user information about events or issues that take place.
This feature enables the user to be aware of the consequences of her/his disclosure decisions. For instance,
when the user shares her/his location in SNS, knowing specifically who, out of her/his connections, has
looked at her/his location data allays some privacy concerns about information disclosure. Moreover, it
improves users’ comfort levels and makes them more willing to share personal information such as location
in contrast to knowing nothing about data viewers (Tsai et al., 2009).
However, the utility of a feedback mechanism is conditional on the delivery time of the messages.
Having frequent feedback messages leads to user disruption and potential loss of attention. Also, displaying
immediate feedback messages right after information disclosure might create a heightened sense of
oversharing (Patil et al., 2014). It is suggested that immediate feedback messages are reserved for most
privacy-sensitive situations. Immediate feedback is also needed for settings calibration to enable a better
match between privacy preferences and app operations. It is also recommended that actionable feedback,
messages that need a user response, is a necessary step to prevent personal data oversharing (Patil et al.,
2015; Pennekamp et al., 2017). These feedback messages, to be effective should deliver privacy-related
content in a readable way and provide actionable choices (Zou et al., 2019). When considering concurrent
notifications, Turner et al., (2019) find that the arrival and presence of notifications can have both negative
and positive behavioral effects. Figure 5 shows an example of a feedback message embedded in a prototype
for a location-based app called Locasa.
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Figure 5: Feedback Message in a Location-Based App, Source: (Patil et al., 2015)

4.3.2.2 Application permissions
Once the app is installed, it will exploit mobile resources according to the permissions granted
previously by the user. This mechanism is called permission-based access control. Permissions include all
the kinds of possible actions a mobile device can perform. These permissions are accessible for app
developers through APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) for security purposes (Pennekamp et al.,
2017). To maintain privacy, no mobile resources are used unless this access is authorized by the user who
permitted the access previously. The app’s use of resources such as the camera, microphone, or media is
either interactive or background. Interactive use is when a user explicitly clicks on the items inside the app.
For this kind of use, there is no need for a separate permission message to authorize access. This approach
avoids annoyance, reduces habituation, and helps the user focus on other less clear authorizations. For
background uses, often made through the source code of the app without the user’s notice, requesting
authorization separately and explicitly is highly recommended (Micinski et al., 2017; Patil et al., 2012). For
example, iOS apps often ask for access to resources when the app is launched, and it may be most effective
to use this time of the app life cycle to ask for background uses (Micinski et al., 2017). An example of an
app permission message which requests to access device location is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Permission Message to Access Smartphone Location

To avoid the risk that users blindly accept all the prompts because they are look-alike (Visuri et al.,
2019; Pennekamp et al., 2017), a key to designing effective permission dialogues is to provide a short
description explaining to the user why this access should be granted. This feature in permission dialogue
design is called purpose string. It is shown that people often grant resource requests with purpose string
more often than those without, regardless of whether the explanation is relevant to the request. It seems that
users become more amenable when the requester provides explanations and becomes less concerned about
their data privacy (Bergström, 2015). However, these results conflict with another study examining the
effect of purpose string on user behavior. In (Shih et al., 2015), the authors conclude that people are less
willing to disclose personal information when they are provided with a vague or non-explanatory purpose
compared to their will when a purpose is missing. A possible explanation is that an ambiguous message
alerts users to possible privacy risks and leads them to make different decisions. If the purpose string is
clear but is only beneficial to developers, users are often unwilling to share their information (Shih et al.,
2015). The disparity between the two studies about the importance of purpose string specificity could be
attributed to the approaches used in probing privacy preferences. The work of (Bergström, 2015) employs
a mail survey to elicit user privacy preferences, while the work of (Shih et al., 2015) uses a field experiment.
Still, the permission-based system is a reasonable approach to protect user’s device from unwanted app
performance.
App default settings is a rather strong form of an indirect approach to promoting certain interaction.
Knowing that some people are not fully aware of their ability to adjust privacy settings, the default settings
defined by the app developer consequently shape user behavior. Users often accept default settings with
premium privacy features (not free) more than their willing to voluntarily select and pay for premium
privacy features (Dogruel et al., 2017). In Facebook, it has been found that the default settings do not closely
match with user-reported privacy attitudes (Watson et al., 2015). Thus, there is a need to specify these
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default settings in a way that maintains as much privacy as possible. More specifically, it is recommended
to define more restrictive default sharing settings to reduce unintended disclosure and to serve as an
adequate starting point for users who can then adjust these settings to meet their actual privacy preferences.
This is precisely what the privacy by default principle suggests.

4.3.2.3 Permission granularity
Given the contextual factors that determine user disclosure preferences, providing users with
varying levels of options for a given permission places more control in the hands of users and alleviates
some of their privacy concerns (Tsai et al., 2009; Kelley et al., 2011; Patil et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2012;
Finnis et al., 2012). Permission settings that offer fine-grained rules over time and resources naturally
express user true privacy preferences, which change according to the characteristics of a given context.
Users are often more comfortable with privacy configurations that offer a diverse palette of sharing rules
than opt-in/opt-out (coarse-grained) sharing mechanism in which users have to choose either to allow or
disallow all requests from a particular app to access certain resources. For instance, designing location
sharing options that allow both abstract location description (i.e., city) and more detailed full address
disclosure increases the user comfort level and prompts more location sharing (Tang et al., 2012) even with
advertisers (Kelley et al., 2011). Time-based rules are another example of fine-grained permissions, which
people prefer to a constant and automated information broadcast (Patil et al., 2012). Designing advanced
privacy settings offers people a way to govern the disclosure of personal information and empowers them
to protect their privacy. Figure 7 exhibits an example of fine-grained permission.

Figure 7: Fine-Grained Privacy Settings, Source: (Knijnenburg et al., 2013)

Also, the subjective perception of the available sharing options plays a key role in the user decision
process. App designers may include extreme options to increase or decrease overall information sharing.
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Moreover, if the app developer aims to promote certain sharing choice, s/he can remove the surrounding
options (reduce granularity) (Knijnenburg et al., 2013).

4.3.2.4 Nudges
Nudges are an effective approach to trigger user attention and manipulate her/his decision. Rather
than direct instructions, nudges come as an indirect encouragement to a certain behavior. In the context of
mobile apps, nudges might take the form of either pop-up messages that require user action or notification
messages that inform users about a certain event at a particular time with no action required. Both forms
are nudges intent to generate a behavioral change in the user (Di Geronimo et al., 2020; Caraban et al.,
2019; Renaud & Zimmermann, 2018; Pennekamp et al., 2017).
Privacy nudges are an effective tool to influence the way users manage their apps’ permissions. An
example of privacy nudges is shown in Figure 8. When a user tries to adjust app permission settings, nudges
in the form of alerts inform the user about the consequences of this change, i.e., what kind of sensitive data
(location, contacts, phone logs, etc.) and to with which installed apps this information has been shared. This
way could encourage both non-active and active users to utilize permission settings better to get them
aligned with their privacy preferences (Almuhimedi et al., 2015).
Besides, nudges can come in the form of notifications displaying some expert recommendations to
generate more privacy protection behavior. However, the study of (Dogruel et al., 2017) concludes that no
benefits are obtained from using an expert piece of privacy-related advice compared to more generic advice.
Caraban et al. (2019) reviewed various nudging mechanisms and the corresponding implementations for
designers to make behavioral change. In general, a nudge could be further effective if it becomes
personalized to certain user behavior and configurable to avoid annoyance.

Figure 8: Privacy Nudges to Influence User behavior, Source: (Almuhimedi et al., 2015)
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4.3.2.5 Personalized indicators
A well-known countermeasure to an unauthorized data access problem is designing indicators that
are personalized to each user of the app. The approach appropriately fits m-banking and m-commerce app
context where users often provide sensitive information such as financial data. Using personalized
indicators in the log-in interface helps users know whether they revealed their data to a legitimate app rather
than a fake but similar one, as shown in Figure 9. The authors of (Marforio et al., 2016) show how effective
it is to deploy a personalized security image selected by the user from her/his device the first time the app
launches. This results in a noticeable reduction of data leakage to unauthorized apps that are seemingly
identical to the original app. Regarding services, personalized services often come with a high level of
privacy concerns; however, when these services are initiated by app users, they trigger the sense of user’s
control and have a positive effect on user’s trust and user’s engagement (Chen & Sundar, 2018).

Figure 9: Example of Using Personal Indicator to Maintain User Privacy, Source: (Marforio et al., 2016)

4.3.2.6 App content to request information
Minor design changes contribute to changes in behavior. By exposing users to certain content in a
certain way including color and size, their beliefs about the appropriateness of disclosing personal
information could be shifted. It is also called (app framing) (Di Geronimo et al., 2020; Pennekamp et al.,
2017). For instance, users who have been exposed to more provocative images rated similar images as more
personally appropriate to share than those exposed to less provocative ones (Chang et al., 2016). Shaping
user perceptions about information dissemination is also possible by displaying what others have considered
acceptable to share. For example, displaying a birthday of a user’s friend in SNS before asking about her/his
birthday implicitly conveys the appropriateness of revealing the date of birth. An example of the effect of
a design feature on user disclosing behavior is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: How a Design Feature Could Changes User behavior, Source: (Chang et al., 2016)

In addition, how personal information is being asked gives people cues about how to make their
decisions regarding information disclosure. For instance, using a conversational style in asking for
information such as “what are you up to?” instead of “type your status here” generates varying user
responses (Chang et al., 2016).

4.3.2.7 Design for trust
As can be derived from the above review of the designing perspective to mobile privacy is that trust
is a fundamental element in the process of making privacy-related decisions. When people have trust in the
app, they are more likely to share their personal information. Building an app that is perceived as
trustworthy could be achieved by employing transparency tools that unveil the opacity of data flow.
Displaying to users which of their personal information has been revealed and to what destinations they
have been sent increases user comfort levels and encourages more sharing. Transparency could also be
achieved by providing a purpose string attached to each permission request (mentioned earlier). Another
way to design for trust is allowing for more user’s active engagement with the app. An example of that is
allowing users to selectivity decide the permissions of the installed apps and providing them with the ability
to change these permissions over time instead of enforcing a specific set of permissions that cannot be
changed.
This section confirms that privacy-related behavior is a complex concept to comprehend or predict
because many factors uniquely play their roles in a specific context. The user side and the app design
features are two main elements that define user privacy-related interaction with a given mobile app.

4.4

Literature review Conclusion
The area of privacy in mobile apps has become highly active recently, with abundant studies

confirming the limited user awareness of privacy-related practices of mobile apps. This calls for more app
developers’ involvement in maintaining user privacy. More specifically, app developers should avoid
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deceptive designs that work for building trust while making unethical practices. The developers should also
strive for design patterns that maintain users’ privacy and guide them “by design” to safeguard their
personal information, to safeguard themselves.
It has been learned from the literature that mobile apps privacy is a rather fragmented field of study.
The reviewed articles have no predominant theories applicable to the research work in the field, nor
predefined standards about conducting empirical studies in this domain. In addition, these papers differ in
the way they look at the topic; some espouse user perspective where mobile app privacy is analyzed by
studying the effect of user characteristics on privacy-related behavior, while other papers espouse the
designer perspective where the topic of privacy is examined by assessing the effect of specific designing
elements on user behavior.
Also, it has been noticed that user privacy has been examined in various discretional information
disclosure contexts, including apps of location-based services, social networking sites, m-banking, and mcommerce. However, very few studies explore the topic in hedonic apps such as mobile games. According
to this review, there is currently a paucity of studies in HCI literature that examine privacy issues in mobile
game settings. Knowing that the number of mobile gamers was 1.3 billion worldwide in 2019 and this
figure is expected to hit 1.7 billion by the end of 2024 (“Number of Mobile Gamers,” 2019) and knowing
that Candy Crush, one of the top popular mobile games, alone has been downloaded almost 3 billion times
since its release (“Candy Crush Usage,” 2020) motivate us to believe that mobile games are suitable
environment to examine privacy. This particular context of interaction is unique because mobile games
exhibit privacy threats that are often disregarded. Game apps are often perceived as a “low privacy risk” or
“non-threatening” environment where people feel their data is secure while interacting with the app for
entertaining purposes. For instance, Pokemon-Go is another popular game that utilizes the user’s mobile
GPS feature. Users who play this particular game give permission to be continuously tracked and for their
personal information to be shared. This exemplifies an unnoticed breach of mobile user privacy.
This review suggests a potential research opportunity that focuses on privacy in mobile apps using
game context. How to engineer users’ disclosure behavior using certain app features? What are the design
elements that influence user disclosure decisions in mobile apps? This research endeavor would ultimately
guide mobile apps developers towards maintaining user privacy and encourage compliance with data
protection regulations. It would also provide information to privacy advocates to build awareness and
motivate positive changes in user behavior and empower them to make more informed disclosure-decisions.
For the dissertation work, we built a game app that runs on iOS mobile devices. This app used to
evaluate the effect of specific design elements on user’s perceptions and behavior related to privacy. The
details of how the custom app was developed are the subject of the next chapter, while Chapter 7 explains
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comprehensively the research method that used to gain more understanding about the impact of app design
on user privacy.
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Chapter 5: App Development Process
This chapter describes the development process of a mobile game app as an artifact to test user
behaviors towards privacy. It begins with a general overview of mobile apps. Following that, is presenting
the decisions made towards define and implement the app for this study and concluding with illustrations
of the app’s interfaces.
Due to the ubiquity and popularity of mobile devices among end-users, mobile apps have become
the essential need of anyone who has a mobile device. A mobile app is a light-weight software designed to
run on mobile devices that provides an economically affordable solution for several user purposes such as
productivity, entertainment and, business (Li & Zhu, 2019).
According to "Operating System Market Share Worldwide Report" in 2019 (in 2021 as well), the
two dominant operating systems that run the largest number of mobile devices across the globe are Android
and iOS. Each of the two platforms exhibits its peculiarities in both their technical foundations and in the
process of building an application itself.
For Android devices, Java is the official language with which Android system and most apps on
Google Play Store are built. Despite the popularity of Java, there are other programming languages such as
Kotlin and C# which developers could select from to build distributable third-party Android software.
Among the tools that help developers create, test, deploy, and manage Android apps are Android Studio
IDE (Integrated Development Environment), Unity, and many others ("Android Developers," 2019)
For Apple devices, an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) with Xcode provides developers
with collections of tools and libraries to create customized software for MacOS, iOS, WatchOS, and tvOS.
While the software can run on any device, Xcode requires a Mac computer to run on while the development
is taking place. With Xcode, the developer could choose either Objective-C or Swift as a programming
language to build apps. These two languages are supported by Apple and are the most popular for app
development. Comparatively, Swift is a newer alternative for developers providing them with more
programming and performance features than Objective-C (Grummitt, 2017). Besides Xcode, Cocoa and
Cocoa Touch are other application programming interfaces developed by Apple for iOS and MacOS
devices respectively. However, unlike Swift in Xcode, Objective-C is the primary language in these two
other development environments ("Documentation Cocoa (Touch)," 2019).
For the development of the mobile app, we made three initial decisions: (1) platform selection (iOS
vs. Android); (2) type of app (utilitarian vs. hedonic); (3) nature of the challenge presented by the app.
These three decisions characterize the nature of the app developed for this dissertation. The next sections
provide detailed justifications for various decisions made during the development process.
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5.1

Initial Decisions

5.1.1

Platform Selection
One of the first decisions developers need to make is whether to design a native app or a cross-

platform one. A native app is one designed for a specific platform either Apple's iOS or Google's Android
using their corresponding programming language, while a cross-platform app is one designed to run on
both systems using JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The native apps outperform the cross-platform apps in
utilizing the system features to their fullest, and thus, increasing the performance. In addition, unlike crossplatform apps, native apps provide a better user experience as designers have more freedom to develop
creative interfaces and smooth functioning apps (Majchrzak et al., 2018; Verma et al., 2018 )
We chose to develop a native app due to its benefits compared to cross-platform apps, and because
it is sufficient for the purposes of this study. From the two dominant platforms for mobile apps, we chose
the iOS platform. An iOS app will enable the developer to explore a new programming language (Swift)
and learn Apple's development environment, rather than applying prior experience in Java language. Recent
studies and press releases show that the number of user data collection requests (user privacy-related data
flows) sent by Android devices is much higher than they are in iOS devices (Schmidt, 2018). Since our
objective is to examine user behavior, instead of collecting sensitive user data we decided to investigate
user privacy in the more privacy-preserving platform.

5.1.2

App Category
Depending on the purpose it fulfills, an app can be broadly characterized as hedonic or utilitarian

(Wakefield & Whitten, 2006). A hedonic app is used for entertainment or leisure purposes, while a
utilitarian app is intended to help the user with specific tasks. The hedonic category can be further broken
down into Health & Fitness, Social Networking, News, Weather, and Games. The utilitarian category
includes Productivity, Education, Business, and Medical Information. Each of the distribution channels of
the two major platforms provides a more extensive list of app types ("App Store Categories," 2019; "Google
Play Apps," 2019).
Most apps, regardless of their type, collect user-related information to fulfill their purpose. The
extent of this data collection depends upon the nature of the app. Many ethical issues arise when researchers
or developers offer apps that ask for sensitive information such as financial apps or from apps that their
frequent use leads to revealing private data such as social media networks or fitness apps. None of these
app categories are suitable for our purposes, as the use of our app is confined to a short time. We cannot
expect participants to volunteer their personal information for a fictional app nor would we want to directly
ask participants for sensitive information. While various kinds of apps could be designed to explore user
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privacy-related behaviors, a mobile game is the best choice. It satisfies the believability threshold because
game apps do not have any associated expectations of realism. Furthermore, a mobile game is well-suited
because it would indirectly elicit privacy-related user information or preferences in a relatively short time
as the main task of the app is to entertain users. Additionally, a certain level of user engagement is a
necessity for truly examining user privacy in the mobile app context as it would lead to more realistic
outcomes. Hence, a game-context is more feasible than any other category to get users engaged in a
relatively short session with the app and explore their privacy-related behaviors.

5.1.3

Game Type
Sharp and Macklin (2016) classify game types into ten main categories: competitive, cooperative,

skill-based, experience-based, role-playing, performative, simulation-based, whimsical, game of chance,
and uncertainty. Each of these types has its design characteristics and provides various player experiences.
Initially, the very popular board game, Snake and Ladder was chosen to be developed. Although it is an
uncomplicated app to implement, it would not have provided a user experience. First, this kind of game is
purely a chance-game app where user game-decisions within the game are very narrow, thus, user
engagement with the app becomes limited. The player solely accepts the number of steps that appear on the
dice and acts accordingly. Examining user privacy with such a limited context of engagement would seem
relatively peculiar from the user's perspective. For instance, asking about user private information
throughout playing Snake and Ladder would appear odd and intrusive. Second, user performance in such a
game does not reflect any aspect of user personality or capabilities. Thus, when it comes to examining
privacy, the area where the researchers could play around is rather tight. These two reasons led us to choose
a concentration (or memory) game. A concentration game would provide a reasonable level of user
engagement and attention such that during a given session with the app, the player continuously has to make
a game decision to achieve the goal of matching all the cards on the board by flipping two at a time (Foerster
& Wattenhofer, 2013). Player performance requires concentration and memory and this serves to test the
users’ cognitive skills, particularly their working memory.
Working memory capacity is an important factor in determining individual differences. It accounts
for a considerable portion of the variance in general intelligence (Conway et al., 2005). During a cognitive
task, working memory is responsible for temporarily maintaining and manipulating information. Working
memory includes attention, executive control, and multiple short-term memory systems that are for storing
information for a brief time (Conway et al., 2003; Ackerman et al., 2005; Yuan, et al., 2006). According to
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), which is one of the most popularly used measures to assess
individual intelligence and cognitive ability, there are four main predictors for general intelligence as shown
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in Figure 11, however, studies have shown that working memory is the most highly correlated component
of general intelligence (Conway et al., 2003; Ackerman et al., 2005; Wechsler, 2008).
A concentration (or memory card) game is typically used as a tool to measure working memory
capacity (Zook et al., 2004). Such studies have inspired us to choose a concentration mobile game app as a
target for implementation. On the one hand, user performance in this game tests certain cognitive skills
related to intelligence level. On the other, this type of apps offers a sufficient level of user engagement to
make it an appropriate ground for user privacy exploration.

Figure 11: General Intelligence Components According to WAIS Scale, Source: (Ackerman et al., 2005)

5.1.3.1 Description of the Game
Concentration, or memory cards, or match game, as it is sometimes called is a popular game around
the globe that requires good memorization skills and a good strategy to succeed in it. The goal of the game
is to match all the cards, by flipping them in successive rounds. The game consists of n pair of identical
cards that are shuffled randomly, then laid out face down on a board. This game can be played by any
number of players or by a single player. If so, it is called solitaire (Foerster & Wattenhofer, 2013). When
there is more than one player, the goal for each person is to collect more matching pairs as possible. The
winner is the player with the most pairs when the board is uncovered. However, when it is a solitaire game,
the goal is to collect more matching pairs as possible with a minimum number of moves or within a certain
time frame (often in order of minutes). This study is interested in the solitaire version of the game.
In the beginning, all 2n cards are face down. In a single move, the player turns the first card over,
then turns the second card, one after the other; if they form a pair (i.e., are identical), they are removed from
the board; if not; they are turned down again. The game continues until either there are no more cards to
flip (all matching pairs are found), or when a particular end condition has met such as exceeding the time
limit or exceeding the number of moves allowed.
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5.1.3.2 Measures Used
After downloading several concentration game apps from the App Store, we noticed that there is a
considerable variation in determining the game end condition and the way the player scores are calculated.
Some apps (e.g., Match Mania, Quick Match Cards) put a time limit to clear the board and decide the
player's score according to how many pairs are matched within a specific time frame. Another category of
concentration apps includes those that allow the player to match all the pairs with no time limit. However,
some apps such as Memory Matches 2, Match 2 Cards incorporate the time spent to clear the board to the
final score for the player. Others such as Memory Cards - Match Pairs use the time spent solely as a
performance indicator. The third group of apps (e.g., Pair Cards, Memory Match-MemH) use the number
of moves as a single performance indicator. These apps present either plain information at the end of the
game such as the time spent, number of wrong guesses, or how many moves the player has made to
complete the game such as in (Memory Cards - Match Pairs, Matchtastic), or present a score calculated in
various ways. The score in the game often combines different factors such as time, number of matches, or
number of wrong moves. Consequently, there is no specific way to judge the player’s performance in a
concentration game. It completely depends on the developer’s preferences. A fourth group includes apps
that have no limits; examples include Object Memory Game, Match Cards - Memory, Memory Games with
Animals, Match Those Cards, Amazing Dinosaur Memory Matching Game, Number Games Match. The
player has endless time and there is no score shown after clearing the board. Neither the time nor the number
of moves or any kind of performance judgments is considered. Their purpose is to entertain users without
providing any kind of performance feedback. Table 12 shows a summary of the game apps evaluated for
this project and their main characteristics.
Table 12: Downloaded Apps using "Memory Games", "Memory Cards", "Match games" keywords
#

1

2

App Name

App Name

Termination

Scoring

(iPhone)

(Apple Store)

Condition

System

Amazing Dinosaur

Unlimited

Memory Matching Game

Time

Dinos Memory Game

Limited
Cards Match Games

Cards Match Games

3

Easy Memory

Pair Cards

4

Match 2 Cards

Match 2 Cards

Time
Unlimited
Time
Unlimited
Time

Nothing Shown
Initial score = 0
Every match +5 ;
Every Mismatch -1
No. of Attempts

Time Elapsed
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5

Match Cards-Memory

Match Cards - Memory

6

Match Mania

7

Match Those Cards

Match Those Cards

8

Matches 2

Memory Matches 2

9

Matchtastic

Matchtastic

Unlimited

Nothing

Time

Shown

Match Mania - Keep

Limited

Flipping

Time

Unknown

Unlimited

Nothing

Time

Shown

Unlimited

Time Elapsed +

Time

Accuracy%(Unknown)

Unlimited

Time Elapsed +

Time

No. of Attempts
Initial score = 0 (could

10

Memorama

Memory*Classic

Unlimited
Time

be negative later)
Every match +10;
Every miss recall -1/-2
+ Time Elapsed

Memory Games with

Unlimited

Nothing

Animals

Time

Shown

11

Memory

12

Memory!

Memory!

13

Memory Adventures

Memory Adventures

14

Memory

15

Memory Match

Memory Match - MemH

16

Number Games

Number Games Match

17

Objects Memory Game

Objects Memory Game

18

Quick Match Cards

Quick Match Cards

Unlimited
Time
Limited
Time

Unknown

Time Elapsed

Memory Cards - Match

Unlimited

Time Elapsed +

Pairs Fun

Time

No. of Mismatch

Unlimited
Time

No. of Attempts

Unlimited

Nothing

Time

Shown

Unlimited

Nothing

Time

Shown

Limited
Time

Unknown

In this study, we are interested in associating user performance in the game with their memorization
skills. Therefore, the app should keep track of the moves the player makes. At any point in the game, if the
player turns over a previously untouched card with its pair in a previously revealed (known location), and
then, turns over a wrong (mismatched) card, the app should deduct points from the player’s total score. This
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penalty takes into account the player’s failure to recall the location of a specific card. A person with perfect
memory would avoid turning over the wrong card and would select the right card's pair to successfully
make a match.
After analyzing the scoring system in the apps listed in Table 12, we noticed that only two of the
examined apps (Cards Match Games and Memorama) consider deducting points when making wrong game
decisions. While it is difficult to know the specific underlying mechanism behind the scoring system, further
investigation via trial and error, revealed that Card Match deducts points for every mismatched move even
the first move when all cards are still unknown for users. Memorama, on the other hand, makes much sense.
According to our experience with the app, this app deducts points when the user forgot the card's location
when they should have not. To identify this occurrence, we will use the term “miss-recall” throughout this
study. This measure indicates how many times a user failed to recall a card when they should have
remembered its location. A high measure of miss-recall is indicative of imperfect memorization skills.
Our analysis of memory game apps showed two options for terminating conditions, namely: time
constraints and the number of moves. We chose the latter because it provides more information than
measures of time limits. Specifically, assessing user performance by the number of moves gives an indirect
measure of miss-recall if it is compared to the optimal number of moves. In the information retrieval
literature, recall is defined as a percentage of the number of retrieved documents that are relevant to the
total number of relevant documents that exist (Elveny et al., 2018). In the context of the concentration game,
a measure of a recall could be defined as a percentage of the number of matched cards to the total number
of moves. At the end of each game, the numerator (total number of matches) would be the same for every
player which is equal to the number of pairs of cards in the game (n). However, the denominator (number
of moves) for best- and worst-case scenario, is dependent upon each player’s performance. This fraction
results in a percentage measure that represents an index of remembering ability (recall). The number of
moves becomes relatively high when the player is unable to recall card locations many times and needs to
make many moves to pair the cards. In this case, the miss-recall is high. When the number of moves is
relatively low, because the pairs are located efficiently, the percentage is low. In this case, the miss-recall
figure would drop implying that the player has good memory skills. To determine the upper and lower
bound for these measures, we need to calculate the maximum number of moves indicating the worst
memorization skill where the miss recall measure is high, and the minimum number of moves indicating
the best possible human memory skills (perfect recall) where the miss-recall measure is lowest.
Determining the two ends of the human recall scale in the concentration game involves finding the
optimal strategy to end the game with the minimum number of moves (perfect human recall ability) and
finding the worst strategy to end the game with the maximum number of moves (worst human recall ability).
According to Foerster and Wattenhofer (2013), an optimal strategy for the solitaire version of the
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concentration game requires between 1.5*n and 1.75*n expected moves to collect all n pairs. Their article
shows detailed numerical calculations for the expected number of moves using an optimal strategy for
various n values (from 1 pair of cards to 50 pairs of cards). We used these values as a minimum bound for
the number of moves. To find the maximum number of moves, we adopted a different strategy. We
developed a simulation with one million trials to automatically solve various board configurations, by
flipping cards randomly. The goal was to calculate the average number of moves a “blind” player would
need to end the game without any effort to memorize the positions of the cards. Details of the simulation
results are given in Appendix E.
For the app, we decided to implement a small version of the game board with 8 pairs of cards, and
a standard board with 14 pairs. From the simulation and the calculations of Foerster and Wattenhofer
(2013), we used the numbers shown in Table 13 to set the two ends of the scale. In each of the boards, we
compute recall as the percentage of the number of matched cards (i.e. number of pairs in the game), to
either the minimum or the maximum number of moves. The scales for the two versions of the game, 8 and
14 pairs, are given in Figure 12.
Table 13: Figures Obtained from the Simulation and (Foerster & Wattenhofer , 2013)
# Pairs

Minimum

Maximum

(n)

Number

Number

of Moves

of Moves

12

64

22

196

8
(16 cards)
14
(28 cards)

For the small board size (8 pairs), the perfect recall score is
for a board size of 14 pairs, the highest recall score is

"%
##

!
"#

, while the worst recall score is

!
$%

. Likewise,

"%

, while the lowest is "&$. These values should be

normalized to 0-1 range, so the user could easily compare and realize where their memory skills fall in the
scale. The recall measure would be displayed to the user as a percentage. Figure 12 illustrates these scales.
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Recall Scale for 8 Pairs of Cards

Recall Scale for 14 Pairs of Cards

0%

100%

Figure 12: Recall Scales for the Two Versions of the Game

Rescaling the above boundaries is performed using min-max normalization, one of the most
common ways to normalize data. The minimum values get transformed into a 0, and the maximum values
get transformed into a 1, while other values in between get transformed into a number between 0 and 1
using the following equation:
!=

#' − &'((#)
+!#(#) − &'((#)

where a is the normalized value of x, x is the original recall measure. Min(x) and Max(x) are the endpoints
of the scale.
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5.2

Technical Background of the App
No prior knowledge of app development I had when I embarked on this project. This section

describes the process I undertook to get ready to develop the target app and use it as an environment to test
the hypotheses of this study. Along with my preparation, I will describe some technical details of the app
development environment in iOS.
The three essential requirements for iOS app development are having macOS, having an Apple
developer account, and installing Xcode. Any Apple's Mac family of computers that has an Intel-based
processor running on Mac OS X is a suitable hardware environment for installing the iOS development kit.
The installation also requires creating an Apple Developer account using an existing or a new Apple ID
("Sign in to Apple Developer," 2019). While the creation of an Apple Developer account costs nothing,
when the app reaches its distribution stage, a minimum annual fee of $99 should be paid. This is a
subscription fee for the Apple Developer Program which allows programmers to use advanced app features
and most importantly, allows them to submit their apps to App Store and make them available for users
worldwide ("Choosing Apple Membership," 2019). The third requirement is installing Xcode. It is Apple's
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that can be downloaded from Mac App Store for free. It
provides developers with complete sets of tools for creating, testing, debugging, and submitting apps to the
App Store. As an IDE, Xcode also offers a built-in code editor, a graphic user interface editor, and
iPhone/iPad simulators to enable developers to test apps without physical devices ("Apple Support Xcode,"
2019).
Prior programming experience is necessary to reduce the effort it takes to build an iOS app from
scratch. As in any software development journey in an unfamiliar environment, I started by developing a
simple "Hello World" program in the Xcode Playground. The Playground is an interactive programming
environment, part of Xcode, that helps developers examine certain Swift syntax and test algorithms skills.
It is an appropriate starting point for new Swift coders because Playground instantly presents the
intermediate results for the variables on its sidebar to easily debug and assess the code written in its editor.
However, Playground does not support user interaction (no interfaces or user inputs) and has performance
limitations. The code written in Playground can only be executed on a simulator, not on a physical device,
which prevents the use of hardware-specific features. During this stage of learning, the main educational
material was a course “Introduction to Swift Programming” from Coursera offered by the University of
Toronto5.
Diving deeply into iOS app development involves designing small Xcode projects that support user
interaction and have a certain flow for the app's interfaces. Interaction design requires specific knowledge
5

Certificate of course completion: https://www.coursera.org/account/accomplishments/certificate/LHJCB4389FEX
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about how to embed code to produce graphical elements such as view controllers, buttons, image views, or
user input fields that respond to user actions, or performance of functional tasks. The transition between
screens is implemented through Xcode’s storyboard and segues (connections) that help in defining the flow
of the app.
Besides “getting one’s hands dirty in the field,” which is the greatest source for learning, my basic
knowledge of Swift was obtained from reading various books listed in Table 14. By embracing failure in
these small projects, employing a trial-and-error approach for problem-solving, and following countless
online recourses/solutions, I attained a sufficient grasp of iOS app development fundamentals. After
mastering these basic skills, I was ready to start developing the target app, a concentration game.
Table 14: References Used to Learn iOS Mobile Apps Development
#

1

Title

Beginning Swift Games Development for iOS
by Wesley Matlock, James Goodwill

2

Year

Publisher

2015

Apress

Games, Design and Play: A Detailed Approach to
Iterative Game Design

2016

by Colleen Macklin, John Sharp
3

iOS App Development for Dummies
by Jesse Feiler

4

iOS Development with Swift
by Craig Grummitt

5

iOS Programming: The Big Nerd Ranch Guide
by Aaron Hillegass, and Christian Keur

6

Learning Swift 2 Programming
by Jacob Schatz

7

Swift in 24 Hours, Sams Teach Yourself
by BJ Miller.

8

The Practitioner's Guide to User Experience Design
by Luke Miller

5.2.1

2014
2018
2016
2015

Addison-Wesley
Professional
John Wiley & Sons
Manning
Publications Co.
Pearson Technology
Group
Addison-Wesley
Professional.

2014

Pearson Education

2015

Hachette UK

Libraries, APIs and SDKs
To provide various app features, mobile app developers often combine existing tools and libraries

with their code. Instead of “reinventing the wheel,” the developer's creativity comes from the integration of
these already exiting tools with the original code of the app under implementation. Several apps in the
market have common elements such as database connectivity and authentication. App developers should
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reuse these components instead of writing original code from scratch to perform the standard functions
needed in most of the apps.
API or, application programming interface, is a way of communication between different programs
which makes the app development process faster and more efficient. An API is a way to interact with
libraries of prewritten code that contains functions, classes, constants, and variables. Developers can call
up these elements to perform basic programming tasks. APIs are also the means of interacting directly with
the services provided by large tech companies such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook. App programmers
can benefit from the vast infrastructure and data centers these organizations have to develop or enhance
their apps. For example, Google APIs which include Google Maps, Google Analytics, and Google Cloud
allow developers to incorporate specific features ("Google APIs Explorer," 2019). Tech firms often expose
their APIs and provide access to their systems for free to obtain more user data. For instance, the use of
Google Maps app activates specific user data transmission to Google servers. This transmission is similar
to what happens when someone uses Yelp (app for crowd-sourced reviews about businesses), which
leverages the Google Maps API.
The Software Development Kit, or SDK, is a set of APIs that have been created in a specific
programming language for a specific platform (Müller & Thiesing, 2011). Facebook, for instance, has
developed different SDKs for their APIs: Facebook SDK for Android, Facebook SDK for iOS, and
Facebook SDK for PHP ("Facebook for Developers: APIs and SDKs," 2019). SDKs often include multiple
APIs, libraries, and documentation. In general, a given SDK contains one or multiple APIs while API does
not contain SDKs.
The majority of apps in the market rely on multiple SDKs. It is up to the developer to identify
which features s/he wants to incorporate into the app, and then how to integrate these APIs to implement
the desirable features. Each API within an SDK serves a different function. For the app described in this
study, we have incorporated three specific features: (1) a social element represented by Facebook SDK for
iOS, (2) a mail service represented by MessageUI framework, and (3) a backend platform for database
storage represented by Parse SDK. The integration of these features with other components of the app is
explained in detail in the next sections.

5.2.1.1 Internal Frameworks
These are the frameworks available within the Apple platform used in the development of the app.
They were used to provide basic functionality and user interface features (Foundation and UIKit), work
with audio and visual data (AVFoundation), and handle emails or short text messages (MessageUI).
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Foundation and UIKit
These are the two basic frameworks for Apple platform devices. Foundation framework is
implemented in Objective-C and it is critical for almost every app to provide the basic layer of
functionalities. It includes all data types for variables, collections, and arrays, methods for string
manipulations, and date and time processing ("Apple Documentation: Foundation," 2019). Foundation
framework has been used in concentration game app for building the core programming functions.
Likewise, UIKit is a required framework for every app that has to interact with users. It is mostly
used in all iOS apps and it constitutes the main unit for designing a user interface. UIKit includes all classes
that are essential to define interface elements such as views, labels, table views, buttons, and navigation
components. Besides, it allows the developer to handle a variety of user events such as tap or swipe on a
specific element in the screen ("Apple Documentation: UIKit," 2019). This framework has been utilized to
design and code assorted interface elements in the main screens of concentration game. Additionally, it
has been used to define the flow of app screens and to trigger the transition between them.
AVFoundation
It is an Objective-C-based framework that provides developers with tools needed to efficiently
work with audio and visual data on Apple platform. By using AVFoundation framework, developers can
create, edit, synthesize, import, and export audiovisual files to build media applications. For instance, the
framework can be used to control device cameras, to playback local or remote media, to composite video
clips to a single file ("Apple Documentation: AVFoundation," 2019; McCune, 2014).
For our app, concentration game, we used this framework to introduce short sound effects of type
".wav" files. At the beginning of the game, shuffling the cards produces sound as well as flipping the cards,
making a correct or incorrect match. These files are stored locally inside the app directory (app bundle) so
the app, using this framework, can find, load, and play them at the appropriate time throughout playing the
game.
MessageUI
MessageUI is a framework that contains classes to easily create user interfaces for sending emails
or SMS. This framework enables developers to show a composition interface for users without requiring
them to leave the app. It allows users to edit the content, send or cancel the process of sending email or
SMS. It, also, allows developers to handle the actions performed by users after showing the composition
interface ("Apple Documentation: MessageUI," 2019; Liu et al, 2011; Wooldridge & Schneider, 2011). For
instance, app developers can know if the user decides to cancel the process of sending to make the app act
differently according to user actions.
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For our app, concentration game, we used this framework to provide app users with an option of
sending via email their recall score, which is calculated and displayed after completing the game. Because
we are watching users sharing behavior of their recall score, we have implemented different code reactions
according to the sending decision user might make.

5.2.1.2 External SDKs
In addition to the internal frameworks, three external ones were used in the development of the app.
They were used to establish backend database functionality (Parse), add animations (Canvas), and interact
with Facebook for social login and sharing (Facebook SDKs).
Parse
This is a cloud-based service that equips developers with tools to establish an app backend. The
backend platform for a given app includes creating a database, sending push notifications, and other
advanced cloud functions. In our concentration game app, Parse plays a vital role in recording all the
information provided by the users as well as their behavior while interacting with the app. By using Parse,
we can track all privacy-related decisions users make during their interaction with the app.
To establish a connection between the app and Parse service, initially, we were required to create
a developer account at the provider's site (Back4App)6, then create an account for the app itself with simple
and straightforward steps. Afterward, Parse SDK for iOS was installed and linked to Xcode project using
Cocoa Pods (library management for iOS). By having the account for the app, we have obtained from the
service provider an application key, a client key, and the server url which were embedded in the app code
to make the connection. Then, using specific syntax of code, we were able to save data entered in the app
by users to the database and retrieve data from the database server provided by Back4App.
Canvas
We used this lightweight SDK to add animations to the app and make the user experience more
enjoyable. Instead of writing tens of code lines to implement very basic animations, this SDK allows
designers to decide how a selected object in the app interface acts. Canvas SDK7 has 29 kinds of moves
that could be triggered either by a user event such as pressing a button or by an app event such as loading
a screen. This SDK was installed and linked to Xcode project using Cocoa Pods.

6

https://www.back4app.com

7

https://canvaspod.io
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Facebook (FBSDKCoreKit, FBSDKLoginKit , FBSDKShareKit )
Social media integration into an app enhances its functionality by providing features to enrich user
experience. For instance, instead of filling sign-in information required by a given app, users can simply
sign in with their Twitter or Google account. In this way, users do not need to remember another account
information to use the app. Instead, they use their daily-checked social media account. In addition, from a
user perspective, instead of providing their data to another app, they trust more a social media platform that
is a well-known tech brand more than a new app recently installed on their devices. Seeing the logos of
these social media networks provides users with a great sense of familiarity and comfort. Besides that,
embedding social media SDKs into the app with sharing features makes the app more involving and allows
the app to reach a wide audience which without these SDKs is inaccessible (Krasnova et al., 2014; Liu et
al., 2018).
Although most of the social media platforms have exposed their APIs such as Twitter API,
Instagram API, YouTube API, and Pinterest API to allow developers to access their functions and integrate
them into apps, Facebook remains on the top of the list of the most famous social network site worldwide
as of January 2021 ("Most Famous Social Network Sites Worldwide," 2021). For this reason, we have
chosen Facebook SDK for iOS to represent the social integration in our app, the concentration game.
Facebook SDKs have different components each of which serve different purposes for the app.
There is Facebook Places SDK for adding location awareness to the app, Facebook Sharing SDK for sharing
app-related content on user Facebook page, and Facebook Login SDK to facilitate sign-in process
("Facebook SDK for iOS," 2019). We installed Facebook Login, Sharing, and Facebook Core SDKs. The
first one is used to examine private information revealed during the login process to the app, the second one
is used to give the user an option, besides email sharing, to share their game score in their Facebook account,
and the third one is used to analyze data of the users interacting with the app.
To implement these features, the developers should first create a developer Facebook account at
Facebook site for developers8 where they can create an app file and fill out some information about the app
such as the app platform (iOS, Android or web), and the desired Facebook services that the app would have
such as Marketing API or Instagram. We have chosen Facebook Login service. After downloading the
Facebook SDKs through Cocoa Pods, Facebook asked for the unique app ID (Bundle ID), which could be
found in Xcode's project general information, to link Facebook service to the iOS app. Then, following the
integration instructions, the app settings in Xcode had to be modified as well. Therefore, we edited the

8

https://developers.facebook.com
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Xcode project file Info.plist, which is a setting file formatted in XML, to link the app to Facebook services.
We added fields to the Info.plist file such as FacebookAppID with value app ID given by Facebook, and
FacebookDisplayName with the name that we have previously created on Facebook site. After completing
these steps, our app was ready to incorporate the integration code specified by Facebook documentation.
Upon implementation of the Facebook Login and Share, we explored what kind of user data the developer
could get from Facebook integration.
There are various permissions that Facebook can grant developers when they integrate Facebook
tools into their apps. However, these permissions have been continuously changing due to privacy issues
raised against Facebook in the recent years. Currently, Facebook puts some restrictions on access to their
users’ data. For some types of user data such as user_friends, user_gender, user_birthday, and even
user_age_range, Facebook requires approval through the App Review process similar to Apple App Store
Review process. The different permissions the developer can obtain with or without an App Review process
are listed on the developer’s Facebook website9. In our app, we tried to get all the permissions that demand
no Facebook Review process which are id, first_name, last_name, name, picture, email. It is worth
mentioning here that at the beginning of our app development, we were able to retrieve user user_gender.
However, since August 1st, 2018, accessing this type of user information requires a Facebook Review
process.10

5.2.2

Apple Application Distribution
Once the iOS app is completely developed and ready to be released, developers have three options

to distribute the app: mass distribution through the App Store, in-house distribution, and ad-hoc through
direct downloads onto specific devices The procedures to publish the app for all iOS users around the world
through Apple App Store are completely different than the procedures for apps intended to be published
for testing purposes or internal use such as within an organization only.
For mass distribution, in App Store, the app should pass Apple review process, which is a check
procedure made by experts to ensure that the app complies with Apple guidelines. Developers should
upload their apps for reviewing to App Store Connect and provide all required descriptions and documents.
This process often takes a couple of weeks. Various Apple guidelines developers should be aware of before
submitting the app to be reviewed to avoid rejection. There are Apple performance guidelines such as
ensuring all the URLs in the app are working, the app is free from bugs and crashes, the app has an accurate
description, and screenshots that inform users before downloading the app about the expected experience.
9

https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/review/login-permissions

10

https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/changelog
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There are Apple business guidelines such as developers should inform users about the expectations from
the app before asking for app subscription and not asking users new subscriptions for upgrading the same
app in which users already subscribed. Moreover, there are Apple legal guidelines such as providing an
accessible privacy policy for the app stating what data the app collects and how it will be used, only
requesting data from users that are relevant to the app functionalities and securing user consent before any
kind of user data collection. The details of these guidelines are offered on the Apple official website11. It is
worth mentioning that the developer should enroll in Apple Developer Program and pay an annual fee of
$99 before being able to ask for an app review. After getting approval from Apple Review, the app is
eligible to be published in App Store to reach users worldwide.
For internal use, or "In-house distribution", the developer should enroll in Apple Developer
Enterprise Program and pay an annual fee of $299. This program asks for a DUNS number, which is a
unique numeric identifier for a single business entity. The program allows developers to securely host and
deploy the app to their employees' devices besides other features such as technical support and team
management.
The third distribution alternative is "Ad-hoc distribution" which restricts distribution to specific
devices. This option requires enrolling in Apple Developer Program as well, however, it does not require
app approval from Apple Review. The limitation of this distribution option is that the developer can install
the app on only up to 100 devices. This alternative is consistent with the goals of this study as it provides
an instant app install on designated devices, which are enough for experimental purposes.
After the developer’s photo ID has been verified, and payment has been accepted, we were able to
create a distribution certificate. Unlike the development certificate which is used during the development
process to run the app on a device, and it is free, the distribution certificate can only be issued for the
members of Apple Developer Program. Because the Ad-hoc distribution certificate requires the unique IDs
(UDID) of all devices on which the app will be installed, we registered them in the developer’s account.
The next step was to put together the devices’ IDs, the app ID, and the certificate in one place, in a
provisioning profile. Any provisioning profile contains these three main elements and is often embedded
in the app bundle during the archiving process. Archiving Xcode project means exporting the app into the
form of .ipa file (downloadable file). Creating a provisioning profile is a way to code sign the app such that
if the app is installed on an unregistered device, the app will not launch. Likewise, if the profile has the
same UDID of the device, but with a different app ID, the app will not launch. After having the .ipa file of
the app, we were able to install it on a mobile device using drag and drop in Xcode.

11

https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines
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5.2.3

Technical Roadblocks
To successfully develop the target app, I had to overcome four main obstacles with regard to the

installation of external frameworks, continuous updates of the SDKs, changing versions of Xcode, and
identification of suitable devices for ad-hoc distribution. The next sections describe each one of these issues
in more detail.

5.2.3.1 CocoaPods Installation
When the time comes to install external frameworks, many available lessons refer to a tool called
CocoaPods. Being not familiar with it, at the beginning, delays SDKs integration. CocoaPods is a
convenient way to add, remove and update libraries needed to be embedded in the app code. Instead of
manually installing these libraries and configuring the dependencies between them, CocoaPods manages
all of that through the Terminal command lines in macOS. CocoaPods is a part of the operation system and
does not require any software installation. Using CocoaPods to add a framework asks for executing a
command line to create a podfile in the Xcode project directory, then edits podfile as a text file to write a
specific syntax indicating the needed SDKs with their versions stated. Every time the developer edits this
file, s/he should run a pod installation command line to link the libraries specified in this file to the project
under implementation. This way of framework installation was used to embed Canvas, Parse, and Facebook
SDKs into the concentration game app.

5.2.3.2 Updating SDKs
It was a programming challenge to keep up with the continuous updates introduced by SDKs
developers, as some of these updates would require re-writing code that was already working under a
previous version of given SDKs. For instance, while writing the code for this app, Facebook SDKs changed
seven times since we first integrated their framework in October 201812. However, we found a way the
developers often use CocoaPods to specify the version of the framework to keep the app running. Another
issue related to the SDKs updates is that the Xcode project for some reason could not recognize Canvas
framework after it was working smoothly using the same SDK. One of the potential solutions was to update
Canvas framework using CocoaPods and reconfigure the dependencies between the various SDKs again.

12

https://developers.facebook.com/docs/ios/change-log-4x/
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5.2.3.3 Updating Xcode
Unlike SDKs versions, it is essential for developers to produce their iOS apps for the current iOS
devices. During the development of the app, Apple has released five versions of Xcode (since May 2018).
Consequently, we have been updating Xcode until it requires updating the macOS itself (from High Sierra
to Mojave operating system) to be able to run the recently used version of Xcode 11.

5.2.3.4 iPod Devices
For the purposes of this study and the ad-hoc distribution method, we needed mobile devices on
which we could install the app. Initially, we were loaned ten iPod touch devices (from Baruch College’s
Information Systems Department) to be used in this research. However, they were all from the 5th
generation and could not be upgraded to the recent iOS system. Although we updated them to iOS 9 (the
latest version they could run), when we tried to install the app, the system was too old to accept an app with
a deployment target of iOS 12. Therefore, the department acquired 8 newer iPod touch devices from 6th
generation that run iOS 12 or up and can operate the app.
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5.3

Overview of BeautifulMind (BeaMind)
"BeautifulMind", or "BeaMind" for short, is the name of the developed app. Its name is derived

from "Beautiful Mind" movie that tells a story of a genius man. The association between the movie and the
app name is that both deal with individual intellectual ability. Another reason to prefer this name is that no
obvious link the user can infer from the app name itself and its purpose until they start using it. The
remaining part of this section is to present a visual experience of the app. The flow of app screens is depicted
in Figure 13 following by a detailed explanation of each screen.
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Figure 13: The Flow of App Screens
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Screen 1: The introductory interface. The app launches with
the above interface informing the user about the purpose of
the app. Before judging user performance, the user will be
given a small version of the game to be familiar with the game
interface elements. By pressing the button (Have Fun), the
user will be taken to the board game: Screen 2.

75

Screen 2: This interface aims to get the user familiar with the
game and interaction techniques. The game starts with 16
cards facing down and waits for the user to select which two,
one after the other, to reveal. Down in this screen, two
counters respond to user actions while playing the game. If
the user makes a selection of two cards to flip, regardless of
whether they are identical or not, the Attempts counter
increases by one counting number of tries the user has been
made so far. The second counter is implemented to reflect the
number of times the user fails to remember a card that has
been revealed previously. Therefore, the goal of the game is
to keep these two numbers low.
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Screen 3: This interface appears after the user flips the
second card of the last two cards of the game in the previous
screen, at the end of the game. The purpose of this interface
is to encourage users to know their recall score by playing
another advanced level of the game after they get used to its
small version.
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Screen 4: For the purpose of the study, and before the game
begins, the user is asked to provide the app with a user’s
nickname, email, birth year, and gender. By hitting (Start)
button, the user will be taken to the next screen.
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Screen 5: The large game board appears with 28 cards
initially facing down. The same two counters on the top of
the screen keep track of user game-decisions. The user’s
nickname, entered via the app registration form appears on
the top to give a sense of friendliness.
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Screen 6: After completion of the game board by matching
all the cards, the app measures user Recall IQ based on the
number of miss recalls s/he have made, then assesses the
score based on the best and worst scores users may have as
explained in Section 5.1.3.2. In addition, in this interface, the
user has four options. Two sharing choices either via email
sent from the app to an email specified by the user with a
screenshot of the Recall scale with user's score, or sharing via
Facebook by which a post in the user's timeline informing
her/his user Recall IQ. The other two options give the user
either a chance to play again and have another Recall IQ (go
back to screen 5) or quitting the app (go to the next screen:
Screen 7).
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Screen 7: When the user decides to exit the app, they will be
asked to take an online survey as a close up for their
participation in the experiment.
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Chapter 6: User Testing
This chapter presents a comprehensive view of the research method with the preliminary results of
the pilot study. The first section states the research questions. The next section defines the theory employed
to derive the research model and to develop the hypotheses. Following that is a detailed explanation for the
research methodology includes experimental design, tasks, and measures. Then, the chapter concludes with
the modifications on the experimental procedure which were resulted from running several pilot sessions.

6.1

Research Questions
This study aims to investigate the role of mobile app design in protecting user privacy. Abundant

research conducted in this area shows how design decisions influence the way users engage with the app
(Micinski et al., 2017; Chang et al., 2016; Patil et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2009). Users make privacy-related
decisions according to the app interface design. For instance, app notifications that remind the user of the
app’s back-end data flows could prompt users to change certain privacy settings (Almuhimedi et al., 2015).
Another example is app privacy default settings which could, with or without user knowledge, leak
information about the daily geo-locations of users (Dogruel et al., 2017). In both cases, app developers who
chose this way to design the app push users to adopt certain behavior that results in either privacy-protective
behavior or privacy breach incidents.
We have inferred from the privacy literature in mobile apps that the two main factors that influence
user privacy concerns and warrant further investigation are app transparency and user control. We believe
that these two aspects could positively influence users’ behavior towards more privacy-protective decisions
in accordance with their preferences. Therefore, in this study, we seek to explore to what extent app design
features affect user privacy concerns, and influence their interaction decisions with the app. This research
examines the potential effects of designing a mobile app that gives the user control over what information
s/he would like to disclose, and the effects of app clarity regarding its practices with user data (collected by
the app) on user privacy concerns. The research questions addressed in this study is: can we, as app
developers, influence users’ privacy concerns and disclosure behavior by introducing transparency and
control features as essential parts of app interface design? Specifically, whether revealing app privacy
practices to users and providing them with full control over their disclosure decisions can alleviate their
privacy concerns, and thus, affect their subsequent app interacting decisions.
The study draws from Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory. CPM framework is
useful to understand the tension between data-providing subjects (mobile apps users), and data recipients
(mobile apps designers) concerning privacy practices. In this study, the variations in disclosure and
concealing user decisions in mobile apps are conceptualized and explored in the light of this theory.
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6.2

Theoretical Background
Due to the complexity of defining and measuring privacy, researchers of information privacy have

focused on privacy concerns as a central construct in almost all empirical privacy research (Xu et al., 2012;
Xu et al., 2011). Privacy concerns is the main focus in this study and many studies showed that they are
antecedents to various behavior-related variables such as the intention to purchase in m-commerce
(Belkhamza et al., 2019), willingness to self-disclose in websites (Gopal et al., 2018), and online health
communities (Zhang et al, 2018).
Privacy concerns are defined as individuals’ inherent worries about the potential loss of information
privacy (Xu et al., 2011). However, such a definition does not reflect the contextual nature of privacy
concerns (Solove, 2005). It is crucial here to distinguish between dispositional privacy concerns and
context-specific privacy concerns. Following the call for the contextual emphasis of privacy concerns, we
use the definition of Xu et al. (2012) and conceptualize privacy concerns as individuals’ concerns about
the possible loss of privacy as a result of information disclosure to a specific external agent (e.g., a specific
mobile app).
In addition to privacy concerns as the focus, we are interested in exploring privacy-related behavior.
Specifically, we aim to explore how privacy concerns impact users’ actual behavior with the app as well as
users’ future intentions as a consequence of privacy concerns. We define user behavior with the app as the
extent to which users share app-generated content with others. We define user Future Intentions as the
extent to which the user would provide her/his personal information requested by the app when the app is
launched (Disclosure Intention), and her/his willingness to reuse the mobile app in the future (Continuance
Intention). More details about these dependent variables are given in the Measures section.

Communication Privacy Management
Communication Privacy Management (CPM) theory was developed by Petronio (2002) as an
attempt to understand the decisions people make about disclosing and concealing private information. The
theory is based on the concept of an invisible personal space where individuals set clearly defined
boundaries between private and public information. According to the theory, when a person decides to
self-disclose, s/he opens privacy boundaries. In contrast, maintaining closed boundaries means that the
person decides to conceal information. This conception of privacy as territoriality or personal space is
originally rooted in the seminal work of Altman (1975), one of the major privacy theorists.
CPM postulates that people believe they own their personal information and have the right to
control it. These two notions, privacy ownership, and privacy control are two main elements in the theory.
Privacy control is the decision-making process people cognitively experience when deciding what
information to disclose, when to disclose, and to whom they disclose. Therefore, individuals practice
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control over their privacy by developing personal privacy rules (Xu et al., 2012; Petronio, 2010; Petronio,
2002).
CPM theory proposes three rule elements to manage individuals’ boundaries: boundary rule
formation, boundary coordination, and turbulence (Petronio, 2010; Petronio, 2002).
Rule formation refers to the influence of individual (core) and environmental (catalyst) factors in
the development of personal privacy guidelines. It suggests that individuals depend on five criteria to
establish these rules, which are: motivations, gender, context, cost-benefit ratio, and culture. Petronio
pointed out that motivational factors are those that deal with individuals’ “goals and need for regulating
revelation and concealment” (Petronio, 2002). People have different levels of an inherent need to maintain
their privacy. For instance, some people are motivated by the need for expression, therefore, their rules are
likely to favor disclosure instead of concealing, while others are motivated by the need of avoiding
interactions that involve self-disclosure, therefore, their rules are likely to favor keeping the boundaries
closed (Xu et al., 2011). Moreover, privacy management rules are also gender-specific. Men and women
differ in the way they establish their rules to maintain privacy (Petronio, 2010). In addition, contextual
factors play a part in establishing and changing these privacy rules. The situational cues where the request
to disclose information is initiated differently influence the individuals’ decision-making process (Xu et al.,
2012; Child et al., 2011; Petronio, 2010). In this study, we seek to examine motivations, gender, and context
implications on the way people form their privacy rules while cost-benefit ratio and culture factors are
excluded from this initial exploration and left for future studies.
For boundary coordination, the theory argues that once an individual reveals personal information,
such information moves from the personal ownership domain to a collective ownership domain with whom
the disclosure was made. Having a collectively held privacy boundary implies joint responsibilities between
the original owner and the co-owner(s) to maintain the confidentiality of the disclosed information
according to the agreed-upon privacy rules (Liu & Wang 2018; Xu et al., 2011). According to CPM, the
original owner and the co-owner(s) should negotiate three types of rules to manage the collective boundary:
permeability, ownership, and linkages. First, the owners have to clearly define the information permeability
rule, which refers to parameters for determining how much others can know about one’s private
information. Second, the information ownership rule deals with parameters for determining the degree of
control co-owner(s) have to make independent revealing/concealing decisions. Third, the information
linkage rules are parameters for determining additional co-owners. Negotiating these different types of
rules controls the extent of proper dissemination and thus, coordinates the boundaries of individual privacy
(Xu et al., 2012; Child et al., 2011; Petronio, 2010).
When rules are misused or violated, the rule coordination process fails, and boundary turbulence
occurs. The original owners of the information often expect that co-owner(s), with whom they shared the
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collective privacy boundaries, will follow their privacy rules set to manage the domain (Xu et al., 2012;
Child et al., 2011). Failing to effectively navigate boundaries might be perceived by those who are involved
as an intrusion or invasion of their privacy. There are various causes for having turbulent boundaries
including no pre-existing rules between the co-owners, or rules that are not clearly defined and
understandable by the parties. Turbulence could also occur when a co-owner intentionally or mistakenly
breaks the coordinated boundary of privacy. Once the privacy regulation system is disrupted, individuals
recalibrate and readjust their privacy rules that are not functioning adequately (or as intended) with regard
to revealing and concealing information to make the system more effective in avoiding subsequent
turbulences. (Liu & Wang 2018; Child & Petronio, 2011; Petronio, 2010).
To summarize, our study applies CPM theory as a framework to explain how users manage their
privacy in the context of mobile apps, how the user boundary rules formation and coordination are
influenced by the design of the app, and how users’ self-disclosure decisions change accordingly.

6.3

Research model and Hypotheses Development
Figure 14 depicts the research model proposed for this study. Based on the CPM framework

described above, this research model specifies that privacy concerns and its subsequent privacy-related
behaviors are 1) formed by individual’s perceived boundary of the information space that depends on
individual’s characteristics as well as contextual factors 2) coordinated by perceived contextual assessment
of trust and intrusion that enable individuals to judge the consequences of personal information disclosure.
Each construct in the model is defined in the following sections. The CPM framework described above is
used as the foundation to formulate hypotheses. We seek to examine what factors affect user privacy
concerns and contribute to explaining user interaction and disclosure behavior in the light of CPM
framework.
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Figure 14: Research Model

6.3.1

Boundary Rule Formation
This research model specifies user control, app transparency, disposition to value privacy, and trust

propensity, as mechanisms to form the privacy rules for individuals. The former two represent the
contextual or the environmental factors while the latter two represent the core factors in the rule formation
process. The core factors for rule formation are excluded from the research model as they are employed in
this study as control elements. The model focuses on the contextual factors user control and app
transparency as the two independent variables that influence the rule formation process.

6.3.1.1 Disposition to Value Privacy
It is a personality attribute that shows how much individuals “value privacy” (Xu et al., 2008). It
is a stable non-changing inherent nature that is reflected in how individuals manage the opening and closing
of the privacy boundaries (Liu & Wang 2018; Xu et al., 2011). This general tendency to preserve personal
space is formed through past life experiences, demographic characteristics, and other personality factors
(Xu et al., 2011). The CPM framework acknowledges the role of individual characteristics in determining
the opening and closing of the privacy boundaries and in creating the rules (Petronio, 2011). Therefore, we
propose this element as a control variable.

6.3.1.2 Trust Propensity
Similar to disposition to value privacy, trust propensity or dispositional trust, is a personality trait
that is formed through socialization and life experience and invariant across situations. The trust literature
has various definitions for trust propensity, however, the definition of Colquitt et al. (2007) as “dispositional
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willingness to rely on others” is more relevant to the current study. The trust propensity here is employed
as a control variable.

6.3.1.3 User Control
The core concept on which CPM is built is that people believe they own their private information
(Petronio 2002). They control the information flow through their boundaries according to the rules they
formed. User control can be defined as the degree to which people perceive they control their information
disclosure decisions (Liu & Wang 2018). Allowing individuals to fully control their privacy boundaries
enhances their sense of ownership. In the context of mobile apps, when users are granted control over which
information to reveal or conceal, they are more likely to feel secure and comfortable and have a high
tendency to trust the app with which they are interacting. Thus, we propose:
H1a: User control is positively related to perceived trust.
Further, when individuals lose control over their boundaries, unwanted exposure to their
information might occur. According to CPM (Petronio, 2002), people have the right to control when to
open their boundaries and when to keep them closed. To disclose information, people need to form their
intention before engaging in the actual action. Inability to voluntary form the intention by enforcing people
to open their boundaries violates the sense of ownership. In the context of mobile apps, when users lose the
ability to control their disclosure decisions and compel to reveal information, they are more likely to feel
intruded into their boundaries by the app. Conversely, when individuals feel that they can control the
amount of information they disclose, the feelings of perceived intrusion should be lower. To summarize,
we propose:
H1b: User control is negatively related to perceived intrusion.

6.3.1.4 App Transparency
App transparency is suggested as a mechanism to inform users when they disclose personal
information. The disclosed information would be held in a co-owned domain where the co-owner accepts
responsibilities for keeping user information secure and private. In a mobile app setting, app transparency
specifically refers to the extent to which user is informed about privacy practices and policies of how the
collected information is used. According to the CPM framework, the situational and environmental factors
influence the management of the privacy rules. We propose that having certain app design cues such as app
transparency during the user-app interaction is more likely to increase user perceived trust towards the app
and facilitates managing the boundaries, therefore, we propose:
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H2a: App transparency is positively related to perceived trust.
In contrast, when a mobile app exhibits obscurity about its data practices, users perceive the
situation as less comfortable to disclose information due to the uncertainty about the app practices. Based
on the previous discussion of CPM, this represents the absence of privacy rules that should be clearly
defined and negotiated between the original owner (the app user) and the co-owner (the app). As Petronio
(2002) pointed out the lack of such pre-existing rules for a situation causes turbulence among co-owners.
Users who interact with such an app probably experience concerns about their privacy, whereas more
transparency would alleviate their concerns, therefore we propose:
H2b: App transparency is negatively related to privacy concerns.

6.3.1.5 User Control and App Transparency
The interaction effect of the two previous constructs is examined in this section. When individuals
are provided with control to establish and maintain their privacy boundaries, and when they have clear
expectations of the other party’s intentions in a given context, they are more likely to have a high level of
trust toward the said party and are more likely to feel less intruded upon by others. Based on CPM, granting
people control would probably enhance their sense of ownership over their private information flows, thus,
making them feel safer from unwanted parties. In addition, having clearly stated privacy rules to maintain
the private space would probably enhance the individual’s perceived trust. In a mobile app setting, when
users have a clear picture of what the app would do with disclosed information and users voluntarily decide
to disclose, the app is more likely to be perceived as trustworthy and less intrusive. Therefore, we propose:
H3a: User control with app transparency is positively related to perceived trust.
H3b: User control with app transparency is negatively related to perceived intrusion.

6.3.2 Boundary Rule Coordination and Turbulence
6.3.2.1 Perceived Intrusion
In the privacy literature, the concept of intrusion has often been related to the concept of personal
space (Xu et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2008; Solove, 2005). Intrusions or invasions to one’s personal space are
often deemed unacceptable and can result in a variety of responses from feelings of discomfort to actions
that aim to reduce the interaction (Petronio, 2002; Shklovski et al., 2014). Existing research in the privacy
literature uses Solove’s (2005) definition of intrusion as “invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquility of
solitude” (Xu et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2008). When individuals feel intruded upon by an unwanted entity that
invades their personal space, they might experience a disruption in their privacy regulation system. Our
study proposes perceived intrusion as a trigger for boundary turbulence. Inability to maintain their private
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space is likely to make them more anxious about their privacy, and thus increase their concerns. In the
context of a mobile app, when users feel intruded on by the app in their private space, they will experience
a high level of privacy concerns. Therefore, we propose:
H4: Perceived intrusion is positively related to privacy concerns.

6.3.2.2 Perceived Trust
It worth noting that we differentiate between trust propensity, which is an individual characteristic,
and individual perceived trust, which is a situational characteristic. This distinction between the two
constructs complies with the work of Pavlou & Gefen (2004) who indicate the effect of propensity to trust
in increasing trust in online contexts. Perceived trust is defined as “users’ confidence in a service provider’s
reliability and integrity” (Akter et al, 2013). It is the willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive
expectations from a trustee (Colquitt et al., 2007; Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). A similar definition is in the work
of Malhotra et al. (2004). The relationship between trust propensity and perceived trust has been previously
explored in other studies such as risk-taking and job performance (Colquitt et al., 2007), and online
marketplaces (Pavlou, & Gefen, 2004).
We propose here that perceived trust is a key factor in determining user privacy concerns. This
premise is consistent with several studies (Park & Kwak 2012; Chellappa & Sin, 2005; Metzger 2004) that
show the influence of trust in institutions or people on privacy concerns. In the context of this study,
individuals who perceive a low level of trust in the app during the interaction are more likely to be anxious
about their privacy, and thus they may experience a high level of privacy concerns. In contrast, those who
perceive the app they are interacting with as trustworthy probably have a lower level of privacy concerns,
therefore we hypothesize:
H5: Perceived trust is negatively related to privacy concerns.

6.3.2.3 User Future Intentions
This research seeks to examine how privacy concerns influence user intention to reuse the app.
Continuance intention of a mobile app can be an appropriate indicator for the success of the app, and
consistent with prior literature, it is defined as “a measure of the strength of one's intention to perform a
specified behavior repeatedly” (Becker, 2007). Individuals with a low level of privacy concerns are more
likely to continue using the app. If users comfortably interact with the app and associate it with low privacy
concerns, they are more likely to have a future intention to reuse it. Therefore, we propose:
H6a: User privacy concerns is negatively related to user continuance intention.
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In addition to continuance intention, the intention to disclose personal information to the app when
it becomes available is also a relevant indicator of future plans. Individuals with a low level of privacy
concerns would be more willing to disclose personal information with the app in the future. However, those
with high levels of privacy concerns, may be less likely to disclose personal information in future interaction
with the app. Therefore, we propose:
H6b: User privacy concerns is negatively related to user intention to disclose.

6.3.2.4 User Actual Behavior
In addition to user future intentions as another dependent variable, we are interested in exploring
how user privacy concerns has an impact on privacy-related subsequent behavior related to the mobile app.
We defined disclosure behavior as how much of their personal information users reveal to the app. We
defined sharing behavior as the decision to share their performance in the app with others.
Individuals with a high level of privacy concerns are less likely to disclose their personal
information and share less about their app performance. Those who have a high level of privacy concerns
towards the app probably perceive the interaction with it as less safe to share their information with the app
or use the app features to share information with others. They are more likely to be conservative with
regards to sharing their information with such an app. To summarize, we propose:
H7a: User privacy concerns is negatively related to user disclosure behavior.
H7b: User privacy concerns is negatively related to user sharing behavior.
To summarize, all the constructs are presented in Table 15.
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Table 15: Definitions of the Research Model Constructs

Construct

Definition

User Control

The degree to which users perceive they control their information disclosure
decisions

App Transparency

The extent to which user is informed about privacy practices and policies of
how the collected information is used

Perceived Intrusion

Invasive acts that disturb user’s tranquility of solitude

Perceived Trust

Users’ confidence in a service provider’s reliability and integrity

Privacy Concerns

Individuals’ concerns about a possible loss of privacy as a result of
information disclosure to a specific external agent

Future Intentions

A measure of the strength of one's intention to disclose personal information
(Disclosure Intention) and to use the app repeatedly (Continuance Intention).

Actual Behavior

How much of their information users reveal to the app or share through the
app.

Disposition to Value Privacy

How much user “value privacy”

Trust Propensity

Dispositional willingness to rely on others

6.4

Methodology

6.4.1

Experimental Design
To investigate the effects of app design on privacy concerns and disclosure behavior, a laboratory

experiment will be conducted. The experimental design is a 2×2 factorial crossing app transparency
(Yes/No) with user control (Yes/No).
We operationalized app transparency in this study as having a real-time notice shown prior to the
user’s first potential disclosure behavior. The purpose of this message is to design for increased app
trustworthiness. It is to accurately inform the user at the moment of the decision-making process about the
app’s privacy practices regarding user disclosed information.
Arguably, the privacy policy of an app is another transparency mechanism often utilized by app
developers. However, we believe, as various studies have proved, in the ineffectiveness of this method due
to various reasons such as the typical length, complexity, and inaccessibility of the language in these
policies (Shayegh et al., 2019; Schaub et al., 2017; Reidenberg et al., 2015). Therefore, we decided to
examine the effect of a pop-up contextual-dependent window, as an additional approach to privacy policy,
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on user disclosure-decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to show the app’s data
practices to the user in the form of a pop-up notice upon making disclosure decisions.
We operationalized user control in the experiment by asking the user to either fill out required fields
or fill out optional fields with her/his personal information. In the first case, users cannot use the app unless
they answer personal questions, and thus, have no control over their information disclosure. In the second
case, app users have the option whether to provide answers to personal questions, thereby having full control
over their privacy boundaries. Conceivably, user control could be implemented by offering privacy settings.
However, we chose an optional vs. required approach to examine its effect during interacting with the app
due to a scarcity of studies that examine the effect of this design cue on user privacy concerns and the
subsequent decisions.
In the experiment, we will randomly assign the participant to one of four conditions, which vary
across two factors: app transparency, and user control. Factor manipulations were implemented by
designing four versions of the app to reflect the experimental treatment conditions. The app interface that
represents the four different conditions is presented in Figure 15. Following the figure is a detailed
explanation of each condition.
Condition 1 (ConTran): In this version of the app, the participant has the option to either disclose some or
all of the four personal information items (nickname, email, year of birth, gender) requested in the
registration screen of the app before proceeding to the next screen. It is indicated in the requested field that
it is “Optional”. By designing the app this way, the participant has control over whether to provide her/his
information. In addition, this version of the app will show a pop-up window stating briefly that user data
would be kept in the app’s server for analysis purposes. Showing a real-time notice upon forming user
decision is how app transparency was operationalized in this experiment. Therefore, subjects in this
condition will have a transparency message about the app data practices at the time of them exercising
control over their disclosure decisions.
Condition 2 (ConNoTran):
In this version of the app, the participant has the option to either disclose some or all of the four personal
information items (nickname, email, year of birth, gender) requested in the registration screen of the app
before proceeding to the next screen. It is indicated in the requested field that it is “Optional”. By designing
the app this way, the participant has control over whether to provide her/his information. Without showing
a pop-up window, subjects in this condition will have no information about app data practices the whole
time during which they interact with the app.
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Condition 1

Condition 2

Condition 3

Condition 4

User control (Yes):

User control (Yes):

User control (No):

User control (No):

personal data entries are

personal data entries are

personal data entries are

personal data entries are

optional.

optional.

required.

required.

App transparency (Yes):

App transparency (No):

App transparency (Yes):

App transparency (No):

message appears

no message appears

message appears

no message appears

ConTran

ConNoTran

NoConTran

NoConNoTran

Figure 15: The Experimental Conditions

Condition 3 (NoConTran):
In this version of the app, the participant must fill out all of the four personal information items (nickname,
email, year of birth, gender) requested in the registration screen of the app before proceeding to the next
screen. It is indicated in the requested field that it is “Required”. By designing the app this way, the
participant has no control over whether to provide her/his information. In addition, this version of the app
will show a pop-up window stating briefly that user data would be kept in the app’s server for analysis
purposes. Showing a real-time notice upon asking for mandatory personal data entry is how app
transparency was operationalized in this condition.

Therefore, subjects in this group will have a

transparency message about the app data practices when they are forced to provide their personal
information.
Condition 4 (NoConNoTran):
In this version of the app, the participant has to fill out all of the four personal information items (nickname,
email, year of birth, gender) requested in the registration screen of the app before proceeding to the next
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screen. It is indicated in the requested field that it is “Required”. By designing the app this way, the
participant has no control over whether to provide her/his information. In addition, this version of the app
will not show anything about the app data practices. Providing no information about app data practices
upon asking for mandatory personal data entry is how the app with no transparency was operationalized in
this condition. Therefore, subjects in this group will have no transparency message about how their personal
data would be handled even though they are forced to provide their personal information.

6.4.2

Subjects
Participants will be recruited from a subject pool in an introductory course in information systems

at a large urban college. A common challenge in designing privacy studies is to avoid drawing subject
attention to the privacy issues under investigation. If participants focus on the privacy aspect of the app, the
results would not accurately reflect the decisions they typically make while interacting with a mobile app
in a real-life situation. Therefore, a recruitment announcement (shown in Appendix F) was sent by the
college’s research participation system inviting them to an experimental session conducted in a study lab.
The experiment is approved by IRB and announced as a study that generally explores the influence of app
interface design on user decision-making, and asks them about their app design-related suggestions.
Participants receive course credit for taking part in this study lab. The user consent form is presented in
Appendix G.

6.4.3

Tasks
Participants interact with the mobile game app we developed (BeaMind) which was described

previously in Chapter 5. Different versions of the app (depending upon the experimental condition) were
installed on iPod devices. The iPod devices were selected as an attempt to mimic the smartphone apps
experience and provide a similar environment for all participants. The experimental task consists of the
completion of a classic matching game by playing a demo version first, then playing two rounds of an
advanced level of the same game. The demo version aims to familiarize the user with the game environment
and to build interaction expectations within the game context. The game requires a certain level of mental
concentration, therefore, we exposed users with an initial chance to warm up before judging their recall
ability. Before playing the two trials, participants are asked to fill out an app registration screen that asks
for general user information: nickname, email, year of birth, and gender. Upon finishing each game, a screen
displays the user’s recall score calculated via the app using the algorithm explained in the previous chapter.
To minimize the chance for participants informing future subjects about the way to beat the game, each
iteration starts with a different randomly ordered set of cards. The app is a game with no time limits to
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achieve a certain level of user engagement. To examine user privacy aspects, throughout the interfaces, we
embedded various designing cues that reflect the four experimental conditions.

6.4.4

Procedure
The in-lab experiment involves three parts: Sona registration system, computer for questionnaire

completion, and iPod for using the app. Subjects who are interested in participating in this experiment will
sign up first in the subject pool management system (Sona). This system provides a list of timeslots
participants could select according to their preferences to start the lab session. Upon arrival, each participant
signs up a sheet with their unique Sona number. This number is used later for granting credits, and for
associating users’ interaction decisions with the app (game log) with their answers to the questionnaire.
After signing up, the subject is randomly assigned to a condition. Each subject will sit on a desk
that has a computer, an iPod, a printed consent form, and an index card. The index card (shown in Appendix
H) has brief instructions about the experiment. The card directs participants to type in their computers a
shortened questionnaire URL address in the Internet browser. The questionnaire link represents the starting
point for collecting experimental data. After entering their Sona number in the questionnaire, and
electronically accepting the printed consent form, they will be directed to a pre-task questionnaire. Upon
completion of the pre-task questionnaire, subjects will then be given more specific instructions on the screen
pertaining to the app installed on their iPods which they will be asked to try. Figure 16 shows the sequence
of steps participants go through when they come to the lab session. We will refer to this lab study as Study
1 throughout the dissertation.

START

1

2

3

4

5

Sheet

Electronic

Pre-task

Playing the game

Post-task

Signing Up

Consent

questionnaire

using iPod

questionnaire

END

Figure 16: Sequence of Steps Participants Go Through in Study 1.
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6.4.5

Measures
This study includes two kinds of measures: objective measures collected from the developed app

(game log) and subjective measures collected from scales embedded in the pre- and post- task questionnaire.
Subjective measures assess user Privacy Concerns and user Future Intentions. In user Future
Intentions we measure two variables: Continuance Intention, and Disclosure Intention of personal
information. In addition, we use previously validated standard scales to measure the remaining research
constructs: Disposition to Value Privacy, Trust Propensity, Perceived Trust, and Perceived Intrusion.
Objective measures, on the other hand, capture participants sharing behavior decisions for their
personal information and their performance in the app. Disclosure Behavior and Sharing Behavior are the
contextually grounded measures gathering the actual decisions user make while interacting with the app.
Details of these measures are provided in the following sections.

6.4.5.1 Disposition to Value Privacy
We thought it is necessary to evaluate the subject’s general attitude toward privacy before engaging
with the app. In other words, how much subjects normally value privacy and maintaining their personal
space. For this goal, we based our three questions on a slightly modified scale taken from Malhotra et al.
(2004).

6.4.5.2 Trust Propensity
Trust propensity is explaining to some degree, actions an individual might take in various
situations. Therefore, we believe it is crucial to measure this variable as part of our research model before
the participant interacts with the app. Trust propensity will be measured using a slightly modified scale of
Cheung et al. (2001).

6.4.5.3 Perceived Trust
Perceived trust is a key factor in determining user privacy concerns. Therefore, for this construct,
the McKnight et al. (2002) scale will be used to capture how the user perceives the interaction with the app
in terms of the trust. The scale will be adapted with minor modifications to appropriately reflect mobile app
context.
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6.4.5.4 Perceived Intrusion
Feeling intruded upon by unwanted parties has its influence on user privacy concerns. We believe
it is necessary to capture how the user perceives the interaction with the app in terms of intrusion. This
construct will be measured using a slightly modified scale of Xu et al. (2008).

6.4.5.5 Privacy Concerns
Privacy concerns is shown to be the strongest predictor for user subsequent privacy-related
decisions (Psychoula et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2008). This study seeks to explore how
mobile-related privacy concerns are formed according to the way the app is designed. Therefore, the main
dependent variable we are interested in and in its impact on participants’ behavior is user’s privacy
concerns. We assess the subject’s privacy concerns according to the scale of Concern for Information
Privacy (CFIP), which is one of the most reliable instruments measuring individuals’ concerns toward
organizational privacy practices. Similar to the work of Xu et al. (2008), which examines user privacy
concerns in the context of websites, the wording of the questions was slightly modified to appropriately
capture the perceptions of mobile apps privacy practices. The 5-item scale used in (Xu et al., 2008) for
measuring privacy concerns was adapted and included in the questionnaires with a five-point Likert scale.

6.4.5.6 User Future Intentions
Continuance Intention
It is argued in this study that the Continuance Intention of a given mobile app can be an appropriate
indicator for the success of the app features in alleviating user privacy concerns. Therefore, we thought to
examine this construct by including a three-item scale adapted from (Li et al., 2012) to capture user
behavioral intention to reuse the app. We refined the three questions to make them specifically relevant to
the present research context.
In addition to the scale, we included two general questions to examine user intention to
reuse/download the app if it is available on app stores. Specifically, participants will be asked “Given
another chance to try "BeaMind" app, would you play the game again?”, and “If "BeaMind" app was on
Apple App Store, would you download it on your mobile device?” The response format for these two
questions is Yes or No. These two questions would provide a generic view of how participants perceive
the developed app as a further attempt to understand their continual use.
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Disclosure Intention
We argue that the intention to disclose personal information to the app when it becomes available
indicates the level of user privacy concerns towards the app. We measure this construct by using a slightly
modified 3-item scale of Xu et al., (2009).

6.4.5.7 Actual User Behavior
Disclosure Behavior
Disclosure Behavior is an ordinal variable that is captured by the app to evaluate how many
information items participants provide on the registration screen. Instead of having a binary variable such
that whether the subject discloses or conceals, Disclosure Behavior counts how many fields the user fills
out. This fine-grained disclosure measure can have one of these values: 0/4, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4, and 4/4. The first
value indicates that the user provided nothing from the four requested fields, while the last value indicates
that the respondent provided all of the requested fields. Although Disclosure Behavior is only applicable in
two conditions of the experiment, this measure is kept for later sub-analysis.
Sharing Behavior
Similarly, Sharing Behavior captures how users select to share their recall IQ score obtained from
the app in all four treatment conditions. The app provides options to share (either via email or via Facebook)
the best recall IQ score they got. The Sharing Behavior variable categorizes participants behavior according
to their decisions into either: “Nothing” (when the subject did not click on any sharing button, neither
Facebook nor Email), “Sharing Via FB Only” (when the user posted the score on her/his Facebook
timeline), “Sharing Via Email Only” (when the user sent the score to an email), or “Double Sharing” when
the participant selects the two ways of sharing. For Sharing Behavior measure, we further add a selfreported measure in the post-task questionnaire adapted from Xu et al., (2009) to assess subjectively the
indented behavior of sharing the game score through the app.
By providing these multiple dependent measures to evaluate user behavior, we hope to enable a
multi-faceted exploration of what user perceives and how this is reflected in their behavior while interacting
with the app. The questionnaire section below details the scales adapted for this study.

6.4.5.8 Manipulation Checks
The two independent variables of interest in this study are app transparency and user control
features. To investigate the effects of our experimental manipulations, subjects are asked to indicate
whether they perceived the app was transparent about its data practices and whether they perceived a
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satisfying level of control over what personal information they should provide to the app. The checks were
implemented via two survey items included in the post-task questionnaire for all participants, including
those in the four experimental groups.
Whether participants perceived the app as one that has transparency and control features can help
in determining if the app was experienced accurately as intended regarding the experimental conditions.
This validity assessment of the experimental manipulations might contribute to explain any unexpected
influence of the independent variables over the dependent ones.

6.4.6

Questionnaire
The items of the pre- and post-questionnaires are presented in Appendix I. The subsequent sections

show the details of the various scales utilized in the experiment.

6.4.6.1 Pre-task questionnaire
The pre-task questionnaire aims to assess individual-characteristics variables. Disposition to Value
Privacy indicates the prior state of the user related to how much s/he “value privacy”, and is used as a
control when analyzing privacy concerns. For Disposition to Value Privacy, we based our three questions
on a slightly modified scale adapted from Malhotra et al. (2004). Participants will be asked to rate, based
on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”, the following statements:
•

Compared to others, I am more sensitive about the way mobile apps handle my personal
information.

•

To me, it is the most important thing to keep my online privacy.

•

Compared to others, I tend to be more concerned about threats to my personal privacy.

Moreover, in the pre-task questionnaire, subjects will be asked for evaluating their trust propensity.
Similarly, this pre-task measure indicates the prior state of the user related to trust propensity and is used
as a control when analyzing trust. Trust propensity will be measured using a slightly modified version of
the scale that Cheung et al. (2001) used to measure Trust propensity using a 5-point Likert scale anchored
by “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”:
•

It is easy for me to trust a developer or an object.

•

My tendency to trust a developer or an object is high.

•

I tend to trust a developer or an object, even though I have little knowledge of it.
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6.4.6.2 Post-task questionnaire
At the end of “BeaMind” app trial, participants will be asked to complete a questionnaire that
captures the remaining research model constructs: Perceived Trust, Perceived Intrusion, Privacy Concerns,
Continuance Intention, and Disclosure/Sharing Intention. Table 16 shows the items of the post-task
questionnaire for the four constructs which are derived from previously validated scales with minor
modifications to appropriately reflect mobile app context. All the constructs will be measured using fivepoint Likert scales ranging from “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree”.
Further, the post-task questionnaire gathers some demographic characteristics of the respondents
including age, gender, ethnicity, and educational backgrounds. We included these control measures to rule
out alternative explanations of findings.
Table 16: Post-task Questionnaire Items

Construct

Items

References

Perceived Trust
•

I believe that the developers behind this app acts in my best interest.

•

If I required help, the developers behind this app would do its best to help (2002)

McKnight et al.

me.
•

The developers behind this app is interested in my well-being.

•

The developers behind this app is truthful in its dealing with me.

•

I characterize the developers behind this app as honest.

•

The developers behind this app keeps its commitments to me.

Perceived Intrusion

•

I feel that as a result of my using these apps, others know about me more than Xu et al. (2008)
I am comfortable with.

•

I believe that as a result of my using these apps, the information about me
that I consider private is now more readily available to others than I would
want to.

•

I feel that as a result of my using these apps, the information about me is out
there that, if used, will invade my privacy.

•

I feel that as a result of my using these apps, my privacy has been invaded by
the others that collect all the data about me.
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Privacy Concerns
•

It bothers me when these apps ask me for this much personal information.

•

I am concerned that these apps are collecting too much personal information (2008),
about me.

Xu et al.,
Originally
developed by

•

I am concerned that unauthorized people may access my personal Smith et al.
(1996)
information.

•

I am concerned that these apps may keep my personal information in a nonaccurate manner.

•

I am concerned about submitting information to apps.

Continuance Intention
•

Assuming that I had “BeaMind” app, I intend to reuse it.

•

Given that I had “BeaMind” app, I predict that I would reuse it.

•

I would reuse “BeaMind” app for entertainment.

Li et al. (2012)

Disclosure Intention (added later)
•

I would be willing to share my personal information through BeaMind when Xu et al., (2009)
it becomes available.

•

I would be likely to share my personal information through BeaMind when
it becomes available.

•

I would probably share my personal information through BeaMind when it
becomes available.

Intention to Share (self-report added later)
•

I was willing to share my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through (Xu et al., 2009)
“BeaMind” when it became available.

•

I was likely to share my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through
“BeaMind” when it became available.
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•

I was probably sharing my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through
“BeaMind” when it became available.

6.4.7

Data Analysis
Once all the data is collected, Privacy Concerns, and its subsequent related behavior outcomes:

Extent of Disclosure, Extent of Sharing, and Continuance Intention are compared across all the conditions
to determine the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. A statistical package R is
used to conduct the necessary statistical tests.

6.4.8

Timeline
A pilot study was conducted in fall 2019 to evaluate the experimental setting, specifically the tasks,

procedure, and functionality of the mobile app “BeaMind”. A few sessions for lab study were conducted in
Spring 2020. Then, the online experiment was conducted in fall 2020.

6.5

Pilot Study
In fall 2019, we ran initial pilots to test the experimental procedures. Our initial sampling frame

consists of 60 business school students at a large public urban university in New York City. Over two
weeks, we were able to collect data from 80 students, and among them, 70 students completed the
experiment. The remaining ten students did not complete experiencing all app screens, and hence, we were
not able to collect complete data from them for our initial analysis. While running the pilot study, we
observed areas in the experimental procedure that need refinement.
For app completion assurance, when a participant finished experiencing the app and reached its
final screen, s/he will ask the researcher to enter a password in the questionnaire screen allowing them to
proceed to the post-task questionnaire. This intervention was implemented later as a completion assurance,
after observing that some participants filled out the post-test questionnaire without finishing the game.
Another modification we made is that we excluded Facebook login element from the app
registration form. This is to emphasize the way users interact with the app without introducing any thirdparty in the middle. Integrating social media element at the beginning would add another dimension for
examining user privacy concerns in mobile apps, and confound the perceptions about the app. There would
be two distinct routes users could select either trust app developers or trust social media platforms embedded
in the app. We preferred to defer such a comparison for future study.
In addition, we interviewed some pilot study participants who completed the experiment to obtain
general feedback to improve the experimental environment and the mobile app. From their general
comments, we did make minor modifications. For instance, we added information about the game app they
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are asked to play in the pre-task questionnaire screen, though these “How to play” instructions were already
embedded in one of the introductory interfaces of the app itself.
Regarding user privacy behavior, it is important to point out that we asked subjects (in the
interviews) whether they looked for the app’s privacy policy while they were using the app. At the
beginning of the pilot sessions, there was no Privacy Policy link. Almost all of them indicated that they did
not bother to look for the Privacy Policy. To collect more systematic data, we programmed a Privacy Policy
button in the app. The goal of this button is to provide experimental evidence about the extent to which
participants voluntarily consult the Privacy Policy of a new app.
Another intriguing finding we noticed from the initial experimental sessions is that nearly all
participants showed an unwillingness to share their recall IQ score via the two programmed ways of sharing.
Therefore, we added an open-ended question in the post-questionnaire asking them to explain the reason
behind such behavior. We also added scale of Intention to Disclose/Share and embedded it in the postquestionnaire aiming to clarify mobile app user’s behavior toward sharing.
We also observed that the scale for privacy concerns might not accurately reflect their behavior.
For instance, one participant expressed a high level of privacy concerns, while s/he voluntarily provided all
the optional personal fields. In order to understand this possible contradiction, we added a context-related
yes-no question asking for their comfort level providing each item (nickname, email, year of birth, and
gender) to the app. This would hopefully provide more insights into mobile users’ privacy concerns.
Further, to obtain more insights about the participants’ general privacy preferences, we included
one of the most commonly cited privacy indexes: Westin’s scale (Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2015). This scale
segments people into three categories: Fundamentalists, Pragmatists, and Unconcerned according to their
answers to three questions related to the use of personal information by commercial entities. We embedded
the most recent set of questions of the scale in the pre-task questionnaire to examine the participant’s
perception towards mobile app data protection (Taylor, 2003). This scale was added later as an attempt to
improve the pre-task questionnaire used in the pilot test. The following are Westin’s scale items:
•

Users have lost all control over how personal information is collected and
used by mobile apps.

•

Most mobile apps handle personal information they collect about users in a
proper and confidential way.

•

Existing laws and apps practices provide a reasonable level of protection
for user privacy today.

Brief descriptive statistics of the preliminary data obtained from the pilot tests across the four
conditions are presented in Table 17. As mentioned earlier in this section, we implemented in the app a
button linking to an app privacy policy screen. The button led to a screen with a note that the Privacy Policy
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is currently under development. The purpose of this is to check how many participants are interested in
reading the app’s Privacy Policy before engaging with it. Surprisingly, after the button was included only
three participants (out of 70) clicked on that button.
The final flow of the app screens reflecting the comments gathered from running the pilot tests is
given in Figure 17. This version of the app would be adopted for the current study to collect the necessary
data.
Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of the Pilot Test

Conditions

App Transparency
NO

NO

User

YES

#Participants = 18

#Participants = 17

Average of Disclosure = 100%

Average of Disclosure = 100%

Sharing action = 3 participants

Sharing action = 1 participant

(via Email Only)

(via Email Only)

#Participants = 17

#Participants = 18

Average of Disclosure = 38.24%

Average of Disclosure = 47.22%

Sharing action = 0 participant

Sharing action = 0 participant

Control

YES
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Figure 17: The Final Version of BeaMind's Screens
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6.6

Modifications on the Experimental Procedure
Due to the current pandemic restrictions related to the conduction of lab studies with participants,

we opted for an online experimental setting where the researcher met with participants via
videoconferencing instead of in the lab. This shifting involved some alterations mainly at two levels:
technical and procedural. This section briefly highlights the main changes that have been made to
accommodate the current situation.
At the technical level, we previously used iPod devices as an experimental tool to deliver the app
to participants. Because this option became impossible due to logistic constraints, we looked for alternative
ways to make the app accessible to participants. One potential path was to convert the app to merely HTML
interfaces on the browser and share the link, however, this would undermine the nature of the mobile app
that is supposed to run as an app on a mobile device, and not as a webpage on a computer. In addition, our
app has interactive features that would be difficult (if not impossible) to implement in a web-browser
platform. The alternative path was to deliver the app to the participants’ own mobile devices (e.g.,
smartphones). While this is an optimal solution, it comes with various challenges.
From a design perspective, the developer who intends to have an app that works on various mobile
devices, with different screen sizes, needs to consider that variety at the early stages of designing the
interfaces and building the app. In our case, as we initially anticipated having a fixed screen size (iPod), we
did not accommodate screen size or mobile device variety considerations while developing the app. This
became an issue when the interfaces that were perfectly working on iPod devices could not be displayed
well on other devices. Therefore, we had to work on auto layout features for all app’s screens to make them
perfectly displayed on any iOS device.
From a distribution perspective, to make iOS app accessible to remote users, the developer has to
upload it to App Store. This option requires approval from the Apple review team in addition to specific
procedures that require filling out forms. We had to find another way to utilize the Apple Store distribution
platform to reach distant participants without going through the App Store complicated approval
procedures. Apple offers such an alternative to test apps that are currently being developed. Through Apple
TestFlight App, which is an intermediate testing platform between the developer and the users, we can
invite designated users to download and test the app. Although this way of distribution imposes lower
demands for Apple review time and effort, it adds extra technical steps on the user side and that challenge
will be explained later.
Therefore, for this dissertation, we have two app versions: iPod and iPhone versions. Both apps
have similar functionality and differ only in the layout of the interfaces. The iPod’s version runs perfectly
on only iPod devices and is compatible with their screen size. The iPhone version is the iPod’s app that was
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adjusted to runs on various iPhone screen sizes. The iPod version was used to conduct the lab study (Study
1), while the iPhone version was used to conduct the online study (Study 2).
At the experimental level, the two parts of Study 1 remain the same: Sona registration system and
computer for questionnaire completion. However, the experimental tool is different. Instead of using preloaded iPods, participants have to download the app onto their own iOS phones at the beginning of the
experimental session. The sessions are conducted via Zoom platform, at prescheduled timeslots, with a
duration of an hour. Participants has to join the Zoom session they previously booked. Each session
accommodates a maximum of six participants. The recruitment flyer and consent form for this online study
are shown in Appendix J and Appendix K respectively.
Like the lab sessions, Zoom sessions do not use audio communication to provide a suitable
atmosphere for conducting the experimental session without having participants interrupt each other. Upon
showing up in Zoom room, each participant provides her/his unique Sona number via Zoom Chat. This
number is used later for granting credits, and for associating users’ interaction decisions with the app (game
log) with their answers to the questionnaire. Then, participants are provided with a survey link that
represents the starting point of data collection.
The survey itself navigates participants through six main parts: email request, consent form, phone
preparation, pre-task questionnaire, installing and trying the app, and post-task questionnaire. The
researcher asks for each participant’s email to send the app invitation link through App Store Connect.
Using this Apple program developer can assign a specific app version to a specific email. Participants’
emails are a vital element to deliver the app to their devices. Each subject’s email is randomly assigned to
an app version (condition). Then, they proceed to accept/reject the electronic consent form. By accepting
the consent, the participant moves to set up their devices by downloading TestFlight App from Apple Store.
Detailed instructions are presented to them to make this step smooth for all iPhone users (See Appendix L).
After getting their phones ready to receive and install the app, participants have to answer the pretask questionnaire. By the time they complete this part, they should have received the invitation link to
download a specific app version. Using the link, they can download and test the app. Details of this part are
graphically illustrated to subjects (See Appendix M). These graphic instructions address any potential
technical issues they might encounter and alleviate the burden on the researcher, who has to manage each
participant individually in a limited-time session.
Participants are asked to notify the researcher when they complete the interaction with the app (i.e.,
going over all app screens). This interruption in the flow of the survey ensures that the app interaction step
is completed. At this point, the researcher checks the database of the app to verify if the participant has
finished. If the database shows incomplete interaction, the researcher informs the participant to go back to
the app and complete all screens. Otherwise, for participants who have completed the app interaction, the
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researcher provides each one with a code to proceed to the post-task questionnaire. After concluding the
post-task questionnaire, which is the final step, participants complete the experiment and are free to leave
Zoom session. Figure 18 shows the sequence of steps participants go through when they attend Zoom
sessions.
Since the experimental procedures changed, we will refer to this online study as Study 2 throughout
the dissertation. The subject pool for this study is quite limited. Unlike in Study 1, where any subject who
was interested in participating was eligible to do so, in Study 2 only iOS phone holders could sign up to
participate. Having an iOS phone was a requirement for participation because the app was developed in an
iOS platform and was not compatible with Android phones.

START

1

Zoom
Signing Up
&
Emails
Collection

2

Electronic
Consent

3

Pre-task
Questionnaire
&
Preparing the
Phone

4

Playing the game
On Participant’s
Phone

5

END

Post-task
Questionnaire
&
Leaving the
Session

Figure 18: Sequence of Steps Participants Go Through in Study 2

This chapter has discussed how individuals’ privacy-related decisions are formed. Using the CPM
framework, we draw a research model and developed the hypotheses for this study. The project continues
to study design cues in mobile apps interfaces. Following the research plan depicted in this chapter, we
were able to obtain users’ perceptional and behavioral data related to privacy and the analysis of this data
is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: Results
This chapter presents the analysis of data obtained from the experimental study. As mentioned
previously, we recruited participants through the CIS Research Participation System at Baruch College.
Subject participation in research studies and compensation are tracked by a commercial system called
SONA®. We posted details of the study and the participation slots to enable subjects to sign up depending
upon their preferences and availability. Potential participants qualified for the study if they were included
in the subject pool (by virtue of their enrollment in the undergraduate core course CIS2200), if they were
at least 18 years old, and if they owned and regularly used an iOS smartphone. Participants who signed up
for the study received course credit. The duration of each study session lasted at most one hour. Over five
hundred individuals participated in the two experimental studies; one conducted in the lab and another
conducted online due to the COVID restrictions.
For the analysis, we separate the sample of Study 1 (lab study in Fall 2019 - Spring 2020) from the
sample in Study 2 (online experiment via Zoom in Fall 2020) due to the different experimental procedures
applied in each case. The total number of participants is 534 participants, with 118 in Study 1 and 416 in
Study 2. The following sections examine each study separately. In addition, we draw a subsample from
Study 2 consisting of participants who passed the experimental manipulation checks, and we refer to this
sample as Study 3. All the studies used the same 2x2 factorial design, crossing control (Y/N), and
transparency (Y/N). In each study, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental
treatments, which were implemented via four different app versions: ConTran (control and transparent),
ConNoTran (control and not transparent), NoConTran (No control and transparent), and NoConNoTran
(no control and not transparent) app.

7.1

Analysis of Study 1

7.1.1

Demographic Variables
Study 1 is the lab study where we were able to collect data from 118 participants. The final

distribution of the participants in the experimental groups is as follows: 30 subjects in ConTran, 27 in
ConNoTran, 30 in NoConTran, and 31 in NoConNoTran. Basic demographic information such as gender,
age, ethnicity, native language, major in school, college level, and employment status were collected in the
post-task questionnaire. The demographic profile of the sample is provided in Table 18. The table highlights
that the 118 participants of this study were equally distributed in terms of gender. The respondents were
predominantly students and unemployed (77%). The age range of the majority is predominantly from 18 to
24 and only 5% is older than 24. The high percentage of students in this age bracket is expected given that
the experiment was held in a college lab where only students who enrolled in CIS2200 class are eligible to
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participate. Regarding majors, 115 were majoring in non-CIS related areas (such as accounting, finance)
and about 59% of the subjects were in their second college year. The sample reflects diversity in
participants’ ethnicities and native languages because the experiment was conducted in one of the most
diverse colleges in the US. In terms of race, participants were Asian (39%), Hispanic (24%), White (22%),
Black or African American (5%), and other (7%). As a result of such diversity, English is the first language
for only half of the sample.
Table 18:Study 1 - Demographic Profile of the Sample

Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percent

Gender

Male

58

49.15%

Female

58

49.15%

Other

2

1.7%

18-24

112

94.9%

25-34

6

5.1%

White

27

22.9%

Asian

47

39.8%

Black or African

6

5.1%

Hispanic

29

24.58

Other

9

7.6%

English

56

47.4%

Not English

62

52.6%

CIS

3

2.5%

Not CIS

115

97.5%

Freshman

14

11.9%

Sophomore

70

59.3%

Junior

28

23.6%

Senior

6

5.1%

Student (unemployed)

91

77.1%

Employed

27

22.9%

Age

Ethnicity

Native language

Major in school

College Level

Employment status
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7.1.2

Construct Validity and Reliability
In this study, we measure user Privacy Concerns, Continuance Intention using adapted scales. In

addition, we used scales to measure user’s Disposition to Value Privacy, Trust Propensity, Perceived Trust,
and Perceived Intrusion. All these scales were measured on a five-point Likert scale with 5 representing
‘strongly agree’ and 1‘strongly disagree’. Table 19 shows the items for each factor.
Table 19: Items of Each Construct

Construct

Items

Disposition to Value Privacy (Malhotra et al., 2004)
DVP1

Compared to others, I am more sensitive about the way mobile apps handle my
personal information.

DVP2

To me, it is the most important thing to keep my online privacy.

DVP3

Compared to others, I tend to be more concerned about threats to my personal privacy.

Trust Propensity (Cheung et al., 2001)
TP1

It is easy for me to trust a developer or an object.

TP2

My tendency to trust a developer or an object is high.

TP3

I tend to trust a developer or an object, even though I have little knowledge of it.

Perceived Trust (McKnight et al., 2002)
PT1

I believe that the developers behind this app acts in my best interest.

PT2

If I required help, the developers behind this app would do its best to help me

PT3

The developers behind this app is interested in my well-being.

PT4

The developers behind this app is truthful in its dealing with me.

PT5

I characterize the developers behind this app as honest.

PT6

The developers behind this app keeps its commitments to me.

Perceived Intrusion (Xu et al., 2008)
PI1

I feel that as a result of my using this app, others know about me more than I am
comfortable with.

PI2

I believe that as a result of my using this app, the information about me that I consider
private is now more readily available to others than I would want to.

PI3

I feel that as a result of my using this app, the information about me is out there that, if
used, will invade my privacy.

PI4

I feel that as a result of my using this app, my privacy has been invaded by the others
that collect all the data about me.

Privacy Concerns (Xu et al., 2008, originally developed by Smith et al., 1996)
PC1

It bothers me when this app ask me for this much personal information.
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PC2

I am concerned that this app are collecting too much personal information about me.

PC3

I am concerned that unauthorized people may access my personal information.

PC4

I am concerned that this app may keep my personal information in a non-accurate
manner.

PC5

I am concerned about submitting information to this app.

Continuance Intention (Li et al., 2012)
IR1

Assuming that I had “BeaMind” app, I intend to reuse it.

IR2

Given that I had “BeaMind” app, I predict that I would reuse it.

IR3

I would reuse “BeaMind” app for entertainment.

We performed factor analysis with VARIMAX rotation of the items included in the questionnaire
to assess whether these 24 items reliably measured their underlying six constructs. It is worth mentioning
here that the two constructs for user’s future intentions (intention to disclose and intention to share) were
not included in this early study, and they were only included in Study 2 and Study 3.
Table 20: Study 1 - Factor Loadings of the Six Constructs
All non-significant cross-loadings which less than ±0.1 were omitted

Items

Factors
1

DVP1

2

3

0.147

0.127

4

5

6

-0.241

0.696

DVP2

0.633

DVP3

0.104

TP1

-0.126

0.903

TP2

-0.102

0.859

-0.149

0.649

-0.145

TP3

0.133

PT1

0.682

PT2

0.735

PT3

0.619

-0.197

PT4

0.732

-0.197

PT5

0.767

PT6

0.772

0.107

-0.154

-0.216

0.103

-0.154

0.14

0.133

-0.125
0.218

0.727

PI2

0.223

0.792

0.251

0.723

-0.183

0.829

0.162

PI1
PI3

-0.148

0.136

0.17

112

PI4

0.272

0.678

0.152

0.123

PC1

0.653

0.218

-0.142

0.108

PC2

-0.151

0.787

0.239

PC3

-0.178

0.69

0.251

PC4

-0.273

0.636

0.15

PC5

-0.183

0.561

0.194

IR1

0.161

0.929

IR2

0.134

0.911

IR3

0.16

0.147

-0.133

0.101
0.135
0.191

0.756

The cutoff of 0.6 or above was considered for acceptable loadings of the items following the
recommendation of Hair et al. (2010). Table 20 above indicates that all resulting factor loadings were equal
to 0.6 or higher. The lowest acceptable loading was 0.561 ≈ 0.6 of the fifth item of privacy concerns scale.
When examining the cross-loadings, all the items exhibit no cross-loadings above 0.4, which satisfies the
criteria for convergent and discriminant validity. This items-selection procedure was used for all of the two
subsequent studies as well.
Cronbach alpha was measured for each construct to check the construct inter-item reliability. As
shown in Table 21 the Cronbach alpha of all constructs ranged from 0.79 to 0.91, exceeding the
recommended minimum cut-off of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). Since Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct
was above the threshold, the constructs meet the reliability criteria. All the items of each construct were
averaged together to form a composite variable or index such that each participant has one value for each
construct determined by the average of her/his responses to the items in each scale. Table 21 also shows
the mean and standard deviation of each composite variable.
Table 21: Study 1 - Alpha Scores, Mean,
and Standard Deviation Values for the Constructs

Cronbach Alpha

Mean

SD

(Standardized)
DVP

0.79

3.4

1.02

TP

0.86

2.59

0.93

PT

0.88

2.73

0.86

PI

0.86

2.46

0.86

PC

0.85

2.79

0.92

IR

0.91

3.22

1.08
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7.1.3

Correlation Analysis
For all the six continuous variables in this study, we further performed a correlation analysis

between each pair. This analysis is to measure the tendency for two variables to increase or decrease
together. The correlation test shows the strength of the association and the significance (p-value) of the
association between the variables. Table 22 presents the correlation coefficients between each pair of
variables in the lower diagonal, and their level of significance in the upper diagonal. Coefficients in bold
are significant.
As the table indicates, the strongest significant correlation was found between user PI and PC with
a positive coefficient r(116) = +0.50, p < .001. It means that when the feeling of being intruded upon by
the app increases, user privacy concerns increase as well. Another notable negative association was found
between PT and PC with r(116) = -0.37, p < .001. This negative relationship implies that when the trust
feeling towards the app rises, the concerns about privacy, user might have, decreases. TP was found to
correlate with user’s IR as well. The more user trusts the app, the more likely s/he has intention to reuse the
app in the future (r(116) = +0.26, p < .001)).
Table 22: Study 1 - Correlation Matrix of the Variables:
Disposition to Value Privacy (DVP), Trust Propensity (TP), Perceived Trust (PT), Perceived Intrusion (PI), Privacy Concerns
(PC), Continuance Intention (IR), Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

7.1.4

DVP

TP

PT

PI

PC

IR

DVP

1

**

ns

*

**

ns

TP

-0.27

1

ns

ns

ns

ns

PT

-0.09

0.12

1

*

***

**

PI

0.23

0.12

-0.18

1

***

ns

PC

0.26

-0.17

-0.37

0.50

1

ns

IR

0.05

-0.03

0.26

-0.04

0.02

1

Measures of Pre-Test Variables
Before the subjects interact with the app, we asked them to respond to privacy- and trust-related

statements on a five-point scale to measure their privacy and trust tendency. The two scales are an
individual’s disposition to value privacy (DVP) and her/his trust propensity (TP). The data showed earlier
(in Table 21) the average level of privacy value for the entire sample is 3.4 out of 5 (±SD= 1.02) and the
average participants’ willingness to trust others for all of them is between medium and high with 2.59
(±SD= 0.93).
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The individual characteristics of subjects and their demographic profiles (continuous and
categorical) should be equally distributed in the four different conditions. Kruskall-Wallis were conducted
for DVP and TP, and chi-square tests were performed for gender, age, ethnicity, native language, major,
college level, and employment status. Table 23 indicates that none of these variables shows a systematic
variation within conditions and therefore, we can assure that the pre-existing characteristics of participants
are randomly distributed across conditions. Although the demographics and the pre-test measures were all
randomly distributed into each condition, they will be used as controls throughout the analysis of the study.

7.1.5

Manipulation Checks
To capture how subjects perceived the experimental manipulations: app control and app

transparency, two items were included in the post-task questionnaire. Since these measures were only used
as manipulation checks to assess the validity of the app version manipulation, they are not used in the
research model. We asked participants right after they completed the app testing session to answer two
yes/no questions indicating whether they noticed the optional data entry in the personal information screen,
and/or a pop-up notification explaining how the app would use private information. For transparency (i.e.
when the app version shows a pop-up notification), 46.7% of the yes-transparency subsample passed the
manipulation check when their condition includes app transparency. About 69% of the no-transparency
subsample passed the manipulation check when their app version did not show a transparency notice. A
similar analysis was conducted for app control, with respect to its manipulation question, whether
participants noticed that the personal information intake screen was optional (yes-control) or mandatory
(no-control). When the app version included the control feature (optionally asked for personal information),
84.2% of the yes-control subsample passed the manipulation check, and when the data entry is mandatory,
about 57.4% of the no-control subsample passed the manipulation check. Table 24 shows the passing rate
in each of the two manipulations.
Table 23: Study 1 - Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

Continuous Variables
MeanConTran
DVP
TP

MeanConNoTran MeanNoConTran

MeanNoConNoTran

3.38

3.13

3.50

3.57

(±SD= 1.02)

(±SD= 0.96)

(±SD= 1.03)

(±SD= 1.04)

2.75

2.74

2.42

2.45

(±SD= 0.87)

(±SD= 1.01)

(±SD= 0.93)

(±SD= 0.93)

c2(3)= 3.27, p=0.35

ns

c2(3)= 5.33, p=0.15

ns

115

Categorical Variables
Gender

c2(6)= 9.94, p= 0.13

ns

Age

c2(3)= 2.63, p= 0.45

ns

Ethnicity

c2(12)= 9.55, p= 0.65

ns

Native language

c2(3)= 0.56, p= 0.91

ns

Major

c2(3)= 3.65, p= 0.30

ns

Employment

c2(3)= 3.46, p= 0.32

ns

c2(9)= 4.14, p= 0.90

ns

status
College Level

Table 24: Study 1 - Distribution of the Participants Who Passed the Two
Checks, Aggregated by the Two Manipulations

Manipulation

Control
Transparency

#Participants

Passing

Who Passed

Percent

Yes

48

84.2%

No

35

57.4%

Yes

13

46.7%

No

18

69%

In total, only 50 out of 118 passed the two manipulation questions which might be due to either the
participants not paying close attention to the app screens or due to the wording of the questions that check
their perceptions of app transparency and control. Although this is a less than perfect rate of manipulation
validity, we used the entire lab sample (118 subjects) for the analysis as we could not run more lab sessions
due to the pandemic restrictions. Table 25 shows the passing rate for each condition separately. The lowest
passing rate was in NoConTran condition where the manipulations did not work as intended. In this
condition, most subjects did not notice that they were mandatorily required to provide their information to
the app either because they provided incorrect information to the app and thus, they felt they still have
control over their privacy, or they believed that providing their information part of the experimental task
they asked to complete to get the credits. They also failed to notice that the app is transparent regarding its
data practices. They might not notice this notification because it appears midway when they are interacting
with the app, and they might be eager to advance to the next steps and start playing the game.
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Table 25: Study 1 - Distribution of the Participants Who
Passed the Two Manipulation Checks Across the Four Groups

Condition

7.1.6

#Participants

Passing

Who Passed

Percent

ConTran

15

50%

ConNoTran

15

55.6%

NoConTran

5

16.7%

NoConNoTran

15

48.4%

Measures of Post-Test Variables

7.1.6.1 Subjective Measures
We asked participants to complete a post-test questionnaire to gather their perceptions about the
overall experiment at the end of the app testing session. In particular, we measured their Perceived Trust
(PT), Perceived Intrusion (PI), Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance Intention (IR).
We performed Kruskall-Wallis test using PT as the dependent variable, the means for subjects’
perception of trust was not significantly different across the conditions (MeanConTran= 2.98 (±SD= 0.79),
MeanConNoTran= 2.72 (±SD= 0.94), MeanNoConTran= 2.68 (±SD= 0.93), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.53 (±SD= 0.75);
χ2(3)= 5.58, p= ns). Similar non-significant difference between the four conditions for the PI variables was
obtained (MeanConTran= 2.38(±SD= 0.83), MeanConNoTran= 2.21 (±SD= 0.79), MeanNoConTran= 2.46 (±SD=
0.79), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.76 (±SD= 0.96); χ2(3)= 5.54, p= ns).
In addition to trust and intrusion perception, the post-test questionnaire asked subjects to indicate
their privacy concern level while interacting with the app. Table 26 presents the mean and standard
deviation of this variable across the four groups. The difference in PC between the four groups was
statistically non-significant with χ2(3)= 2.40, p= ns. The group of participants who have the app with no
user control and no transparency message exhibits the highest average of privacy concerns and those who
have the app version with user control and transparency message have the lowest average of privacy
concerns. When comparing these two groups only, the difference still was not statistically significant
(χ2(1)= 1.74, p= ns).
In the lab study, one question about continuance intention (IR) was included in the post-task
questionnaire. Analyzing IR showed a statistically significant difference in the intention among the four
groups (MeanConTran= 2.77 (±SD= 0.98), MeanConNoTran= 3.15 (±SD= 1.12), MeanNoConTran= 3.55 (±SD=
0.97), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.40 (±SD= 1.10); χ2(3)= 9.52, p<.01). Although the difference is significant, it
was not expected to find the lowest continuance intention in users who had the app with two privacy-
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protected features (control and transparency), and the second-highest average in users who had the app
without the two features.
Table 26: Study 1 - Descriptive Data of PC Across Conditions

Condition

PCmean(SD)

ConTran

2.65(±SD= 0.78)

ConNoTran

2.67(±SD= 0.90)

NoConTran

2.8(±SD= 0.94)

NoConNoTran

3.01(±SD= 1.03)

7.1.6.2 Objective Measures
The objective measures in this experiment captured the actual disclosure and sharing decisions
made by users during the interaction with the app. We measured how much of the requested personal
information users provided to the app at the beginning of the app trial session, then we measured as well
whether users choose to share their recall scores with others when they reached the last screen of the app
via email or Facebook or share the score in both ways. The two measures were analyzed after participants
completed the experimental session. The frequencies of the two behavioral variables are presented in Table
27.
The table shows that the majority of subjects (about 92%) decided not to share their game score
using any of the available options. Those who decided to share the game score (about 8%) prefer to share
it through email than to share it through Facebook. When examining the difference in sharing behavior
across the four conditions, chi-square analysis indicates that the difference is statistically non-significant
with χ2(3)= 6.78, p= ns. Such a noticeable unwillingness to share will be discussed later when analyzing
the responses for a qualitative survey question asking about the potential reasons for refraining from
showing others how a user performs in a memory game.
The information disclosure measure is relevant only in two experimental groups where the app
allows users to control how much information they want to disclose. The app asks for four personal
information items: nickname, email, year of birth, and gender. We argued here that users who provide one
or two elements to the app and chose not to provide all fields have some privacy concerns towards the app
that is similar to those who provide nothing. After dividing participants into two groups: Low Disclosure
(those who disclosed only one, two elements, or nothing, out of four) and High Disclosure (those who
disclosed three or all the four items), 42 users are in the Low Disclosure group, whereas only 15 users are
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in the High Disclosure group. It should be pointed out here that only ten of those who granted disclosure
control provided all the four items of the personal information requested by the app.
Table 27: Study 1 - Behavioral Variables Statistics
* This number represent 61 of participants who were forced to provide all the fields
and 10 participants who voluntarily provided all the optionally requested items.

Variable
Sharing

No Sharing

Email

Facebook

Double

Sharing

Sharing

Sharing

108

10

0

0

Nothing

One

Two

Three

Four

Item

Items

Items

Items

24

10

5

71*

Behavior

Disclosure
Behavior

8

When analyzing the impact of the transparency message on the disclosure behavior for the two
groups, chi-square test shows the difference was significant. The figures in Table 28 indicate that the popup transparency notice has an impact on concealing decision such that the number of users who keep their
personal information private in the group of app with transparency notice was higher than those who keep
them private when there is no transparency notice (24 vs. 18). We expected an opposite effect of
transparency notice. Similarly, on disclosure behavior, the transparency notice has a negative impact in
encouraging users to reveal most or all personal information. More users prefer to disclose most of their
personal in the absence of transparency notice (12 vs. 3). In other words, the transparency message did not
help in encouraging users to reveal most or all of the personal information requested by the app.
Table 28: Study 1 - Comparison of Disclosure Rate Between
Two Versions of the App, N=57

Condition

Disclose nothing/

Disclose most/

Disclose less

Disclose all

ConTran

24

3

ConNoTran

18

12

χ2(1)= 6.12, p=0.01
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To gain a deeper understanding of what piece of the requested personal information users regard
as most private, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis for questions purposely embedded in the posttest questionnaire will be presented in the Additional Analyses section.

7.1.7

Test of the Hypotheses
This section presents testing of each hypothesis. If the hypothesis involves a relationship between

two categorical variables, Chi-Square tests will be used. If the relationship stated in the hypothesis is
between two continuous variables, regression will be used. Logistic regression analysis will be applied to
test the hypothesis that involves discrete dependent variables. For hypothesis linking discrete independent
variable with continuous dependent variable, Kruskall-Wallis which is a non-parametric ANOVA will be
used to analyze the relationship.

7.1.7.1 Hypothesis 1
H1 proposed that when subjects are allowed to have control over their disclosure decisions, the app
will be perceived as more trustworthy (H1a), and less intrusive (H1b) than when the app forces them to
provide personal information.
The mean of perceived trust for subjects who interact with the app version that optionally ask for
private information trust the app more (MeanCon= 2.86, ±SD= 0.87) than those who were required to provide
all of their information to the app (MeanNoCon= 2.60, ±SD= 0.84). Kruskal-Wallis test shows that perceived
trust was not significantly different between the two app versions with χ2(1)= 3.32, p=0.07 ns.
Similarly, users who interact with the app that forced them to reveal private information have a
higher mean of perceived intrusion (MeanNoCon= 2.61 ±SD= 0.89) than those who engaged with the app that
provides them with discretional disclosure (MeanCon= 2.30 ±SD= 0.81). This difference in intrusion
perception between the two groups was statistically non-significant with χ2(1)= 3.71, p=0.05 ns.
Given these hypotheses testing results, both H1a and H1b are not supported.

7.1.7.2 Hypothesis 2
H2 predicted that the level of app transparency regarding data practices positively affects users’
level of trust in the app (H2a), and negatively affects users’ level of privacy concerns (H2b).
When comparing the means of perceived trust between subjects who interact with app version that
has the transparency notice and app version that does not have, the difference was not significant (MeanTran=
2.83 (±SD= 0.87), MeanNoTran= 2.62 (±SD= 0.84), χ2(1)= 1.87, p= ns). The result implies that having a
notice stating the app data practices has no effect on the level of trust users feel towards the app.
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This transparency notice has no effect as well on the level of privacy concerns that users might
have during the interaction. Although subjects who were in the group of the app with no transparency
feature have a higher mean of privacy concerns (MeanNoTran= 2.85 (±SD= 0.98)) than those who have the
app with transparency feature (MeanTran= 2.73 (±SD= 0.86)), Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the difference
was not statistically significant (χ2(1)= 0.43, p= ns).
Since the p-values are higher than the significance level in H2a and H2b, both hypotheses are not
supported.

7.1.7.3 Hypothesis 3
The previous hypotheses proposed separate effects for the two independent variables (app
transparency and app control). H3 predicts the interaction effect of the two factors on perceived trust and
perceived intrusion.
H3a proposed that the level of trust towards the app for subjects who interacted with the version
that has control and transparency features would be higher than any of those who interact with the version
that has neither (no control over disclosure decision and no information about app data practices) or one of
these features. The average of the perceived trust level of the app with the two features is higher than the
average of the three other groups (MeanConTran= 2.98 (±SD= 0.79), MeanConNoTran= 2.72(±SD= 0.94),
MeanNoConTran= 2.68 (±SD= 0.93), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.53(±SD= 0.75)) while the group of the app without
the two feature exhibits the lowest average of trust perception. However, when analyzing the significance
of the difference, Kruskal-Wallis test shows it was not statistically significant (χ2(3)= 5.58, p= ns). Then,
we further analyzed the difference in perceived trust between the group that has the app with two features
(transparency and control) with only those who have the app without the two features (no transparency and
no control). Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there is a significant difference between the two groups with
MeanConTran= 2.98 (±SD= 0.79) vs. MeanNonConNoTran= 2.53 (±SD= 0.75), and χ2(1)= 5.37, p<.05.
H3b predicted that when subjects were granted control and transparency while interacting with the
app, their feeling of being intruded upon by the app decreases. Although the four means of the four
conditional groups slightly differ (MeanConTran= 2.38 (±SD= 0.83), MeanConNoTran= 2.21 (±SD= 0.79),
MeanNoConTran= 2.46 (±SD= 0.79), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.76 (±2SD= 0.96)), these differences were not
significant (χ2(3)= 5.59, p= ns). The same comparison has been made between the group that has the app
with two features (transparency and control) with only those who have the app without the two features (no
transparency and no control) to check the effect of these features on the level of user’s intrusion perception.
The result, though, was not significant (χ2(1)= 2.75, p= ns).
Therefore, H3a is partially supported and H3b is not supported.
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7.1.7.4 Hypothesis 4
H4 predicted that the more one perceives the app as intrusive, the more concerns about privacy one
would have towards the app. When correlating the perceived intrusion variable with privacy concerns, the
correlation is positive and significant (r(116)= +0.50, p<.001).
The two variables are continuous; therefore, a simple linear regression was performed to investigate
the relationship between them. The linear regression was performed with privacy concerns as the dependent
variable and perceived intrusion as an explanatory variable with all of the control variables in order to
estimate the effect of the feeling of being invaded by the app on user privacy concerns. The results in Table
29 show that the model is significant (F(10, 107)=5.63; p<.001) and the b coefficient of perceived intrusion
is significant (PI b=0.51, p<.001). It is worthy of note that the other significant coefficient in this regression
is user trust propensity (TP b=-0.18, p<.05). None of the other control variables were significant. These
results indicate that when a user feels that the app invades her/his privacy, this feeling increases their level
of privacy concerns, while controlling for individual characteristics. Therefore, H4 is supported.
Table 29: Study 1 - Linear Model for PC Explained by PI and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(10, 107)

5.63***

R2

34.47%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

1.17 (1.32 ns)

PI

0.51 (5.64***)

DVP

0.09 (1.11 ns)

TP

-0.18 (-2.11*)

Gender

0.22 (1.51 ns)

Age

0.13 (0.35 ns)

Ethnicity

0.04 (0.63 ns)

EmpStatus

0.09 (0.45 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.03 (-0.26 ns)

Language

-0.11 (-0.75 ns)

Major

0.58 (1.23 ns)
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7.1.7.5 Hypothesis 5
H5 proposed that individuals who perceive low levels of trust in the app during the interaction are
more likely to be anxious about their privacy and experience a high level of privacy concerns. The
correlation between perceived trust and privacy concerns in this lab study is negative and significant
(r(116)= -0.37, p<.001). This implies that when the app is perceived as more trustworthy, users’ concerns
about their privacy become lower.
Linear regression analysis with privacy concerns as the dependent variable against perceived trust
with control variables in Table 30 showed that the whole model was significant (F(10, 107)=3.35; p<.001).
Perceived trust (PT) in this model has a significant effect on the level of privacy concerns with b=-0.34 and
p<.001. User disposition to value privacy (DVP) was significant as well with b=0.19 and p<.05. The
significant model indicates that when a user interacts with an app that is perceived as trustworthy, s/he has
lesser privacy concerns, while controlling for individual characteristics. Therefore, H5 is supported.
Table 30: Study 1 - Linear Model for PC Explained by PT and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(10,107)

3.35***

R2

23.86%

Parameters
Intercept
PT
DVP
TP

b Coefficient (t, p)
2.31 (2.2*)
-0.34 (-3.53***)
0.19 (2.29*)
-0.05 (-0.53 ns)

Gender

0.15 (0.99 ns)

Age

0.35 (0.89 ns)

Ethnicity

0.03 (0.42 ns)

EmpStatus

0.1 (0.46 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.04 (-0.3 ns)

Language

-0.19 (-1.17 ns)

Major

0.71 (1.4 ns)
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7.1.7.6 Hypothesis 6
H6 proposed that users who have high levels of privacy concerns toward the app are less likely to
have intentions to reuse the app in the future.
Although there were significant effects of both control variables ethnicity and college level, the
model was found to be non-significant (F(10, 107)= 2.29; ns) when regress user privacy concerns along
with all control factors on user intention to reuse the app in the future. The model indicates that the
independent variable privacy concerns was not significant as well. Such a result implies that the user’s
future intention to interact with the app cannot be predicted by the level of privacy concerns s/he might
have. Table 31 illustrates the model. Considering this analysis, H6 is not supported.
Table 31: Study 1 - Linear Model for IR Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

IR
Model F(1,107)

2.29 ns

R2

17.64%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

5.17 (4.42***)

PC

-0.03 (-0.28 ns)

DVP
TP
Gender
Age
Ethnicity

0.08 (0.78 ns)
-0.06 (-0.53 ns)
0.37 (1.94 ns)
-0.65 (-1.35 ns)
0.2 (2.51*)

EmpStatus

-0.16 (-0.64 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.42 (-2.77**)

Language

-0.27 (-1.36 ns)

Major

0.35 (0.57 ns)

7.1.7.7 Hypothesis 7
H7 predicted that an increase in the level of privacy concerns decreases the likelihood of user
disclosure (H7a) and sharing (H7b) behavior.
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Disclosure behavior was measured by how much of the requested information user reveals to the
app during the interaction. Out of four requested items, this measure counts how many of these items were
provided. Users have the discretion to reveal/conceal personal information in only two conditions of the
experiment (57 participants) when the app data entries are optional. Logistic regression was used to evaluate
the influence of privacy concerns on user disclosure behavior. Using disclosure, which is an ordinal measure
as the dependent variable with privacy concerns and all of the control factors as explanatory variables,
Table 32 shows that the model (χ²(10)= 7.06) was not statistically significant. Based on the results of this
analysis, there is no effect of privacy concerns on how much users disclose their personal information to
the app. Therefore, H7a is not supported.
Table 32: Study 1 - Logistic Regression Model for Disclosure Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Disclosure Behavior
Model χ²(10)

7.06 ns

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

21%

R2(McFadden)

15%

Parameters

b Coefficient (z , p)

(Intercept)

7.43 (1.3 ns)

PC

0.73 (1.23 ns)

DVP

-0.14 (-0.29 ns)

TP

-0.34 (-0.67 ns)

Gender
Age

0 (0 ns)
-4.55 (-1.77 ns)

Ethnicity

0.91 (1.51 ns)

EmpStatus

0.19 (0.16 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.5 (0.73 ns)

Language

0.18 (0.2 ns)

Major

13.17 (0.01 ns)

To evaluate user sharing behavior, we captured the options to share their game scores that users
chose after completing the game. A logistic regression model of the objective sharing measure shows no
significant effect of privacy concerns on predicting sharing behavior, and it shows no effect of any of the
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control variables on user sharing behavior. The whole model (χ²(10)= 10.88) was not statistically
significant, and thus H7b is not supported. The results are presented in Table 33.
Table 33: Study 1 - Logistic Regression Model for Sharing Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Sharing Behavior
Model χ²(10)

10.88 ns

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

20%

R2(McFadden)

16%

Parameters

b Coefficient (z , p)

Intercept

-8.92 (-1.85 ns)

PC

-0.88 (-1.88 ns)

DVP

0.41 (1.08 ns)

TP

0.23 (0.57 ns)

Gender

-0.28 (-0.41 ns)

Age

3.03 (1.76 ns)

Ethnicity

0.22 (0.7 ns)

EmpStatus

1.61 (1.21 ns)

CollegeLevel

-1.19 (-1.75 ns)

Language

-0.92 (-1.15 ns)

Major

-15.73 (-0.01 ns)

Given these hypotheses testing results, both H7a and H7b are not supported.

7.1.8

Significance of the Model
A hierarchical stepwise linear regression approach is adopted to test the significance of the entire

research model, including all the variables in the same regression. In this approach, the explanatory factors
are added in a stepwise fashion according to their placement in the research model. The app features (user
control and app transparency) were considered the primary contributor to user’s privacy concerns and
entered in the first block of the regression model. In the second block, the mediator variables (perceived
trust and perceived intrusion) were entered. Eventually, all the nine control variables were entered in the
third block of the regression model as shown in Table 34.
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The adjusted R2 value for the complete model indicates that 32.7 percent of the variance for user
privacy concerns is explained by variables selected for this study. In the complete model, the variance for
privacy concerns for app users could be attributed primarily to the user’s perceived trust (PT: b = -0.28,
p< .01) and the user’s perceived intrusion towards the app (PI: b = 0.48, p < .001). Neither the
manipulations nor the control variables are significant in the complete model.
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Table 34: Study 1 - Step-wise Regression of the Whole Model of PC

Block 1

PC ~ Trans *

PC ~ Trans * Control

PC ~ Trans * Control + PT +

Control

+ PT + PI

PI + Control Variables

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 2

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 3

b Coefficient (t, p)

Parameters
Intercept

3.01 (18.23***)

2.48 (6.65***)

2.48 (2.6*)

App Transparency(AT)

-0.21 (-0.88 ns)

-0.02 (-0.1 ns)

-0.13 (-0.63 ns)

User Control(UC)

-0.34 (-1.41 ns)

-0.03 (-0.12 ns)

0 (0 ns)

Interaction AT*UC

0.19 (0.57 ns)

0.01 (0.03 ns)

0.13 (0.44 ns)

PT

-0.3 (-3.54***)

-0.28 (-3.19**)

PI

0.47 (5.44***)

0.48 (5.23***)

Adj. R2
Model F(3,114) =

-0.1%
0.96, p= 0.41 ns

DVP

0.09 (1.11 ns)

TP

-0.16 (-1.8 ns)

Gender

0.26 (1.77 ns)

Age

-0.05 (-0.13 ns)

Ethnicity

0.05 (0.88 ns)

EmpStatus

-0.03 (-0.17 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.01 (-0.13 ns)

Language

-0.13 (-0.91 ns)

Major

0.56 (1.21 ns)

29.5%
F(5,112)=

10.78, p< 0.001 ***

32.7%
F(14,103) =

5.06, p< 0.001 ***
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7.2

Analysis of Study 2

7.2.1

Demographic Variables
In the online experiment (Study 2), the final distribution is 104 respondents in each condition. The

post-task questionnaire collects basic demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, native language,
major in school, college level, employment status, and iPhone model. The demographic profile of the
sample is provided in Table 35.
As shown in the descriptive statistics, the sample comprises 199 males and 215 females. Most
respondents (89%) were in the 18-24 age range. This was expected as the sample was drawn from a student
subject pool. Only 5.3% were majoring in CIS, while the rest were enrolled in the various other majors of
the Business school. Consistent with the demographics of Baruch College’s student population, the sample
showed considerable diversity in culture and native language as the college in NYC attracts people from
around the world. The sample is skewed toward Asian ethnicity with nearly 52.9%, only 19.9% of the
subjects are White and the rest belong to either African American, Hispanic, or other ethnic groups. English
is the first language of only about half of the participants 47.4%, while the remaining 52.6% speak another
language besides English. Close to 60% of responses reported new iPhone models used for the study.
Table 35: Study 2 - Demographic Profile of the Sample

Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percent

Gender

Male

199

47.8%

Female

215

51.7%

Other

2

0.5%

18-24

372

89.4%

25-34

39

9.4%

35-44

4

0.9%

Above 44

1

0.2%

White

83

19.9%

Asian

220

52.9%

Black or African

15

3.6%

Hispanic

77

18.5

Other

21

5%

Age

Ethnicity
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Native language

Major in school
College Level

Employment status
iPhone model

7.2.2

English

197

47.4%

Not English

219

52.6%

CIS

22

5.3%

Not CIS

394

94.7%

Freshman

3

0.7%

Sophomore

267

64.2%

Junior

115

27.6%

Senior

31

7.5%

Student (unemployed)

361

86.8%

Employed

55

13.2%

New (iPhone 8 and above)

252

60.6%

Old (Up to iPhone 7)

164

39.4%

Construct Validity and Reliability
As in study 1, we adapted various scales to assess user Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance

Intention (IR), Disclosure Intention of personal information. In addition, we used scales to measure user’s
Disposition to Value Privacy (DVP), Trust Propensity (TP), Perceived Trust (PT), and Perceived Intrusion
(PI). To assess whether these 30 items reliably measured their underlying eight constructs, we performed
factor analysis with VARIMAX rotation of the items included in the questionnaire. All these items used for
the constructs were measured on a five-point Likert scale with 5 representing ‘strongly agree’ and
1‘strongly disagree’. The cutoff of 0.6 or above was considered for acceptable loadings of the items
following the recommendation of Hair et al. (2010). We adapted the same scales mentioned in study 1
(previously listed in Table 16), and we added here two more scales to measure user’s intention to disclose
personal information (IDP) and user’s intention to share the game score (ISG). Table 36 lists the additional
items for the two factors, and Table 37 shows the convergent and discriminant validity of each factor after
rotation. The results indicate that all resulting factor loadings were equal to 0.6 or higher, with no crossloadings of items above 0.4, which satisfies the criteria for convergent and discriminant validity.
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Table 36: Study 2 - Items of the Two Additional Constructs

Construct

Items

Intention to Disclose Personal Info (Xu et al., 2009)
IDP1

I would be willing to share my personal information through BeaMind when it
becomes available.

IDP2

I would be likely to share my personal information through BeaMind when it
becomes available.

IDP3

I would probably share my personal information through BeaMind when it becomes
available.

Intention to Share Game Score (Xu et al., 2009)
ISG1

I was willing to share my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through
“BeaMind” when the score was computed.

ISG2

I was likely to share my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through “BeaMind”
when the score was computed.

ISG3

I was probably sharing my performance in the game (my Recall IQ) through
“BeaMind” when the score was computed.
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Table 37: Study 2 - Factor Loadings of the Constructs
All non-significant cross-loadings which less than ±0.1 were omitted

Items

Factors
1

7

8

3

4

5

6

-0.161

0.780

-0.127

0.755

-0.119

0.778

TP1

0.828

-0.115

TP2

0.924

TP3

0.782

-0.173

0.108

0.124

0.200

DVP1
DVP2

2

0.139

DVP3

0.107

0.104

0.126

0.106

-0.100

PT1

0.681

-0.180

0.134

PT2

0.602

-0.128

PT3

0.692

PT4

0.796

-0.117

0.108

PT5

0.818

-0.106

0.115

PT6

0.787

0.119
0.170

0.104

PI1

0.299

0.644

PI2

0.310

0.735

0.139

0.171

PI3

-0.110

0.279

0.843

PI4

-0.122

0.284

0.807

PC1

-0.144

0.686

0.225

-0.135

PC2

-0.156

0.739

0.344

-0.111

PC3

-0.191

0.707

0.276

PC4

-0.161

0.645

0.394

PC5

-0.159

0.681

0.288

IR1

0.221

IR2

0.219

IR3

0.214

IDP1

0.255

IDP2
IDP3

0.158

0.104
-0.118

-0.154

0.155

0.110

0.154

0.857

0.165

0.916

0.199

0.170

0.748

-0.169

0.153

0.779

0.169

0.229

-0.137

0.123

0.891

0.185

0.237

-0.141

0.182

0.829

0.201

0.125
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ISG1

0.139

-0.109

0.790

0.132

0.122

ISG2

0.963

0.141

0.111

ISG3

0.819

0.116

Construct inter-item reliability was measured by Cronbach alpha. As shown in Table 38 the
Cronbach alpha of all constructs ranged from 0.85 to 0.94, exceeding the recommended minimum cut-off
of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). Since the Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct was above the threshold,
the constructs meet the reliability criteria. All the items of each construct were averaged together to form a
composite variable or index such that each participant has one value for each construct determined by the
average of her/his responses to the items in each scale Table 38 also shows the mean and standard deviation
of each composite variable.
Table 38: Study 2 - Alpha Scores, Mean,
and Standard Deviation Values for the Constructs

Cronbach Alpha

Mean

SD

(Standardized)

7.2.3

DVP

0.85

3.92

0.79

TP

0.89

2.87

0.87

PT

0.89

3.33

0.64

PI

0.89

2.77

0.86

PC

0.89

2.86

0.84

IR

0.92

3.23

1

IDP

0.94

2.51

0.89

ISG

0.91

2.85

0.96

Correlation Analysis
We further performed a correlation analysis for all the continuous variables which measures the

tendency for two variables to increase or decrease together. The correlation test shows the strength of the
association and the significance of (p-value) of the association between the variables. Table 39 represents
the correlation coefficients between each pair of variables in the lower diagonal, and their level of
significance in the upper diagonal. Coefficients in bold are significant.
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Table 39: Study 2 -Correlation Matrix of the Variables:
Disposition to Value Privacy (DVP), Trust Propensity (TP), Perceived Trust (PT),
Perceived Intrusion (PI), Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance Intention (IR), Intention to Disclose Personal
Information (IDP), Intention to Share Game Score (ISG)
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

DVP

TP

PI

PT

PC

IR

IDP

ISG

DVP

1

***

***

*

***

ns

***

*

TP

-0.27

1

ns

ns

*

ns

***

ns

PI

0.23

-0.03

1

*

***

ns

*

*

PT

0.11

0.09

-0.12

1

***

***

***

***

PC

0.3

-0.12

0.62

-0.31

1

*

***

***

IR

0.09

-0.02

-0.08

0.38

-0.12

1

***

***

IDP

-0.17

0.18

-0.11

0.41

-0.33

0.41

1

***

ISG

-0.10

0.05

-0.11

0.2

-0.18

0.29

0.34

1

As Table 39 shows, the strongest correlation was found between PI and PC and it was statistically
significant, r(414) = +0.62, p < .001. It indicates that when the feeling of being intruded upon by the app
increases, the user’s privacy concern increases as well. In addition, there is a significant positive association
between PT and both IR and IDP, with r(414) = +0.38, p < .001 and r(414) = +0.41, p < .001 respectively.
It implies that when perceived trust towards the app increases, the user’s intention to reuse the app and the
user’s intention to disclose personal information increase as well. Another notable association was found
between PC and IDP with r(414) = -0.33, p < .001. The two variables are negatively correlated indicating
that when the user’s privacy concerns decrease, her/his intention to disclose personal information increases.

7.2.4

Measures of Pre-Test Variables
Before participants engage with the app, they were required to answer questions about their general

attitudes towards privacy and trust as in the lab study. In addition, the most recent version of Westin’s scale
was included to categorize respondents as either privacy fundamentalists, pragmatists, or unconcerned
(Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). Westin’s scale has three items, which we adapted for the case of mobile
apps:
1- Users have lost all control over how personal information is
collected and used by mobile apps.
2- Most mobile apps handle personal information they collect
about users in a proper and confidential way.
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3- Existing laws and apps practices provide a reasonable level of
protection for user privacy today.
Subjects were labeled according to their responses to these questions such that those who agreed
(or strongly agree) with the first statement and disagreed (or strongly disagree) with the second and the
third statements are the fundamentalists, those who disagreed with the first statement and agreed with the
second and third statements are unconcerned, while the pragmatists are all the other respondents
(Kumaraguru & Cranor, 2005). As shown in Table 40 the majority of the subjects were privacy pragmatists
with about 59.4%.
Table 40: Westin's Categories of the Study 2 Sample

Westin’s Index
privacy fundamentalists

27.6%

privacy pragmatists

59.4%

privacy unconcerned

13%

Two additional scales were included as well to assess the individual’s disposition to value privacy
(DVP) and her/his trust propensity (TP). The data shown in Table 38 indicates that the average level of
privacy value for the entire sample is 3.92 out of 5 (±SD= 0.79) which is rather high. Regarding participants’
willingness to trust others, the data shows the average trust propensity level for all subjects is between
medium and high with 2.87 (±SD= 0.87).
All of these pre-existing characteristics of subjects (continuous and categorical) should be equally
distributed in the four different conditions. To ensure that none of these attributes predominate in one
condition more than any other one, non-parametric ANOVAs via Kruskall-Wallis were conducted for DVP
and TP, and chi-square tests were performed for gender, age, ethnicity, native language, major, college
level, employment status, and iPhone model. As the results in Table 41 below indicate, none of these
variables shows a systematic variation within conditions and therefore, we can assure that the pre-existing
characteristics of participants are randomly distributed across conditions. The demographics and the pretest variables will be used as controls throughout the analysis of the study, although they were all randomly
distributed into each condition.

7.2.5

Manipulation Checks
As in the previous study, there were two yes/no questions to check for valid manipulations. The

two items were to assess whether participants noticed the control and transparency features while
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interacting with the app (the optional data entry in the personal information screen, and/or a pop-up
notification explaining how the app would use private information).
For transparency (i.e., when the app shows a pop-up notification), 59.6% of the yes-transparency
subsample passed the manipulation check when their condition includes app transparency. About 55% of
the sample passed the manipulation check when their app version did not show a transparency notice. A
similar analysis was conducted for app control, with respect to its manipulation question, whether
participants noticed that the personal information intake screen was optional (yes control) or mandatory (no
control). When the app version included the control feature (optionally asked for personal information),
82.2% of the yes-control subsample passed the manipulation check, and when the data entry is mandatory,
about 50% of the no-control subsample passed the manipulation check. Table 42 shows the passing rate in
each of the two manipulations.
Table 41: Study 2 -Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

Continuous Variables

DVP

TP

MeanConTran

MeanConNoTran

MeanNoConTran MeanNoConNoTran

3.78

4.10

3.91

3.89

(±SD= 0.87)

(±SD= 0.69)

(±SD= 0.78)

(±SD= 0.81)

2.88

2.87

2.94

2.81

(±SD= 0.88)

(±SD= 0.94)

(±SD= 0.76)

(±SD= 0.90)

c2(3)=7.48, p=0.06

ns

c2(3)=1.03, p=0.80

ns

Categorical Variables
Gender

c2(6)= 2.53, p= 0.87

ns

Age

c2(9)= 12.79, p= 0.17

ns

Ethnicity

c2(12)= 9.87, p= 0.63

ns

Native language

c2(3)= 3.27, p= 0.35

ns

Major

c2(3)= 4.03, p= 0.26

ns

Employment

c2(3)= 4.76, p= 0.19

ns

College Level

c2(9)= 11.18, p= 0.26

ns

iPhone model

c2(3)= 1.45, p= 0.69

ns

status
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Table 42: Study 2 - Distribution of the Participants Who Passed the Two Checks,
Aggregated by the Two Manipulations

Manipulation

#Participants

Passing

Who Passed

Percent

Yes

171

82.2%

No

103

49.5%

Transparency Yes

124

59.6%

No

114

54.8%

Control

In total, only 168 out of 416 passed the two manipulation questions which might be due to either
the participants not paying close attention to the app screens or to the wording of the questions that check
their perceptions of app transparency and control. Although this is a less than perfect rate of manipulation
validity, we used this information to purge the sample and remove participants who did not pass the
manipulation checks. In other words, we created a subsample for Study 3 comprised only of those who
successfully passed the two manipulation checks from the sample of the current study (Study 2) which uses
the full sample (416 participants). Table 43 shows the passing rate for each condition separately. The lowest
rate was in NoConTran condition where the manipulations did not work as intended. In this condition, most
subjects did not notice that they were required to provide their information to the app either because they
provided incorrect information to the app and thus, they felt they still have control over their privacy, or
they believed that providing their information part of the experimental task they asked to complete to get
the credits. They also failed to notice that the app is transparent regarding its data practices. They might not
notice this notification that appears in the middle of the app’s screen because they want to quickly complete
all the app’s screens.
Table 43: Study 2 - Distribution of the Participants Who
Passed the Two Manipulation Checks Across the Four Groups

Condition

#Participants

Passing

Who Passed

Percent

ConTran

61

58.7%

ConNoTran

39

37.5%

NoConTran

25

24%

NoConNoTran

43

41.4%
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7.2.6

Measures of Post-Test Variables

7.2.6.1 Subjective Measures
At the end of the app testing session, we asked participants to complete a post-test questionnaire to
gather their perceptions about the experiment. In particular, we measured their Perceived Trust (PT),
Perceived Intrusion (PI), Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance Intention (IR), and Intention to Disclose
Personal Information (IDP).
With Kruskall-Wallis, using PT as the dependent variable, the means for subjects’ perception of
trust was not significantly different across the conditions (MeanConTran= 3.39 (±SD= 0.61), MeanConNoTran=
3.31 (±SD= 0.66), MeanNoConTran= 3.30 (±SD= 0.60), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.31 (±SD= 0.69); χ2(3)= 3.37, p=
ns). Similar non-significant difference between the four conditions for the PI variable was obtained
(MeanConTran= 2.71(±SD= 0.88), MeanConNoTran= 2.72 (±SD= 0.88), MeanNoConTran= 2.83 (±SD= 0.90),
MeanNoConNoTran= 2.84 (±SD= 0.82); χ2(3)= 2.44, p= ns).
The post-test questionnaire also asked subjects to indicate their privacy concern level while
interacting with the app. Table 44 presents the mean and standard deviation of this variable. The difference
in PC between the four groups is not significant with χ2(3)= 1.21, p= ns.
Table 44: Study 2 -Descriptive Data of PC Across Conditions

Condition

PCmean(SD)

ConTran

2.82(±SD= 0.77)

ConNoTran

2.86(±SD= 0.87)

NoConTran

2.9(±SD= 0.93)

NoConNoTran

2.86(±SD= 0.78)

Regarding user future intentions, two questions were embedded in the questionnaire asking about
intention to reuse the app (IR) and intention to disclose personal information to the app (IDP). The four
means of the four conditional groups were statistically equivalent for both variables: IR with MeanConTran=
3.16 (±SD= 1.04), MeanConNoTran= 3.27 (±SD= 1.02), MeanNoConTran= 3.27(±SD= 0.98), MeanNoConNoTran=
3.23 (±SD= 1.05); χ2(3)= 0.66, p= ns, and IDP with MeanConTran= 2.49 (±SD= 0.93), MeanConNoTran= 2.45
(±SD= 0.91), MeanNoConTran= 2.60 (±SD= 0.88), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.50 (±SD= 0.86); χ2(3)= 2.22, p= ns.

7.2.6.2 Objective Measures
In addition to the composite variables that were created from the post-test questionnaire, there were
variables about sharing and disclosure behavior captured during app testing. We measured whether users
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choose to share their recall scores with others via email or Facebook or share the score in both ways. We
also measured how much of the requested personal information user provided to the app. Both measures
were analyzed after participants completed the experimental session. The frequencies of the two behavioral
variables are presented in Table 45.
Regardless of the app version, about 90% of subjects decided not to share their scores using any of
the available sharing options. In addition, their sharing behavior was not statistically significant across the
four conditions with χ2(9)= 12.55, p=0.18 ns. The same result was obtained when we divided the
participants into only two groups (Share vs. not Share) and compare their behavior in the four conditions
with χ2(3)= 6.97, p= 0.07 ns.
However, there was significant variation in sharing behavior between those who were given control
over disclosing personal information and those who were required to provide their personal information.
As Table 46 indicates, chi-square analysis shows that the number of participants who prefer not to share in
the control condition (i.e., optional data entry) is lower than those in the no-control condition (i.e., required
data entry). This is might be due to the impression the app gives in each condition. Subjects in the app with
no control might feel their privacy is vulnerable, therefore they decided not to share their app performance
with others in attempting to restore control over their privacy. That also might explain why the number of
sharing cases in the group of the app with control is higher than those in the group of the app without
control. In contrast, the app with control might give a sense of a privacy-friendly environment where users
voluntarily decided to share their game score with others. The significant results also hold when breaking
down the sharing behavior into email sharing, Facebook sharing, and double sharing with χ2(3)= 9.73,
p<0.05 where the majority of sharing decisions (81%) goes to email as a preferable way of sharing.
Table 45: Study 2 -Behavioral Variables Statistics
* This number represent 208 of participants who were forced to provide all the fields
and 56 participants who voluntarily provided all the optionally requested items

Variable
Sharing

No Sharing

Email

Facebook

Double

Sharing

Sharing

Sharing

379

30

3

4

Nothing

One

Two

Three

Four

Item

Items

Items

Items

62

23

29

264*

Behavior

Disclosure
Behavior

38
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Table 46: Study 2 -Comparison of Two Sharing Behavior Between
App with Control and App Without Control Groups.
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

Condition

Not Sharing

Sharing

App with Control

182

26

App with no Control

197

11

χ2(1)= 5.81, p= 0.02 *

In addition, we measured how much personal information users disclose to the app. Although this
variable is applicable only in two treatment groups, we analyzed if the user is provided with control over
disclosure decision, will they voluntarily reveal their personal information? The app optionally asks users
for four elements of personal information: nickname, email, year of birth, and gender. As in Study 1, we
divided users into two categories (Low Disclosure and High Disclosure) to compare them. Out of 208
participants in the two yes-control groups, 60% of the sample prefer to share less or not to share at all. This
implies that when the user is granted control over disclosure s/he prefers to maintain their privacy by not
revealing or revealing less.
In analyzing the impact of the transparency message on the disclosure behavior between the two
experimental conditions, Table 47 indicates that there was variation in disclosure behavior, however, chisquare test shows that difference is not significant. These figures show that the transparency pop-up notice
did not sufficiently convince users to disclose their information to the app. This might be attributed to the
content of the message itself. A potential explanation is that the message was very concise and lacked the
necessary details to establish trust in the app and make users willingly divulge their personal information.
Another explanation is that readers did not appreciate the importance of the message when they read it and
dismiss it as a non-useful notification.
Table 47: Study 2 -Comparison of Disclosure Rate Between Two
Versions of the App, N=208

Condition

Disclose nothing/

Disclose most/

Disclose less

Disclose all

ConTran

64

40

ConNoTran

59

45

χ2(1)= 0.32, p=0.57, ns
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To gain a deeper understanding about why participants show such a low rate of game-score sharing
with others, and what piece of the requested personal information users regard as most private, quantitative
analysis and qualitative analysis for two questions purposely embedded in the post-test questionnaire will
be presented in the Additional Analyses section.

7.2.7

Test of the Hypotheses
Similar to the hypothesis testing procedure of study 1, this section presents testing of each

hypothesis individually and uses Chi-Square, Kruskall-Wallis (non-parametric ANOVA), regression
analysis depending on the case.

7.2.7.1 Hypothesis 1
H1 proposed that when subjects are allowed to have control over their disclosure decisions, the app
will be perceived as more trustworthy (H1a), and less intrusive (H1b) than when the app forces them to
provide personal information.
When comparing the means of perceived trust across the two conditions of control MeanNoCon= 3.31
(±SD= 0.65) and MeanCon= 3.35 (±SD= 0.63), subjects who were interacting with the app that optionally
ask for private information trust the app more than those who were required to provide all of their
information to the app. However, a Kruskal-Wallis test shows that perceived trust was not significantly
different between the two groups with χ2(1)= 1.62, p= ns. Similarly, while users who interact with the app
that forced them to reveal private information have a higher mean of perceived intrusion (MeanNoCon= 2.83
±SD= 0.86) than those who engaged with the app that provides them with discretional disclosure (MeanCon=
2.71 ±SD= 0.88), this difference was not significant (χ2(1)= 2.43, p= ns). Since the p-values in both tests
were higher than the significance level, neither H1a nor H1b is supported.

7.2.7.2 Hypothesis 2
H2 predicted that the level of app transparency regarding data practices positively affects users’
level of trust in the app (H2a), and negatively affects users’ level of privacy concerns (H2b).
The mean of perceived trust for subjects who interact with the app version that shows pop-up
transparency notice is slightly higher than those who have no transparency notice (MeanTran= 3.35 (±SD=
0.61) vs. MeanNoTran= 3.31(±SD= 0.67)). However, Kruskal-Wallis test shows that perceived trust was not
significantly different between the two app versions groups ( χ2(1)= 0.52, p= ns). User privacy concerns
was not statistically different as well when comparing the level of concerns of the two groups (χ2(1)= 8.11,
p= ns). The two means were closely equal (MeanNoTran= 2.86 (±SD= 0.82), MeanTran= 2.85 (±SD= 0.85))
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indicating that the transparency notice was not convincing enough to influence the privacy concerns level
of those who have the app version with the transparency message and those who have the app version
without it. Given these testing results, both H2a and H2b are not supported.

7.2.7.3 Hypothesis 3
The previous hypotheses proposed separate effects for the two independent variables (app
transparency and app control). H3 predicts the interaction effect of the two factors on perceived trust and
perceived intrusion.
H3a predicted that the level of trust towards the app for subjects who interact with the version that
has control and transparency features would be higher than those who interact with the version that has
neither (no control over disclosure decision and no information about data practices). A Kruskal-Wallis
test was used to check the interaction effect of both transparency and control on perceived trust. The app
version with both features (user control and app transparency) exhibits the highest level of perceived trust
comparing to the three other app versions. The means of perceived trust across the four groups slightly
differ (MeanConTran= 3.39 (±SD= 0.61), MeanConNoTran= 3.31(±SD= 0.66), MeanNoConTran= 3.30 (±SD= 0.60),
MeanNoConNoTran= 3.31(±SD= 0.69)). However, this difference was not statistically significant (χ2(3)= 3.37,
p= ns). We see a noticeable difference in perceived trust between the condition with two features
(transparency and control) and the other three conditions which had the other three versions of the app. We
divided the participants based on the version they had into two groups only: participants engaged with the
app with control and transparency and participants engaged with the other three versions and compute
Kruskal-Wallis. The results were not significant (χ2(1)= 3.21, p= 0.07 ns). Then, we further analyzed the
difference in perceived trust between the group that has the app with two features (transparency and control)
with only those who have the app without the two features (no transparency and no control). Kruskal-Wallis
test indicated that there is no significant difference between the two groups with MeanConTran= 3.39 (±SD=
0.61) vs. MeanNonConNoTran= 3.31 (±SD= 0.69), and χ2(1)= 1.82, p= ns.
Regarding perceived intrusion, H3b proposed that when subjects were granted control and
transparency while interacting with the app, their feeling of being intruded upon by the app decreases. The
means of the four groups show similarity in users perceived intrusion without significant difference
(MeanConTran= 2.71 (±SD= 0.88), MeanConNoTran= 2.72 (±SD= 0.88), MeanNoConTran= 2.83 (±SD= 0.90),
MeanNoConNoTran= 2.84 (±SD= 0.82); χ2(3)= 2.44, p= ns). The means of feeling intruded upon by the app for
the two groups who have optional data entries were lower than those who have mandatory data entries.
However, this comparison was tested previously in H1b and it was not significant. As in the evaluation of
perceived trust above, we compared perceived intrusion between the two groups that have the app version
with both transparency and control features and those who do not have any of these features. There was a
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difference in the means of perceived intrusion between the two groups (MeanConTran= 2.71 (±SD= 0.88) vs.
MeanNonConNoTran= 2.84 (±SD= 0.82)), but this difference was not significant (χ2(1)= 1.06, p= ns).
Therefore, H3a and H3b are not supported.

7.2.7.4 Hypothesis 4
H4 predicted that the more the user perceives the app as intrusive, the more concerns about privacy
s/he would have towards the app. When correlating the perceived intrusion variable with privacy concerns,
the correlation is positive and significant (r(414)=+0.62, p<.001).
The two variables are continuous; therefore, a simple linear regression was performed to investigate
the relationship between them. The linear regression was performed with privacy concerns as a dependent
variable and perceived intrusion as an explanatory variable along with all of the control variables in order
to estimate the effect of the feeling of being invaded by the app on user’s privacy concerns. The results in
Table 48 show that the model is significant (F(11, 404)=27.29; p<.001), and the b coefficient of perceived
intrusion is significant (PI: b=0.56, p<.001). It is worthy of note that the other significant coefficient in
this regression is the user’s disposition to value privacy (DVP: b=0.16, p<.001). None of the other control
variables were significant. These results indicate that when a user feels that the app invades his privacy,
this feeling increases his level of privacy concerns, while controlling for individual characteristics. In other
words, if the app is viewed as intrusive, privacy concerns increase. Therefore, H4 is supported.
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Table 48: Study 2 -Linear Model for PC Explained by PI and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(11, 404)
R2
Parameters
Intercept

27.29***
42.55%

b Coefficient (t, p)
0.74 (2.01*)

PI

0.56 (14.67***)

DVP

0.16 (3.78***)

TP

-0.06 (-1.57 ns)

Gender

-0.02 (-0.38 ns)

Age

-0.004 (-0.05 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.04 (-1.43 ns)

EmpStatus

0.10 (1.01 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.08 (1.58 ns)

Language
Major
iPhone Model

-0.004 (-0.06 ns)
0.09 (0.60 ns)
-0.09 (-1.37 ns)

7.2.7.5 Hypothesis 5
H5 proposed that individuals who perceive low levels of trust in the app during the interaction are
more likely to be anxious about their privacy and experience a high level of privacy concerns. The
correlation between perceived trust and privacy concerns is negative and significant (r(414)=-0.31,
p<.001). This implies that when the app is considered more trustworthy, users’ concerns about their privacy
becomes lower.
Linear regression analysis with privacy concerns as the dependent variable against perceived trust
with control variables in Table 49 showed that the whole model was significant (F(11, 404)=11.06; p<.001).
Perceived trust in this model has a significant effect on the level of privacy concerns with b=-0.45 and
p<.001 . The regression shows that DVP is significant as well with b=0.35 and p<.001. Therefore, H5 is
supported.
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Table 49: Study 2 -Linear Model for PC Explained by PT and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(11,404)
R2
Parameters
Intercept
PT
DVP
TP

11.06***
23.31%

b Coefficient (t, p)
2.77 (5.81***)
-0.45 (-7.70 ***)
0.35 (7.06***)
-0.007 (-0.16 ns)

Gender

0.002 (0.04 ns)

Age

0.02 (0.22 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.04 (-1.17 ns)

EmpStatus

0.12 (1.09 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.08 (1.24 ns)

Language

-0.15 (-1.95*)

Major

-0.08 (-0.99 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.08 (-1.03 ns)

7.2.7.6 Hypothesis 6
H6 proposed that users who have high levels of privacy concerns toward the app are less likely to
have intentions to reuse the app in the future (H6a), and less likely to show the intention to disclose personal
information (H6b).
There is a significant but rather weak correlation between privacy concerns and future intention to
reuse the app. A linear regression model was run using intention to reuse as a dependent variable and
privacy concerns as an explanatory variable along with the control variables. The result in Table 50
indicates a significant relationship between the two. The model was significant (F(11,404)= 2.16; p<.05),
and the negative coefficient of privacy concern was significant as well ( b= -0.19, t= -3.05 and p<.01). In
addition, the model shows a significant effect of DVP (b= 0.15, t= 2.18 and p<.05) and ethnicity (b= 0.09,
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t= 1.97 and p<.05) on the intention to reuse the app. While controlling for individual characteristics, this
result indicates that user’s intention to use the app in the future can be predicted to some extent from
evaluating user privacy concerns towards the app such that users who have a high level of privacy concerns
are more likely to refrain from using the app again and vice versa.
Table 50: Study 2 -Linear Model for IR Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

IR
Model F(11,404)

2.16*

R2

5. 54%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

2.80 (4.65***)

PC

-0.19 (-3.05**)

DVP
TP

0.15 (2.18*)
-0.005(-0.10 ns)

Gender

0.16 (1.65 ns)

Age

0.09 (0.64 ns)

Ethnicity
EmpStatus
CollegeLevel
Language

0.09 (1.97*)
-0.06 (-0.40 ns)
0.03 (0.36 ns)
-0.05 (-0.48 ns)

Major

0.05 (0.23 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.02 (0.81 ns)

When examining the effect of privacy concerns on user intention to disclose personal information
requested by the app, the linear model in Table 51 showed a significant negative coefficient of privacy
concerns with b= -0.31, t=-5.99 and p<.001. In addition, the regression results show that the individual
characteristics trust propensity and language have their significant effect on user intention to reveal personal
information to the app with b=0.11, t=2.20; p<.05 and b= -0.17, t=-2.12; p<.05 respectively. The whole
model of user intention to disclose personal information explained by user privacy concerns and other
control variables was significant as well (F(11, 404)= 6.98; p<.001). Users who have a low level of privacy
concerns are more likely to have the intention to disclose personal information to the app.
Considering the two analyses above, both Hypothesis H6a and H6b are supported.
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Table 51: Study 2 -Linear Model for IDP Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

IDP
Model F(11,404)

6.98***

R2

15. 97%

Parameters
Intercept

b Coefficient (t, p)
3.85 (7.73***)

PC

-0.31 (-5.99***)

DVP

-0.06 (-1.12 ns)

TP
Gender
Age
Ethnicity

0.11(2.20*)
0.13 (1.57 ns)
-0.09 (-0.45 ns)
0.04 (1.04 ns)

EmpStatus

-0.10 (-0.80 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.11 (-1.65 ns)

Language
Major
iPhone Model

-0.17 (-2.12*)
-0.17 (-0.94 ns)
0.10 (1.19 ns)

7.2.7.7 Hypothesis 7
H7 predicted that an increase in the level of privacy concerns decreases the likelihood of user
disclosure (H7a) and sharing (H7b) behavior.
Disclosure behavior was measured by how much of the requested information user reveals to the
app during the interaction. As mentioned previously, this measure is only applicable in two conditions (out
of four), when users have the discretion to reveal or conceal some or all of the four items of personal
information requested by the app. We used logistic regression, appropriate for ordinal data, to evaluate the
effect of privacy concerns on the ordinal measure of how much the user revealed. Using a count of disclosed
items of personal information as a dependent variable and privacy concern as an independent variable with
all of the control variables, the significant model (χ²(11)= 22.01; p<.05) in Table 52 shows that user privacy
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concerns is statistically significant with b= -0.79, z =-3.02 and p<.01 suggesting a negative association of
the concerns users might have with the probability of disclosing personal information. The model shows as
well significant coefficients for both participant’s college level (b= 0.75, z =1.98 and p<.05) and her/his
native language (b= -0.86, z =-2.09 p<.05) that affect their disclosure behavior.
Table 52: Study 2 -Logistic Regression Model for Disclosure Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Disclosure Behavior
Model χ²(11)

22.01*

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

16%

R2(McFadden)

11%

Parameters

b Coefficient (z , p)

Intercept

3.49 (1.66 ns)

PC

-0.79 (-3.02**)

DVP

-0.16 (-0.63 ns)

TP

-0.24(-1.11 ns)

Gender

-0.40 (-1.01 ns)

Age

-0.23 (-0.50 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.28 (-1.76 ns)

EmpStatus
CollegeLevel
Language
Major
iPhone Model

0.94 (1.76 ns)
0.75 (1.98*)
-0.86 (-2.09*)
-0.10 (-0.12 ns)
0.18 (0.45 ns)

To evaluate user sharing behavior, we used objective and subjective measures. The objective
sharing measure captured the ways of sharing users chose when they obtained their game scores. The
subjective self-reported measure asked users in the post-questionnaire, after completing the app and decided
actual sharing, how much they were willing to share their performance in the app with others.
A logistic regression model of the objective sharing measure shows a significant effect of the
control variables: ethnicity, college level, and language. However, the model was not significant. The
results are presented in Table 53.
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Table 53: Study 2 -Logistic Regression Model for Sharing Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Sharing Behavior
Model χ²(11)

17.00 ns

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

9%

R2(McFadden)

7%

Parameters

b Coefficient (z , p)

Intercept

-3.99 (-1.78 ns)

PC

0.00 (-0.01 ns)

DVP

-0.14 (-0.60 ns)

TP

0.09(0.93 ns)

Gender

-0.30 (-0.85 ns)

Age

-0.32 (-0.60 ns)

Ethnicity

0.39 (2.59 **)

EmpStatus

0.46 (0.76 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.54 (2.07*)

Language

-0.84 (-2.91*)

Major

0.21 (0.27 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.11 (-0.29 ns)

We further analyzed the subjective measure of intention to share by performing a linear regression
using the privacy concerns as an explanatory variable with the control variables, and intention to share as a
dependent variable. The model in Table 54 was significant (F(11,404)= 2.29; p<.05), and the negative
coefficient of privacy concern was significant as well ( b= -0.18, t= -3.09 and p<.01). This implies that user
privacy concerns have an impact on user intention to share. From the previous analysis, H7a is partially
supported with half of the sample while H7b is supported only when using the subjective sharing measure.
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Table 54: Study 2 -Linear Model for ISG Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

ISG
Model F(11,404)

2.29*

R2

5.85%

Parameters

7.2.8

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

3.56 (6.27***)

PC

-0.18 (-3.09**)

DVP

-0.08 (-1.24 ns)

TP

0.00 (0.01 ns)

Gender

0.17 (1.77 ns)

Age

0.04 (0.30 ns)

Ethnicity

0.06 (1.15 ns)

EmpStatus

0.03 (0.23 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.06 (-0.79 ns)

Language

-0.17 (-1.79 ns)

Major

-0.04(-0.20 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.05 (-0.48 ns)

Significance of the Model
As in the previous study, to test the significance of the entire research model, we adopted a

hierarchical stepwise linear regression approach where we add the explanatory factors sequentially
according to their placement in the research model such that app features (user control and app
transparency) were entered first, the mediators (perceived trust and perceived intrusion) were entered
second, and all the ten control variables were entered in the third block of the regression model. Results are
shown in Table 55.
The adjusted R2 value for the complete model indicates that 47.4 percent of the variance for user
privacy concerns is explained by variables selected for this study. In the complete model, the variance for
privacy concerns for app users could be attributed primarily to the user’s perceived trust (PT: b = -0.35,
p< .001), user’s perceived intrusion towards the app (PI: b = 0.52, p < .001), and to users’ general tendency
to value privacy (DVP: b = 0.21, p< .001). Neither the manipulations nor the other control variables are
significant in the complete model.
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Table 55: Study 2 -Step-wise Regression of the Whole Model of PC

Block 1

PC ~ Trans *

PC ~ Trans * Control

PC ~ Trans * Control + PT +

Control

+ PT + PI

PI + Control Variables

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 2

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 3

b Coefficient (t, p)

Parameters
Intercept

2.86 (34.81***)

2.31 (11.04***)

1.71 (4.26***)

App Transparency(AT)

0.04 (0.35 ns)

0.05 (0.52 ns)

0.06 (0.66 ns)

User Control(UC)

0.00 (0.03 ns)

0.07 (0.83 ns)

0.03 (0.4 ns)

Interaction AT*UC

-0.09 (-0.54 ns)

-0.06 (-0.48 ns)

0 (-0.03 ns)

PT

-0.32 (-6.63***)

-0.35 (-7.19***)

PI

0.57 (15.93***)

0.52 (14.25***)

Adj. R2
Model F(3,412) =

-0.6%
0.18, p= 0.91 ns

DVP

0.21 (5.1***)

TP

-0.03 (-0.79 ns)

Gender

0 (-0.02 ns)

Age

-0.01 (-0.15 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.03 (-1.08 ns)

EmpStatus

0.05 (0.54 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.06 (1.19 ns)

Language

-0.04 (-0.65 ns)

Major

0.09 (0.67 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.08 (-1.33 ns)

43.7%
F(5,410)=

65.42, p< 0.001 ***

47.4%
F(15,400) =

25.93, p< 0.001 ***
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7.3

Analysis of Study 3

7.3.1

Demographic Variables
This study consists of 168 participants who correctly answered the two questions checking the

experimental manipulations from Study 2 sample.

The final distribution of the participants in the

experimental groups is as follows: 61 subjects in ConTran, 39 in ConNoTran, 25 in NoConTran, and 43 in
NoConNoTran. Although this represents a small sample size, it provides clean data to analyze the
manipulation effect of the experiment.
Table 56: Study 3 - Demographic Profile of the Sample

Demographic Characteristics

Frequency

Percent

Gender

Male

77

45.8%

Female

90

53.6%

Other

1

0.6%

18-24

148

88.1%

25-34

19

11.3%

35-44

1

0.6%

White

34

20%

Asian

99

58.9%

Black or African

4

2.4%

Hispanic

24

14.3%

Other

7

4.2%

English

76

45.2%

Not English

92

54.7%

CIS

9

5.4%

Not CIS

159

94.7%

Freshman

12

7.1%

Sophomore

111

66.1%

Junior

43

25.6%

Senior

12

7.1%

Student (unemployed)

150

89.3%

Employed

18

10.7%

New(iPhone 8 and above)

97

57.7%

Old (Up to iPhone 7)

71

42.3%

Age

Ethnicity

Native language
Major in school
College Level

Employment status

iPhone model
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As shown in Table 56 above the subjects showed an adequate distribution of gender (77 males, 90
females) and 88% in the age range of 18-24. The majority of them (89%) were unemployed students, in
their second year of college (66%), predominantly majoring in non-CIS (94.7%). While the sample is
skewed toward Asian ethnicity with nearly 58.9%, only 20% of the subjects are White and the rest belong
to either Hispanic, African American, or other cultures. The native language of 54.7% of the subjects is not
English. Further, more than half of the sample (57.7%) uses iPhone 8 or newer (launched after 2018) as
their personal device used for the experiment.

7.3.2

Construct Validity and Reliability
As in Study 2, the same measurement model was used to evaluate the eight constructs of this study

which are Privacy Concerns(PC), Continuance Intention(IR), Disclosure Intention of personal information
(IDP), Sharing Intention of the Game score (ISG), user’s Disposition to Value Privacy (DVP), Trust
Propensity (TP), Perceived Trust (PT), and Perceived Intrusion (PI). To check the reliability of the 30 items
using subsample data, factor analysis with VARIMAX rotation was performed. All these items (listed in
Study 2) were measured on a five-point Likert scale with 5 representing ‘strongly agree’ and 1‘strongly
disagree’. The cutoff of 0.6 or above was considered for acceptable loadings of the items following the
recommendation of Hair et al. (2010). Table 57 indicates that all resulting factor loadings were equal to 0.6
or higher, except for the second item of the perceived trust scale which was removed because its loading
was very low. When examining the cross-loadings, all the items exhibit no cross-loadings above 0.4 and
that satisfies the criteria for convergent and discriminant validity.
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Table 57: Study 3- Factor Loadings of the Constructs
All non-significant cross-loadings which less than ±0.1 were omitted

Items

Factors
1

DVP1
DVP2
DVP3
TP1
TP2
TP3
PT1
PT2
PT3
PT4
PT5
PT6
PI1
PI2
PI3
PI4
PC1
PC2
PC3
PC4
PC5
IR1
IR2
IR3
IDP1
IDP2
IDP3
ISG1
ISG2
ISG3

0.185

0.636
0.453
0.682
0.841
0.808
0.756

-0.11
-0.142
-0.152
-0.168
-0.178
-0.104
-0.136
0.14
0.17
0.199
0.244
0.179
0.158
0.132

2
0.198
0.148
0.157

3

-0.16
-0.135

-0.141

6

-0.108
0.645
0.766
0.844
0.767
0.309
0.341
0.194
0.227
0.29
-0.107
-0.143

7
-0.222
-0.157
-0.146
0.831
0.907
0.794

0.106
-0.122

-0.131

5

0.112
0.118
0.139

-0.103
-0.191
-0.22

0.329
0.304
0.276
0.239
0.634
0.682
0.745
0.727
0.673

4

0.116
0.188

0.145
0.195

8
0.768
0.698
0.859
-0.112
-0.152
-0.196
0.203
0.172
0.16

0.122
-0.169
0.119
0.163
0.141
0.118

-0.108
-0.103
-0.191
-0.123
0.165
0.206
0.187
0.766
0.94
0.848
0.147
0.105

0.108
0.222

0.122
0.813
0.972
0.831

0.126
0.18

0.852
0.936
0.68
0.225
0.156
0.197
0.128
0.13

Following the same procedures employed in Study 1 and Study 2, construct inter-item reliability
was measured by Cronbach alpha. As shown in Table 58, the Cronbach alpha of all the constructs ranged
from 0.87 to 0.94, exceeding the recommended minimum cut-off of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). Since
Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct was above the threshold, the constructs meet the reliability
criteria. All the items of each construct were averaged together to form a composite variable or index such
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that each participant has one value for each construct determined by the average of her/his responses to the
items in each scale. Table 58 also shows the mean and standard deviation of each composite variable.
Table 58: Study 3 - Alpha Scores, Mean,
and Standard Deviation Values for the Constructs

7.3.3

Cronbach Alpha
(Standardized)

Mean

SD

DVP

0.87

3.91

0.83

TP

0.90

2.82

0.89

PT

0.88

3.31

0.62

PI

0.89

2.87

0.85

PC

0.89

2.92

0.82

IR

0.90

3.20

0.98

IDP

0.94

2.44

0.82

ISG

0.92

2.77

0.91

Correlation Analysis
The analysis of correlation for all the continuous variables shows the strength of the association

and the significance (p-value) of the association. Table 59 presents the correlation coefficients between
each pair of variables in the lower diagonal, and their level of significance in the upper diagonal.
Coefficients in bold are significant.
The table indicates that the correlation between PI and PC is positive and statistically significant
with r(166)= +0.59, p < .001. It indicates that when the feeling of being intruded upon by the app increases,
user’s privacy concern increases as well. Another notable statistically significant association was found
between IR and IDP. This positive correlation (r(166)=+0.42, p < .001) shows that when user’s intention
to reuse the app increases, her/his intention to disclose personal information increases as well. In addition,
there is a negative relationship between PT and PC. This significant correlation (r(166)=-0.31, p < .001)
implies that when the level of user’s privacy concerns decreases, the perception of the user towards the
app’s trustworthiness increases. These correlations are similar to what has been found in Study 2 with the
larger sample.
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Table 59: Study 3 - Correlation Matrix of the Variables:
Disposition to Value Privacy (DVP), Trust Propensity (TP), Perceived Trust (PT),
Perceived Intrusion (PI), Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance Intention (IR), Intention to Disclose Personal
Information (IDP), Intention to Share Game Score (ISG)
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

7.3.4

DVP

TP

PT

PI

PC

IR

IDP

ISG

DVP

1

***

ns

***

***

ns

ns

ns

TP

-0.35

1

ns

ns

**

ns

*

ns

PT

0.11

0.08

1

*

***

***

***

*

PI

0.28

-0.08

-0.18

1

***

**

ns

ns

PC

0.34

-0.20

-0.31

0.59

1

*

***

*

IR

-0.02

-0.01

0.31

-0.23

-0.20

1

***

***

IDP

-0.10

0.18

0.36

-0.10

-0.27

0.42

1

**

ISG

-0.08

-0.02

0.15

-0.09

-0.17

0.30

0.24

1

Measures of Pre-Test Variables
In the pre-test questionnaire, certain individual characteristics were assessed. Similar to Study 2,

we asked participants to respond to privacy- and trust-related statements on a five-point scale in order to
measure their general tendency towards privacy and trust. The most recent Westin’s scale used in this study
to categorize the participant to either privacy fundamentalist, pragmatist, or unconcerned (Kumaraguru &
Cranor, 2005). Table 60 gives the percentage of each group in Study 3 sample. Comparing to Study 2, this
sample have more privacy fundamentalists with 32.7 % comparing to 27.6% and less unconcerned
participants about their privacy with 11.3% comparing to 13%. This might explain to some extent why the
subjects in this study noticed the privacy clues embedded in the app and passed the manipulation check
questions.
Table 60: Study 3 - Westin's Categories of the Study 3 Sample

Westin’s Index
privacy fundamentalists

32.7%

privacy pragmatists

56%

privacy unconcerned

11.3%

With regard general tendency towards privacy (DVP), the sample appears to have a similar average
DVP with 3.9 (±SD= 0.83) to the average DVP of Study 2. However, the average trust propensity (TP) of
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the participants (2.82, ±SD= 0.89) was found lower than the average of Study 2 sample (2.87, ±SD= 0.87).
Subjects in this sample tend to trust the others less.
As in previous analyses, we checked for the randomization of demographic variables across
conditions. Table 61 indicates that none of these variables shows a systematic variation within conditions,
and therefore, we rule out alternative explanations for the results observed, as the case in the previous
studies of this experiment. Nevertheless, the demographics and the pre-test measures will be used as
controls throughout the analysis of the study to enhance the explanatory power of the regression models.
Table 61: Study 3 - Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

Continuous Variables
MeanConTran
DVP

TP

MeanConNoTran MeanNoConTran MeanNoConNoTran

3.85

4.18

3.85

3.79

(±SD= 0.81)

(±SD= 0.57)

(±SD= 0.99)

(±SD= 0.94)

2.84

2.86

2.80

2.76

(±SD= 0.88)

(±SD= 0.87)

(±SD= 0.67)

(±SD= 1.04)

c2(3)= 4.65, p=0.20

ns

c2(3)=0.36, p=0.95

ns

Categorical Variables
Gender

c2(6)= 5.03, p= 0.54

ns

Age

c2(6)= 2.33, p= 0.89

ns

Ethnicity

c2(12)= 10.73, p= 0.55

ns

Native language

c2(3)= 0.94, p= 0.82

ns

Major

c2(3)= 3.88, p= 0.27

ns

Employment status

c2(3)= 1.87, p= 0.60

ns

College Level

c2(9)= 8.11, p= 0.52

ns

iPhone model

c2(3)= 0.29, p= 0.96

ns

7.3.5

Manipulation Checks
Since this is a subsample of Study 2, all participants included passed the manipulation checks by

responding correctly to the two yes/no questions related to the experimental manipulations app transparency
and user control according to their assigned conditions. As mentioned previously, the distribution of the
168 participants across conditions was unbalanced: 61 subjects in ConTran, 39 in ConNoTran, 25 in
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NoConTran, and 43 in NoConNoTran. However, this subsample has the benefit that includes only those
who noticed the experimental manipulations.

7.3.6

Measures of Post-Test Variables

7.3.6.1 Subjective Measures
As in the previous studies, we measured their Perceived Trust (PT), Perceived Intrusion (PI),
Privacy Concerns (PC), Continuance Intention (IR), and Intention to Disclose Personal Information (IDP),
through the subjective measures in the post-task questionnaire at the end of app testing session.
Several Kruskall-Wallis tests were conducted to examine the difference in the means of these
measures across the four experimental groups. With PT as a dependent variable, the perception of trust
among the conditions was statistically significant (MeanConTran= 3.62 (±SD= 0.51), MeanConNoTran= 3.21
(±SD= 0.53), MeanNoConTran= 3.25 (±SD= 0.60), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.98 (±SD= 0.67); χ2(3)= 32.88, p <
.001).

Unlike Study 2, Study 3 shows that when a participant perceived the app privacy-related

manipulations, the degree of trust perception towards the app significantly varies across the conditions.
When examining PI, the difference between the four groups was not statistically significant
(MeanConTran= 2.73 (±SD= 0.86), MeanConNoTran= 2.73 (±SD= 0.74), MeanNoConTran= 3.00 (±SD= 1.01),
MeanNoConNoTran= 3.12 (±SD= 0.81); χ2(3)= 5.60, p= ns). The participants had similar level of intrusion
perception towards the app. However, perceived intrusion was found to be statistically different (χ2(1)=
5.48, p < .05) between the two groups of control conditions. Those who were granted app control over
their disclosure decisions felt less intruded upon by the app (MeanCon= 2.73 ±SD= 0.81) than those who
were forced to provide all the required information requested by the app (MeanNoCon= 3.07 ±SD= 0.88).
This difference might be attributed to the app manipulation or to the difference in the number of subjects
in each of two control conditions (NCon=100 vs. NNoCon=68).
The difference in PC was not statistically significant cross the four conditions (MeanConTran= 2.75
(±SD= 0.78), MeanConNoTran= 2.96 (±SD= 0.79), MeanNoConTran= 2.93 (±SD= 1.00), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.13
(±SD= 0.78); χ2(3)= 6.47, p= ns). However, when comparing between the two groups of those who have
the two app’s features (transparency and control) and those who have none of the two features (MeanConTran=
2.75 (±SD= 0.78), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.13 (±SD= 0.78)), the variance was significant (χ2(1)= 6.82, p < .01)
with comparable number of subjects in each group (NConTran=61 vs. NNoConNoTrann=43). It implies that the app
with two privacy features (transparency and control) contributes to lower the privacy concerns user might
have during the interaction compared to the app that has none of these features. This is was not the case in
Study 2 sample.
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There were two questions asked about intention to reuse the app (IR) and intention to disclose
personal information to the app (IDP). Analyzing IR showed non-significant difference in the intention
among the four groups (MeanConTran= 3.40 (±SD= 0.90), MeanConNoTran= 3.08 (±SD= 0.79), MeanNoConTran=
3.26 (±SD= 0.79), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.02 (±SD= 1.10); χ2(3)= 4.05, p= ns). Although there is a noticeable
difference in the IR means between the two groups of the app with two privacy features vs. the app without
the two privacy features (MeanConTran= 3.40 (±SD= 0.90), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.02 (±SD= 1.10), this variance
was not statistically significant (χ2(1)= 2.92, p= ns).
For IDP, the difference in the means of the four groups was not significant with MeanConTran=
2.65(±SD= 0.89), MeanConNoTran= 2.26 (±SD= 0.70), MeanNoConTran= 2.42 (±SD= 0.74), MeanNoConNoTran=
2.29 (±SD= 0.81) and χ2(3)= 6.22, p= ns. The same statistically non-significant result was obtained from
comparing the IDP means between the two groups of the app with two privacy features vs. the app without
the two privacy features with χ2(1)= 3.57, p= 0.06 ns.

7.3.6.2 Objective Measures
The two objective measures were analyzed after participants completed the experimental session.
We captured how much of the requested personal information users provided to the app at the beginning of
the app trial session, then we measured whether users chose to share their recall scores with others when
they reached the last screen of the app via email or Facebook or share the score in both ways. The
frequencies of the two behavioral variables are presented in Table 62.
Table 62: Study 3 - Behavioral Variables Statistics
* This number represent 68 of participants who were forced to provide all the fields
and only 30 participants who voluntarily provided all the optionally requested items.

Variable
Sharing

No Sharing

Email

Facebook

Double

Sharing

Sharing

Sharing

156

10

1

1

Nothing

One

Two

Three

Four

Item

Items

Items

Items

25

13

14

98*

Behavior

Disclosure
Behavior

18

Like user’s sharing behavior in Study 1 and Study 2, about 92% of subjects decided not to share
their scores with others. This high percentage of refraining from sharing will be discussed later in a separate
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section. In addition, it seems that users in this sample prefer email sharing to Facebook sharing, and only
one participant chose to share the game score via both email and Facebook. When examining the difference
in sharing behavior across the four conditions, chi-square analysis indicates that the difference is not
statistically significant with χ2(9)= 10.66, p= ns. This non-significant result holds as well (χ2(3)= 3.81,
p=ns) when we categorize the subjects into two groups (sharing vs. not sharing). Analyzing further the
sharing behavior between various groups of the sample revealed no significant differences based on the
treatments they experienced (control vs. no control, transparency vs. no transparency, and app with two
features vs. app without two features).
The information disclosure measure is only relevant in two (out of four) experimental groups where
the app allows users to control how much information they want to disclose. There are only 100 participants
in the two yes-control conditions. After using the same grouping of Low Disclosure (those who disclosed
only one, two elements, or nothing out of the four requested items: nickname, email, year of birth, and
gender) and High Disclosure (those who disclosed three or all the four items), 56 (56%) users chose to
reveal less or nothing compared to 44 (44%) users who disclosed most or all of the required personal items.
The impact of the transparency message on the disclosure behavior for the two groups was not
significant. Table 63 indicates that there was a slight variation in disclosure behavior, however, chi-square
test shows that difference is not significant.
Table 63: Study 3 - Comparison of Disclosure Rate Between
Two Versions of the App, N=100

Condition

Disclose nothing/

Disclose most/

Disclose less

Disclose all

ConTran

34

27

ConNoTran

22

17

χ2(1)= 0.0004, p=0.95, ns

More details about such a low rate of game score sharing and disclosure behavior will be presented
in the Additional Analyses section.

7.3.7

Test of the Hypotheses
The same procedure of statistical tests selection in Study 1 and Study 2 is used here to examine

each hypothesis individually, and consists of Chi-Square, Kruskall-Wallis, or regressions, depending on the
relations predicted in each hypothesis.
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7.3.7.1 Hypothesis 1
H1 proposed that when subjects are allowed to have control over their disclosure decisions, the app
will be perceived as more trustworthy (H1a), and less intrusive (H1b) than when the app forces them to
provide personal information.
The mean of perceived trust for subjects who interact with the app version that optionally ask for
private information trust the app more (MeanCon= 3.46, ±SD= 0.55) than those who were required to provide
all of their information to the app (MeanNoCon= 3.08, ±SD= 0.65). Kruskal-Wallis test shows that perceived
trust was statistically significant between the two groups with χ2(1)= 17.69, p<0.001.
Similarly, users who interact with the app that forced them to reveal private information have a
higher mean of perceived intrusion (MeanNoCon= 3.07 ±SD= 0.88) than those who engaged with the app that
provides them with discretional disclosure (MeanCon= 2.73 ±SD= 0.81). This difference in intrusion
perception between the two groups was statistically significant with χ2(1)= 5.48, p<0.05.
Given these hypotheses testing results, both H1a and H1b are supported. It worth noting here that
the same two hypotheses were not supported by Study 1 or Study 2 sample. This indicates that having a
restricted sample of participants with only those who perceived the privacy control treatments (in this case
discretional vs. required disclosure) as intended has its effect on user’s trust and intrusion perception
towards the app.

7.3.7.2 Hypothesis 2
H2 predicted that the level of app transparency regarding data practices positively affects users’
level of trust in the app (H2a), and negatively affects users’ level of privacy concerns (H2b).
When comparing the means of perceived trust between subjects who interact with app version that
has the transparency notice and app version that does not have, the difference was significant (MeanTran=
3.51 (±SD= 0.56), MeanNoTran= 3.09 (±SD= 0.62), χ2(1)= 22.71, p<.001 ). The result implies that having a
notice stating the app data practices contributes to increasing the level of trust users feel towards the app
compared to those who does not have that notice.
This transparency notice affects the level of privacy concerns as well. Subjects who were in the
group of the app with no transparency feature have a higher mean of privacy concerns (MeanNoTran= 3.05
(±SD= 0.79)) than those who have the app with transparency feature (MeanTran= 2.80 (±SD= 0.85)).
However, Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the difference was not statistically significant (χ2(1)= 3.52,
p=0.06 ns).
Since the p-value was lower than the significance level in H2a and higher in H2b, H2a is supported
while H2b is not supported. Compared to Study 2 results, H2a is rejected in Study 2 and supported in Study
3. This might be due to users’ awareness of privacy clues embedded in the app design (transparency notice

161

in this case) as the sample of this study represents only the subjects who passed the two manipulation
checks. Although H2b is not supported in this study, it was close to be supported given that the p-value
(0.06) is very close to the significance level. This result might be due to the small number of subjects in
each of the experimental groups for this study.

7.3.7.3 Hypothesis 3
The previous hypotheses proposed separate effects for the two independent variables (app
transparency and app control). H3 predicts the interaction effect of the two factors on perceived trust and
perceived intrusion.
H3a proposed that the level of trust towards the app for subjects who interact with the version that
has control and transparency features would be higher than any of those who interact with the version that
has neither (no control over disclosure decision and no information about data practices) or one of these
features. The average of the perceived trust level of the app with the two features is higher than the average
of the three other groups (MeanConTran= 3.62 (±SD= 0.51), MeanConNoTran= 3.22(±SD= 0.53), MeanNoConTran=
3.25 (±SD= 0.60), MeanNoConNoTran= 2.98(±SD= 0.67)) while the group of the app without the two feature
exhibits the lowest average of trust perception. When analyzing the significance of the difference, KruskalWallis test shows it is statistically significant (χ2(3)= 32.88, p<.001).
H3b predicted that when subjects were granted control and transparency while interacting with the
app, their feeling of being intruded upon by the app decreases. Although the four means of the four
conditional groups slightly differ (MeanConTran= 2.73 (±SD= 0.86), MeanConNoTran= 2.73 (±SD= 0.74),
MeanNoConTran= 3.00 (±SD= 1.09), MeanNoConNoTran= 3.11 (±SD= 0.81)), these differences were not
significant (χ2(3)= 5.59, p= ns). There is no significant result was obtained as well when comparing the
average of perceived trust between users of the app that has the two features and users of the app that has
none of the two features (χ2(1)= 3.27, p= ns).
Therefore, H3a is supported and H3b is not supported.

7.3.7.4 Hypothesis 4
H4 predicted that the more the user perceives the app as intrusive, the more concerns about privacy
s/he would have towards the app. When correlating the perceived intrusion with privacy concerns, the
correlation is positive and significant (r(166)=+0.59, p<.001).
The two variables are continuous; therefore, a simple linear regression was performed to investigate
the relationship between them. The linear regression was performed with privacy concerns as the dependent
variable and perceived intrusion as an explanatory variable with all of the control variables to estimate the
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effect of the feeling of being invaded by the app on user privacy concerns. The results in Table 64 show
that the model is significant (F(11, 156)=10.7; p<.001) and the b coefficient of perceived intrusion is
significant (PI: b=0.51, p<.001). It is worthy of note that the other significant coefficients in this regression
is the disposition to value privacy (DVP: b=0.18, p<.01) and college level (b=0.22, p<.01). None of the
other control variables were significant. These results indicate that when the user feels that the app invades
into her/his privacy, this feeling increases her/his level of privacy concerns while controlling for individual
characteristics. Therefore, H4 is supported.
Table 64: Study 3 - Linear Model for PC Explained by PI and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(11, 156)
R2
Parameters

10.7***
43%

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

0.56 (0.86 ns)

PI

0.51 (8.03***)

DVP

0.18 (2.69**)

TP
Gender

-0.08 (-1.35 ns)
0.01 (0.13 ns)

Age

-0.14 (-0.86 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.03 (-0.53 ns)

EmpStatus

0.12 (0.68 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.22 (2.61**)

Language

0.1 (1.01 ns)

Major

0.04 (0.19 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.08 (-0.73 ns)

7.3.7.5 Hypothesis 5
H5 proposed that individuals who perceive low levels of trust in the app during the interaction are
more likely to be anxious about their privacy and experience a high level of privacy concerns. The
correlation between perceived trust and privacy concerns in this study is negative and significant (r(166)=-
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0.31, p<.001). This implies that when the app is considered more trustworthy, users’ concerns about their
privacy becomes lower.
Linear regression analysis with privacy concerns as the dependent variable and perceived trust with
control variables in Table 65 showed that the whole model was significant (F(11, 156)=5.53; p<.001).
Perceived trust in this model has a significant effect on the level of privacy concerns with b=-0.41 and
p<.001. Like the previous hypothesis, DVP was significant as well with b=-0.38 and p<.001. The
significant model indicates that when the user interacts with an app that is perceived as trustworthy, s/he
has fewer privacy concerns, while controlling for individual characteristics. Therefore, H5 is supported.

Table 65: Study 3 - Linear Model for PC Explained by PT and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

PC
Model F(11,156)

5.53***

R2

28.06%

Parameters
Intercept
PT

b Coefficient (t, p)
2.62 (3.19**)
-0.41 (-4.33***)

DVP

0.38 (5.06***)

TP

-0.04 (-0.64 ns)

Gender

0.02 (0.16 ns)

Age

-0.17 (-0.94 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.08 (-1.52 ns)

EmpStatus

0.22 (1.16 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.18 (1.92 ns)

Language

0.04 (0.34 ns)

Major

-0.16 (-0.61 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.02 (-0.21 ns)
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7.3.7.6 Hypothesis 6
H6 proposed that users who have high levels of privacy concerns toward the app, are less likely to
have intentions to reuse the app in the future (H6a), and less likely to have the intention to disclose personal
information (H6b).
There is signification weak correlation between user privacy concerns and her/his intention to reuse
the app with r(166)=-0.20, p<.05. Although there were significant effects of both PC and language, the
model of IR was found to be non-significant (F(11, 156)=1.59; ns) when regressing user privacy concerns
along with all the control variables on user intention to reuse the app in the future. This result indicates that
the user’s future intention to interact with the app cannot be predicted by the level of privacy concerns s/he
might have. Table 66 illustrates the model.
Table 66: Study 3 - Linear Model for IR Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

IR
Model F(11,156)

1.59 ns

R2

10.09%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

4.12 (4.19***)

PC

-0.22 (-2.23*)

DVP
TP

0 (-0.03 ns)
-0.08 (-0.83 ns)

Gender

0.13 (0.88 ns)

Age

0.01 (0.04 ns)

Ethnicity

0.04 (0.58 ns)

EmpStatus

0.14 (0.54 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.14 (-1.11 ns)

Language

-0.34 (-2.19*)

Major

0.63 (1.86 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.02 (-0.14 ns)

Another linear regression was performed to assess the effect of privacy concerns on user’s intention
to disclose personal information requested by the app. With IDP as the dependent variable and PC with all
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controls as explanatory factors, the model in Table 67 was found to be significant (F(11, 156)=4.31;
p<.001). The model indicates privacy concerns level can explain to some extent the user’s intention to
provide her/his private information to the app. The negative b coefficient of PC was significant (PC: b=0.19 and p<.001 ). In addition to the significance of PC, the model of IDP points out that the college level
and language have their significant impact on predicting the user’s intention to disclose with b=-0.41, t=4.12; p<.001 and b= -0.36, t=-3; p<.01 respectively.
Considering the two analyses above, Hypothesis H6a here was not supported (unlike Study 2), and
H6b is supported (similar to Study 2).
Table 67: Study 3 - Linear Model for IDP Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001;

IDP
Model F(11,156)

4.31***

R2

23.32%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

3.78 (4.99***)

PC

-0.19 (-2.41*)

DVP

-0.05 (-0.63 ns)

TP

0.11 (1.54 ns)

Gender

0.19 (1.62 ns)

Age

0.24 (1.29 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.01 (-0.24 ns)

EmpStatus

-0.19 (-0.96 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.41 (-4.12***)

Language
Major
iPhoneModel

-0.36 (-3**)
-0.11 (-0.43 ns)
0 (0.04 ns)

7.3.7.7 Hypothesis 7
H7 predicted that an increase in the level of privacy concerns decreases the likelihood of user
disclosure (H7a) and sharing (H7b) behavior.
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As in the previous studies, disclosure behavior was measured by how much of the requested
information users reveal to the app during the interaction. Out of the four requested items, this measure
counts how many of these items were provided. Users have the discretion to reveal/conceal personal
information only in two conditions of the experiment (100 participants) when the app data entries are
optional. Logistic regression was used to evaluate the influence of privacy concerns on user disclosure
behavior. Using disclosure ordinal measure as a dependent variable and privacy concerns and all of the
control factors as explanatory variables, the model in Table 68 shows that the model (χ²(11)=19.50) was
not statistically significant with p-value=0.05. Based on the results of this analysis, there is no effect of
privacy concerns on how much users disclose personal information to the app.
Table 68: Study 3 - Logistic Regression Model for Disclosure Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Disclosure Behavior
Model χ²(11)

19.50 ns

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

29%

R2(McFadden)

21%

Parameters
Intercept

b Coefficient (z , p)
5.81 (1.44 ns)

PC

-0.75 (-1.77 ns)

DVP

-0.32 (-0.63 ns)

TP

0.08 (0.2 ns)

Gender

-0.11 (-0.16 ns)

Age

-1.28 (-1.4 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.38 (-1.58 ns)

EmpStatus

0.75 (0.82 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.98 (1.56 ns)

Language

-2.04 (-2.63**)

Major

0.28 (0.22 ns)

iPhone Model

0.53 (0.81 ns)

Similarly, sharing behavior was examined using logistic regression. There are four potential options
for sharing the game score in the app which are sharing via email, sharing via Facebook, sharing via both
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ways, or play the game app without sharing. Using privacy concerns along with all controls as independent
variables and sharing behavior as a dependent variable, the model was non-significant (χ²(11)=9.65; ns).
This was expected given that 92% of subjects decided not to share their scores with others. The result is
shown in Table 69.
Table 69: Study 3 - Logistic Regression Model for Sharing Behavior
Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Sharing Behavior
Model χ²(11)

9.65 ns

R2(Cragg-Uhler)

14%

R2(McFadden)

11%

Parameters
Intercept
PC

b Coefficient (z , p)
-4.45 (-1.06 ns)
0.02 (0.04 ns)

DVP

-0.19 (-0.45 ns)

TP

-0.2 (-0.48 ns)

Gender

-0.41 (-0.66 ns)

Age

-0.32 (-0.34 ns)

Ethnicity

0.36 (1.27 ns)

EmpStatus

0.51 (0.43 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.77 (1.71 ns)

Language

-0.96 (-1.32 ns)

Major

0.92 (0.76 ns)

iPhone Model

0.73 (1.01 ns)

As in Study 2, the self-reported intention to share game score was analyzed via linear regression
where privacy concerns along with all control factors regressed on user’s intention to share. The results of
the regression in Table 70 show that the model was not statistically significant indicating that no effect of
user’s privacy concerns on user intention to share the game score via the provided sharing features.
Therefore, both H7a and H7b were not supported.
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Table 70: Study 3 - Linear Model for ISG Explained by PC and Control Variables
Significance levels: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

ISG
Model F(11,156)

1.03 ns

R2

6.76%

Parameters

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

4.63 (4.98***)

PC

-0.13 (-1.32 ns)

DVP

-0.11 (-1.08 ns)

TP

-0.09 (-1.02 ns)

Gender

0.07 (0.48 ns)

Age

0.01 (0.03 ns)

Ethnicity

0.07 (1.04 ns)

EmpStatus

-0.25 (-1.02 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.18 (-1.52 ns)

Language

-0.2 (-1.39 ns)

Major

0.13 (0.41 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.07 (-0.51 ns)
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7.3.8

Significance of the Model
A hierarchical stepwise linear regression approach is adopted to test the significance of the entire

research model. In this approach, the explanatory factors are added in a stepwise fashion according to their
importance. As explained previously, starting with the app features (user control and app transparency) in
the first block, continuing with the mediator variables (perceived trust and perceived intrusion) in the
second block, and ending with all the ten control variables in the third block. The results of this stepwise
regression model are shown in Table 71.
The adjusted R2 value for the complete model signifies that 42.54% of the variance for user privacy
concerns is explained by variables selected for this study. In the complete model, the variance for privacy
concerns for app users could be attributed primarily to the user’s perceived trust (PT: b = -0.3, p< .001),
user’s perceived intrusion towards the app (PI: b = 0.48, p < .001), users’ general tendency to value privacy
(DVP: b = 0.22, p< .01), and the participant’s college level ( b = 0.18, p < .05). Neither the manipulations
nor the other control variables are significant in the complete model.
Compared to Study 2, the regression results of the PC model in both studies highlight the
importance of user’s perception of trust and intrusion in explaining user’s privacy concerns. Although the
explanatory power in Study 2 was higher, Study 3 shows a close percentage (47.4% vs. 42.5%). User’s
disposition to value privacy (DVP) was significant in both studies, while Study 3 shows that the college
level is significant as well.
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Table 71: Study 3 - Step-wise Regression of the Whole Model of PC

Block 1

PC ~ Trans *

PC ~ Trans * Control

PC ~ Trans * Control + PT +

Control

+ PT + PI

PI + Control Variables

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 2

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 3

b Coefficient (t, p)

Parameters
Intercept

3.13 (25.13***)

2.28 (6.37***)

1.78 (2.46*)

App Transparency(AT)

-0.21 (-1.01 ns)

-0.07 (-0.42 ns)

-0.08 (-0.51 ns)

User Control(UC)

-0.18 (-0.97 ns)

0.1 (0.68 ns)

0.03 (0.2 ns)

Interaction AT*UC

0.00 (0 ns)

-0.03 (-0.14 ns)

0.06 (0.28 ns)

PT

-0.28 (-3.14**)

-0.3 (-3.32**)

PI

0.54 (9.02***)

0.48 (7.44***)

Adj. R2
Model F(3,164) =

1.6%
1.89, p= 0.13 ns

DVP

0.22 (3.17**)

TP

-0.06 (-1.06 ns)

Gender

0.01 (0.15 ns)

Age

-0.17 (-1.07 ns)

Ethnicity

-0.03 (-0.53 ns)

EmpStatus

0.04 (0.24 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.18 (2.19*)

Language

0.07 (0.7 ns)

Major

0.12 (0.54 ns)

iPhone Model

-0.08 (-0.83 ns)

38.3%
F(5,162)=

21.77, p< 0.001 ***

42.5%
F(15,152) =

9.24, p< 0.001 ***
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7.3.9

Additional Regressions
With the Study 3 sample (which includes only participants who perceived the experimental

treatments as intended), we formulated two additional regressions to examine two additional dependent
variables. The first model uses the user’s future intention to reuse the app (IR) as a dependent variable, with
the independent variables, three mediators ( privacy concerns, perceived trust, perceived intrusion, and
controls, as explanatory variables).
Table 72 shows that only 9.8 percent of the variance in the user’s future intention to reuse the app
(IR) can be attributed mainly to user’s perception of trust and intrusion with b=0.3 and p<.01 for PT and
with b=-0.23 and p<.05 for PI. The model shows as well the significance of the coefficient of the user’s
native language with b=-0.33 and p<.05. It is worth noting here that the explanatory power of IR regression
model did not improve when adding the control variables at the third stage indicating the insignificance of
these controls on explaining the user’s future intention.
In the same way, we created the second additional model where user sharing behavior is the
response variable and all of the other variables are the explanatory ones including treatments, mediators,
and controls. The goal is to estimate the effect of these measures in explaining the sharing decisions user
might make while interacting with the app. The results of the logistic regression (logistic regression used
here because sharing decision is a discrete dependent variable) reported in Table 73 indicate that the whole
model of user sharing behavior is non-significant although its explanatory power was increasing through
the three stages of regression formulation. This result was expected given that most of the participants
refrained from sharing their recall scores through the app and showed invariance in their behavior regardless
of the conditional groups they were assigned to and regardless of their individual characteristics. In fact,
this result sets the stage for more analysis that will be presented in the following section.
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Table 72: Study 3 - Step-wise Regression of the Whole Model of IR

Block 1

IR ~ Trans *

IR ~ Trans * Control +

IR~ Trans * Control + PT +

Control

PT + PI + PC

PI + PC + Control Variables

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 2

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 3

b Coefficient (t, p)

Parameters
Intercept

3.02 (20.3***)

2.4 (4.19***)

2.46 (2.24*)

App Transparency(AT)

0.24 (0.98 ns)

0.1 (0.42 ns)

0.13 (0.57 ns)

User Control(UC)

0.06 (0.29 ns)

-0.12 (-0.57 ns)

-0.08 (-0.38 ns)

Interaction AT*UC

0.08 (0.24 ns)

0.04 (0.14 ns)

0 (0.01 ns)

PT

0.43 (3.24**)

0.4 (2.89**)

PI

-0.21 (-1.97 ns)

-0.23 (-2.01*)

PC

0 (-0.02 ns)

0.01 (0.11 ns)

Adj. R2
Model F(3,164) =

1%
1.55, p= 0.20 ns

DVP

-0.05 (-0.42 ns)

TP

-0.08 (-0.87 ns)

Gender

0.12 (0.85 ns)

Age

0.07 (0.31 ns)

Ethnicity

0.03 (0.41 ns)

EmpStatus

0.29 (1.15 ns)

CollegeLevel

-0.13 (-1.04 ns)

Language

-0.33 (-2.17*)

Major

0.39 (1.17 ns)

iPhone Model

0.03 (0.19 ns)

10%
F(6,161)=

4.08, p< 0.001 ***

9.8%
F(16,151) =

2.13, p< 0.01 **
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Table 73: Study 3 - Step-wise Logistic Regression of the Whole Model of User Sharing Behavior

SharingBehavior ~

SharingBehavior ~

SharingBehavior ~ Trans *

Trans * Control

Trans * Control + PT

Control + PT + PI + PC +

+ PI + PC

Control Variables

Block 1

b Coefficient (t, p)

Intercept

-2.03 (-4.26***)

-2.78 (-1.22 ns)

-4.23 (-0.79 ns)

0.04 (0.05 ns)

-0.02 (-0.03 ns)

0 (0 ns)

User Control(UC)

-0.89 (-1.02 ns)

-0.79 (-0.87 ns)

-0.99 (-0.97 ns)

Interaction AT*UC

-0.5 (-0.39 ns)

-0.64 (-0.49 ns)

-0.3 (-0.2 ns)

PT

0.06 (0.11 ns)

0.07 (0.1 ns)

PI

0.71 (1.62 ns)

0.87 (1.71 ns)

PC

-0.54 (-1.14 ns)

-0.59 (-0.98 ns)

App Transparency(AT)

R2(Cragg-Uhler)
Model χ²(3) =

Block 2

6%
3.82, p= 0.28 ns

b Coefficient (t, p)

Block 3

DVP

-0.06 (-0.13 ns)

TP

-0.26 (-0.61 ns)

Gender

-0.61 (-0.87 ns)

Age

-0.57 (-0.57 ns)

Ethnicity

0.38 (1.23 ns)

EmpStatus

0.18 (0.14 ns)

CollegeLevel

0.85 (1.69 ns)

Language

-0.8 (-1.04 ns)

Major

1.48 (1.09 ns)

iPhone Model

0.54 (0.72 ns)

9%
χ²(6) =

6.47, p= 0.37 ns

b Coefficient (t, p)

23%
χ²(16) =

16.20, p= 0.44 ns
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7.4

Additional Analyses
This section presents further analysis of Study 2 data. Specifically, we analyzed participants’

responses to an open-ended question about their sharing behavior. Then, we presented results of
participants’ perceptions for which of the personal information element is regarded as highly private.

7.4.1

Why do users refrain from sharing the game score?
The initial analysis of Study 1 revealed a very low sharing rate (8.5%), which indicates that subjects

in all conditions decided not to share their recall score through any of the available sharing options. As a
result of this finding, we added an open-ended question asking why they did not share (see Appendix I).
This question was added to the post-task questionnaire for Study 2 and appeared only to those who
completed the game without making a sharing decision.
Since sharing rates remained low in both Study 2 and Study 3 (8.8% and 7.1%, respectively), we
used the qualitative data (entered in response to the open-ended question) to understand the reasons behind
such behavior. All the answers of Study 2 (379 subjects who decided not to share) were classified. The first
step was reading the responses and identifying the common categories for reasons mentioned in the
answers. Each participant could type several possible causes, which means that each participant may
mention one or two or even three reasons in the answer to this question. On the other hand, 17 participants
left the space blank or gave no reason. Consistent with the techniques typically used for qualitative analyses,
all responses were organized by similarity, and each group received a label representative of the theme.
Within each thematic category, the responses were divided into sub-groups with more specific reasons.
The motives behind not sharing the game score are broadly classified here into three categories:
privacy-related, app-related, and usability-related reasons. Privacy-related responses are when the
participant explicitly mentioned her/his concerns about privacy as a barrier to score’s sharing. This category
is further divided into four subclasses which are lack of trust in the app connecting to Facebook/Email, lack
of trust in Facebook, recall score is private, and sharing in general leads to privacy breaches. The second
category of the reasons behind refraining from sharing is app-related. This category includes all the
responses that explicitly criticize the app, either its functionality, its reputation, the insignificance of its
outcome (the score), or the fact that the sharing can be facilitated without the app. The last category is
usability-related reasons. This class includes all the reasons that are more related to the way participants
use the app or use the available sharing features. This class is divided into three subcategories: the user did
not notice the score/sharing option in the app’s screens, the user was not happy with the obtained score, and
the user of the app does not have an account in Facebook to share the score through. Examples of
participants’ responses and the assigned categories are shown in Table 74.
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As previously mentioned, each participant’s response may have one or more reasons. For instance,
this answer has two classes of the causes for not sharing (1) insignificance of game app result and 2) not
happy with recall score to share), s/he wrote: “I felt like posting it or sending it to someone would be
pointless and since I scored low people might judge.” Another example that has three reasons mentioned
(1) not a Facebook user, 2), insignificance of game app result, and 3) not happy with recall score to share),
s/he wrote “I do not have Facebook, and I didn't have a good enough reason to e-mail it to anyone. Also,
my score was lower than I expected, and I didn't want to share it.” In total, 438 reasons were extracted from
their answers to the open-ended question asking them, “could you please explain why you did not share
your best recall IQ score on Facebook or via email?”
Then, the frequencies of these categories are counted to see the most common reasons that prevent
participants from using the two sharing features provided in the app.
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Table 74: Types and Reasons for not Sharing the Game Score

Why did you

Description

Examples of illustrative quotes from participants

not share your
score?
Privacy-related

Lack of trust in the app

To prevent the app link my personal

reasons

connecting to Facebook/Email.

informational with my social media and etc.

Lack of trust in Facebook.

You would have to log in to Facebook to share
which I am not comfortable with.

Recall score is private.

Because it provides information about me to
others

Sharing in general leads to
App-related

privacy breaches.

I was not comfortable sharing

Unknown app.

Didn't think it was important enough to share my

reasons

score considering the game is not well-known to
others.
Lack of trust in the way the

The results did not reflect what I believe is my

app uses to evaluate recall

true ability when it comes to matching games.

ability.
Insignificance of game app

I didn't think it was something worth sharing.

result/ lack of friends who are

I feel like it’s not something someone would care

interested in recall score to

about, what my score in a video game would be.

share with.
Sharing can be made without

It is much more convenient to send a screenshot

the app.

and share it with my friends that way, rather than
using Facebook, and email.

Usability-

Not a Facebook user

I don't have a Facebook account

Not happy with recall score to

I didn't do very well, so I didn't find the need to

share

share it.

Not seeing the score or the

I did not see the option to share the score.

related reasons

sharing options.
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As Figure 19 indicates, the most common reason deterring app users in this experiment from
sharing the score is the insignificance of the content/result the app generates. The fact that the game app is
a hedonic app used for entertaining discourage users from sharing. In addition, sharing the score from a
game app often occurs to create a competitive environment with peers; however, in the case of this
experimental app which has a limited number of users (students), sharing the score for competing with
others who know nothing about the game makes the sharing action less significant. The second most
common reason is that the participants were not satisfied with their performance, such that if they had gotten
a better recall score, they might have made a sharing decision. The next common reason is that some
participants believe their recall ability represented by the game score is a private score that should not be
shared with others. In other words, the app evaluates one aspect of their mental ability, and sharing that
with others makes them exposed to other’s judgment.
Reasons for Keeping Recall Score Private
Lack of trust in Facebook.

2

Unknown app

5

Not seeing the score or the sharing options.

7

Sharing can be made without the app.

12

Lack of trust in the way the app uses to evaluate recall ability.

13

Lack of trust in the app connecting to Facebook/Emai l.

13

Sharing in general leads to pri vacy breaches.

23

Not a Facebook user

26

Recal l score is private.

54

Not happy with recall score to share

83

Insignificance of game app result/ lack of friends who are interested in
recall score to share with.

200
0
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100

150

200

250

Frequency

Figure 19: Frequencies of the Reasons Mentioned in Participants’ Answers

Out of the three main categories, Figure 20 shows that approximately 53% of the reasons for not
sharing the score were under the app-related category, while only 21% were privacy-related. Thus,
encouraging app users to engage in more sharing practices involves working on the app itself. First, making
the app more popular to reach a wider audience might increase the probability of score sharing with friends.
Second, building trust in the app such that users believe in the accuracy and reliability of the way the app
evaluates recall ability, which can be achieved by explaining in more detail the basis for such assessment.
Third, providing more sharing channels instead of only Facebook and email might help in increasing score
sharing rate.
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TYPES OF RESASONS FOR NOT SHARING
Privacy-related
21%

Usability-related
26%

Usabili ty-related
App-related
Privacy-rel ated

App-related
53%
Figure 20: Percentage of Each Category

7.4.2

What information is considered most private in app interaction?
One question was embedded in the post-task questionnaire asking participants about their

perception towards the app that asks them for personal information. The question asks them whether the
app has the right to request a nickname, email, year of birth, or gender of the person. The goal of this yes/no
question is to locate which of the four personal elements elicits the highest level of privacy concerns. Unlike
the question of the reason behind not sharing the game score, this question was offered to all the participants.
Based on the analysis for the yes/no questions for each personal element, about 56% of the
participants believe that year of birth is the most private element that the app should not ask its users to
provide. Following that are the gender and the email of the user with similar percentages (about 51% and
50%, respectively). It appears from the data that asking for a nickname does not cause a privacy issue for
app users. However, there is still 16% of respondents believe that even the nickname is private. The
frequencies of the responses that indicate the app should not ask for each personal information is presented
in Figure 21.
The experimental app requests these four elements during the experimental session, then the
perceptions towards providing them to the app were obtained at the end of the session in the post-task
questionnaire. The goal is to give participants the chance to experience a real interaction session where they
have to provide these elements, then collect their opinions. It worth noting here that there are various
personal elements that the app might ask for and are not included in the current study, such as phone
number, city, address, occupation, marital status, etc. This could elicit even higher privacy concerns, but
we decided not to include them in this study because they are not consistent with the spirit of a gaming app.
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Figure 21: Frequencies of the Respondents Who Believe the App Should not Ask for Personal Information, N=416
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Chapter 8: Discussion
This chapter presents a thorough discussion of the results and provides potential explanations for
the apparently conflicting outcomes of the three datasets. Following that is presenting the theoretical,
methodological, and design implications of the study, then concluding with future research directions to
improve the current study.
The objective of this empirical study was to find out if and how privacy cues embedded in app
design influence users’ privacy concerns and their subsequent interacting decisions. Specifically, we
designed an app that has two privacy-related features: a transparency message that explains app privacy
practices and user control over what personal information to disclose. Using four app versions, we sought
to investigate how the two features affect user’s perceptions and behavior. With three different datasets,
our analysis reached various results that will be discussed in this chapter. Figure 22 summarizes the
hypotheses testing results for all of the three studies. The figure shows only the hypotheses that are
supported in each study. Table 75 clearly lists both the supported and the rejected hypotheses in the three
studies.
Boundary Coordination
& Turbulence

Boundary Rule
Formation

H6b

User Control
(UC)
(partially)

H1a(+)

H5(-)

Privacy
Concerns

H3a(+)

Interaction
UC X AT

App Transparency
(AT)

Perceived
Trust

H1b(-)

Perceived
Intrusion

H4(+)

H6a
(partially)

H7a

User Future
Intention
Actual User
Behavior
in App
H7b

H2a(+)
Legend
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3

_ _ _ _ _
_________
..................

Figure 22: Hypotheses Test Results for the Three Studies
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Table 75: Results of the Hypotheses Testing in the Three Studies

Study 1

Study 2

Study 3

H1a

Not Supported

Not Supported

Supported

H1b

Not Supported

Not Supported

Supported

H2a

Not Supported

Not Supported

Supported

H2b

Not Supported

Not Supported

Not Supported

H3a

Partially Supported

Not Supported

Supported

H3b

Not Supported

Not Supported

Not Supported

Hypothesis 4

Supported

Supported

Supported

Hypothesis 5

Supported

Supported

Supported

H6a

Not Supported

Supported

Not Supported

H6b

Not Applicable

Supported

Supported

H7a

Not Supported

Partially Supported

Not Supported

H7b

Not Supported

Supported

Not Supported

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 7

(Subjective Measure)

We examined how privacy concerns that users might have affected their future intentions.
Specifically, we measured the user’s intention to reuse the app in the future (continuance intention) and the
user’s intention to disclose personal information. For continuance intention, only the data of Study 2 showed
that privacy concerns negatively affects user intention to reuse the app such that when app users have a
high level of privacy concerns, they are less likely to reuse the app again. This is not supported in both
Study 1 and Study 3 and this could be attributed to the larger number of data points required to support this
finding. Recall Study 2 has the largest sample. For disclosure intention, the effect of privacy concerns on
user’s intention to disclose personal information was non-significant in Study 1. In contrast, Study 2 and
Study 3, showed the negative effect of privacy concerns on the disclosure intention. One possible
explanation is the participants used their own devices to test the app, which achieves a more realistic
interaction scenario than using iPod devices in a lab as in Study 1. Instead of using school-owned devices
to test the app, participants in study 2 (and 3) have a more realistic chance to define their intention to
disclose personal information to the app because they were interacting with it using their own devices.
User’s actual decisions to disclose personal information to the app was negatively influenced the
level of concerns users had about their privacy. Using the two applicable experimental groups, if users feel
the app is not safe or trustworthy to provide personal information, they will prefer to keep their information
private. This was an expected result, although Study 1 and Study 3 did not support this finding, perhaps
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due to the reduced sample size. In study 1, there was a small number of participants who were in the two
experimental conditions where the disclosure was optional (only 57), and not all of them passed the two
manipulation checks. In contrast, although Study 3 did not show a significant effect of privacy concern on
disclosure behavior and it has a small number of subjects, the p-value was close to the significance level
(p=0.053). If we had a sufficient number of users who perceived the privacy cues in the app design as
intended, this proposition relating the privacy concerns with disclosure behavior is likely to be supported.
Additionally, we examined another aspect of user behavior which is the decision to share the game
score. Study 2 concludes, using only the self-reported measure, that when users have a higher level of
privacy concerns, they are more likely to end the app without sharing the game score via email or via
Facebook. A possible explanation for why linking privacy concerns to sharing decisions was not supported
in any of the studies using the objective measure is that the app presents a game whose content might not
be of interest to people. This is what the qualitative analysis of the survey question of “why not share?”
revealed. The majority of the respondents mentioned that the insignificance of the game content (and
associated score) makes them not interested in sharing. Therefore, using actual game-score sharing
decisions to proxy for user sharing behavior is not a precise measure, given the game-context of the app. If
the app was not a game (for instance, a productivity app), a sharing feature might have been more useful
for users.
Regarding user perceptions of trust and intrusion, our findings indicate the presence of a strong
effect of the two perceptions on user concerns about her/his privacy. These two perceptions represent a
complementary view of the antecedents of user’s privacy concerns. Perceived trust is a more user-related
aspect where user initiates the trust feeling according to the current situation while perceived intrusion is a
more app-related aspect where the app initiates the invasion to trigger the intrusion perception. We included
these two perceptions to have a more inclusive analysis of how user’s privacy concerns is affected by the
two perceptions during the interaction. When the app, through its design cues, succeeded in establishing a
high level of trust perception and a low level of intrusion perception, this would alleviate privacy concerns.
The effect of the two perceptions was confirmed in all of the three studies, which stresses the importance
of such user’s perceptions that the app developer should take into account while designing the app.
Designing a trustworthy app includes declaring its data practices and requesting less personal information.
Designing a non-intrusive app includes granting users control over the disclosure of personal information
and requesting only necessary personal information. App developers have room here to shape user’s privacy
concerns by working on building a desirable level of trust and intrusion perceptions that achieve the desired
level of user-app interaction.
One of the surprising results was that when users did not perceive app features as intended, no
effect of the way the app is designed on their perception toward the app in terms of trust and intrusion. In
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other words, the dataset that includes only participants who passed the two manipulation checks (Study 3)
reached different conclusions than the two datasets that included all participants’ data, including those who
did not pass the two check questions (Study 1 and Study 2). Given the nature of the subsample in study 3
(where participants were paying attention to the app design cues), its results are more reliable.
A pop-up notification stating the app data practices in how to handle user disclosed information is
designed to build trust between the app and the user. Such a designing element has its influence on
increasing user’s level of trust perception. Study 3 results show that user’s trust perception towards the app
was influenced by the transparency notice that was shown to users during the interaction, such that those
who had app without the notice perceived the app with a low level of trust comparing to those who had the
app with a transparency notice. However, this conclusion was not confirmed in Study 1 and Study 2, where
the data includes all the responses, even those who failed in one or both manipulation checks. This implies
that when users pay no attention to the pop-up transparency notification, there is no discernible impact of
this feature on trust perception. This finding also suggests that users might have noticed the transparency
message, but the content of the message was not strong enough to increase their trust perception. These are
two additional explanations for why the transparency feature designed for our app did not affect user’s trust
perception in Study 1 and Study 2.
The presence of transparency notice has no impact on alleviating users’ privacy concerns. This
conclusion was confirmed by all of the three studies indicating the insufficiency of the notice we designed
in reducing the concerns users might have related to their privacy. App developers might be able to design
a different transparency message shown to users during the interaction that influences their privacy
concerns. This message could be different in the content it shows, the time it pops up, or in the way it is
designed, i.e., font color, textual vs. graphical contents, etc.
The results of this experiment also highlight the importance of the user control feature in mobile
app design. User control in this experiment was implemented by optional vs. required data entry. It shows
that when users are granted control over disclosure decisions by optionally asking for personal information,
their trust perception level towards the app increases and their intrusion perception towards the app
decreases. This is a key finding for app developers where they can “engineer” how users perceive the app
in terms of trust and intrusion to reach the desirable level of user interaction. When users decide to disclose
personal information to the app, they are more likely to trust the app and feel that it is privacy unobtrusive.
However, this was not the conclusion for both Study1 and Study 2. These two studies showed a nonsignificant effect of user control feature on her/his trust and intrusion perception. One way to explain this
finding is that when users do not realize the data entries are optional, they would feel the app enforce them
to disclose their personal information even though the optionality feature is provided. This is exactly what
happened in Study 1 and Study 2, where the majority of the participants failed to notice this feature. Thus,
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this false perception of a design feature negatively affected their trust and intrusion perception. Also, the
experimental setting of the app might make the participants overlook the optional data entry, either because
they want to complete all the tasks in a short time or because they believe they have to provide their
information even it is optional to guarantee their research participation compensation (i.e., credit
assignment). Both scenarios are not applicable in the real world of user-app interaction, where users freely
choose what app to interact with and have a better chance to notice all app features.
Furthermore, when examining the interaction effect of the two app features (user control and app
transparency) on user perceptions, our findings reveal that the interaction effect between the two features
has no impact on user intrusion perception in any of the three studies. However, the interaction effect of the
two features has been found to influence user trust perception such that participants who had the app with
the two features had a higher level of trust towards the app compared to those who had one feature only
who also had a higher level of trust than those who had the app without the two features. In other words,
the interaction of the two privacy design app features (transparency and control) positively affects the user’s
level of trust. Even though the observed interaction effect was only significant in Study 3, Study 1
confirmed this effect but only when comparing two different app versions (presence of both vs. absence of
both). The interaction effect was significant between the app with two features and the app without the two
features such that those who had the app with user control over disclosure decisions in addition to the app
transparency notice had a higher level of trust than those who had the app that required information
disclosure without a transparency notice. Dissimilarity in these three studies about the interaction effect of
the two features on user trust perception could be attributed to the previously mentioned issue with the
validity of the manipulations. We believed that Study 3 is more accurate to represent the effect of the two
features on user trust perception as it has the data for all the app users who noticed both features.

8.1

Implications

8.1.1

Theoretical Implications
This study utilized communication privacy management theory (CPM) to propose and test a

research model that examines the roles of contextual factors in users’ rule formation process and analyzes
the privacy rule coordination system in the context of mobile apps. The introduction of mobile app designs
as contextual factors affecting the formation and coordination of user’s privacy rules offers a novel context
to examine the application of CPM.
By attempting to theorize user’s privacy concerns in the context of mobile apps, we used CPM
theory to conceptualize designing elements in mobile app interfaces as contextual factors that contribute to
either form new privacy rules towards this specific app or update privacy rules user might have prior to
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using the app. These rules are reflected in the contextual perception assessment and the decisions users
make during the interaction with the app.
The contextual designing elements used here are user control and transparency notice. These two
design elements are derived from the core notions of the CPM theory, namely: privacy ownership, where
people believe they own their personal information, and privacy control, where people believe they have
the right to control disclosure decisions. In this study, we challenged the concept of privacy ownership by
enforcing app users to reveal personal information. We tried to revoke user ownership over their personal
information disclosure and assessed its consequences. Also, we challenged the concept of privacy control
by not defining pre-existing rules before disclosure. These rules govern user disclosed information to the
app through not showing app transparency notice. We also implemented the other sides of the two concepts
where the user has control over disclosure decisions and the app clearly defined the rules for the co-owned
private information.
Then, while interacting with the app, users coordinate their privacy rules by making a contextual
assessment of the app interfaces, which leads to either reveal/conceal personal information or causes
turbulence to the privacy management system. Specifically, we assessed user intrusion perception that is
derived from the privacy ownership notion and user trust perception that is related to privacy control rules.
Typically, a user starts her/his session with the app, having previously created privacy rules
pertaining to what to disclose to the app and when. These rules were formed according to individual
characteristics such as gender, motives (trust propensity and privacy dispositional), or contextual cues
embedded in the app interface design. For instance, an app that defines its rules regarding potential user
disclosure might heighten trust perception of the current situation that results in lower privacy concerns and
more disclosure/interaction decisions. Similarly, when the app offers discretional disclosure, the user’s
intrusion perception might lessen and result in less privacy concerns and more interaction decisions such
as using its sharing features. Likewise, when the user starts the app session with more conservative privacy
rules, then the app enforces her/him to disclose personal information against her/his rules, that would cause
turbulence in the privacy system resulting in a high level of intrusion perception, high level in privacy
concerns, and less engagement with the app. The same consequences might occur when the app shows no
rules governing potential disclosure decisions.
This study presents a novel theoretical perspective towards understanding user’s privacy. The
framework of CPM helped in explaining how users manage their privacy in the context of mobile apps,
how user’s boundary rules formation and coordination are influenced by the design of the app, and how
users’ disclosure decisions change accordingly.
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8.1.2

Practical/Design Implications
The goal of developing this mobile app and testing different design features was to help app

developers gain more insights into how users interact with various mobile app interfaces and how it affects
their privacy concerns and behavioral decisions. The results of this experiment can also provide user
interface guidelines for privacy by design approach that aims to protect mobile user’s privacy.
One important practical implication of the study’s results is the need for app designers to
concentrate on interfaces that would capitalize on the sense of privacy ownership. For instance, app
developers could offer more flexibility in user’s disclosure decisions through discretionally allowing for
the providing of personal information. This would promote the sense of privacy ownership and eliminate
the unwanted perception of intrusion. On the other hand, the results indicate that app interfaces that require
users to disclose personal information in order to run negatively impact user’s perception of trust as these
interfaces implicitly violate user’s privacy ownership. In addition, such app screens that enforce users to
reveal personal information intrude upon the user’s right to control personal information flow, and that
would result in avoiding effective interaction with a mobile app.
Some apps require the user’s personal information to run, such as fitness or wellness apps, where
users have to enter private information for the app to function. To enhance the ownership perception in this
kind of apps, developers could minimize the exchange of personal information between the user and the
app to its smallest point and only ask for information that is absolutely necessary for the app to operate.
Furthermore, our results show that the inclusion of a transparency notice in the app interface design
affects user’s trust perception. This suggests that app developers should consider embedding a transparency
message that declares app data practices with regard to user’s disclosed information (in addition to the
privacy policy, which the user seldom reads). App designers should also ensure that app users can easily
comprehend the textual information about app data practices to leverage the positive effect of such a notice
in enhancing trust perception. Developers could be creative in how to convey such practices in a simple
and comprehensive way, such as including graphical representation or make the transparency notice (or
message) more interactive in a way that users could decline some app practices. The integration of such a
privacy cue into the app interface design boosts the user’s sense of control over her/his privacy by being
aware of the rules that govern any potential disclosure.
Trusting the app and feeling that the app is privacy-safe while interacting with it are crucial design
outcomes that developers should achieve. These user perceptions lead to low privacy concerns, which in
turn result in more engaging activities with the app. Deploying these two privacy cues in the design of the
app also represents compliance with privacy by design approach (PbD), where app developers integrate
privacy requirements, like any other functional requirements, throughout the app development life cycle.
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For businesses, most app providers’ models depend on the utilization of user data to provide
relevant ads and personalized services. This study shows that implementing an app with required data
entries makes users “pay” with their data for the services provided by apps, particularly the free ones. Users
often show a willingness to provide personal information without paying sufficient attention to the
consequences of such behavior on their privacy. Any business model that depends on taking personal data
from mobile app users should establish a solid basis of trust perception prior to asking for personal
information. Needless to say, this practice must comply to ethical and legal requirements of information
privacy.

8.1.3

Methodological Implications
Our theory-driven methodological approach demonstrated several experimental contributions to

mobile app privacy research. Although the experiment was not a full field study, we were able to conduct
a realistic app environment where users employed their own devices to download and use the app. Unlike
the majority of research in the area of user’s privacy which uses either mockup apps or relies only on selfreported data, we created a real game app that offers an engaging/entertaining interaction to realistically
test user’s perceptions and behavior which address the contextual nature of privacy.
Furthermore, we created a motivation for app users by choosing a game that measures user’s recall
ability. Making users engaging with a trial version of a game creates a more believable setting for the users
to provide more realistic reactions related to the user’s privacy. We allowed users to play the game several
times to ensure that the experimental task is understandable and the interaction is realistic. Most
importantly, by developing a game interaction environment with an artificial motive to obtain high recall
scores, we drew users’ attention away from the privacy aspects of the experiment to obtain more accurate
data related to privacy concerns.
In addition, in this experiment, we gathered both intentions and actual disclosure behavior. Actual
disclosure was also captured in two realistic forms: actual disclosure for registration information and actual
sharing for the game score, while the intentions were measured using scales embedded in the questionnaire.
We utilized both objective and subjective measures to enable a multi-faceted analysis to understand user
privacy-related behavior in mobile app interaction. By considering the previously mentioned experimental
aspects, the results of this study are difficult to obtain from a simulation, laboratory experiment, or survey.
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8.2

Limitations and Future Research Directions
This experiment has several limitations that present useful opportunities for future research. In this

section, we discuss these limitations that need to be addressed to yield better results.
Although we were striving to achieve a high level of eco validity of this ‘in-situ’ experiment by
building a real app, the settings of all of the studies lacked one or more aspects of real-life scenarios. First,
the devices used during the experiment were iPods in Study 1. Although these devices were chosen to
mimic the experience of using an app on a mobile device, they are still not the participants’ personal devices
which might affect the decisions, particularly privacy-related decisions they make during the interaction
with the app. This issue was resolved in Study 2, where participants used their own iPhones. Second, the
app itself was chosen for the participants. In reality, app users often visit the App Store to select, based on
several factors, which app to download on their devices. The app may have been perceived as artificial. The
way users interacted with this experimental app (they were asked to try) may be different from their
behavior when they freely choose what app to download. The experimental nature of the trial app usage
limits the study's external validity. Participants were directed to try the app rather than searching for it in
response to a specific need. Additionally, limiting the use of the app to only the experimental session is not
like the typical environment of apps where users can open the app several times and at any time. In fact,
with experimental apps, it might be difficult to provide real apps for participants to choose from. However,
one potential future research to overcome the eco validity issues is to extend this experiment from a onesession to a longitudinal study where researchers keep track of all users’ interaction decisions over a longer
time (i.e., days or weeks). This would provide more realistic reactions to the app under study.
Another major experimental issue was in the design of the manipulations. The difference between
the four app versions (representing all the treatment combinations of manipulations) was subtle. Although
this allowed to standardize the treatment conditions and have comparability, it may prevented participants
from noticing specific manipulations, with the resulting similarity of outcomes between the four groups.
This situation could be addressed in future research where the developer allows for more noticeable
differences between the app versions. For instance, in this experiment, app transparency notice was
implemented as a small pop-up window that appears to users one time and contains textual information.
This notice could be improved in several ways, for instance, showing it more than one time, changing its
format, i.e., font/window size/color, or including a simple graphical representation of the app data practices,
to make the message more noticeable and comprehensible. The user control manipulation in this experiment
was somewhat challenging. Although we believe the operationalization of user control through voluntary
vs. required data entry in the app was sufficient for this experiment, an experimental setting involving credit
assignment for students might intervene here to give a false impression for some participants. Some might
believe providing information to the app is necessary to assigning credits, even if it is discretional. If this
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is explained to participants prior to the experimental sessions, it will draw their attention to the privacy
aspects of the app and might lead to biased results in privacy-related studies. One possible way to fix this
issue is to clarify this in the advertising post for the experiment and not directly from the researcher during
the experimental session to offer some time gap that might alleviate the bias effect. In this regard, it also
would be interesting to gather the developers’ points of view about their attitudes towards user’s privacy
when developing apps for the public. This would give more insights into privacy issues in general and the
developer’s preferences in implementing these two design elements (app transparency and user control) in
particular.
A third limitation of this study is related to the type of the app. Our experimental app is a hedonic
and built for entertaining purposes, which presents a unique context when utilized to judge users’ actual
decisions. In our experiment, we kept track of users’ decisions to share their game scores as a measure of
actual user behavior with the app. The qualitative analysis revealed that interacting with a game app that
generates merely game scores is not salient enough to make a sharing decision. This makes the behavioral
measure we chose for this type of app not precise enough to yield generalizable results about user-app
interaction decisions. One potential way to address this issue is to develop a productivity app that helps
users to accomplish certain tasks and present it in a workplace context. The nature of the app along with
the environment where it used may change the user’s decisions.
Participants in our experiment were limited to students. Like any research in similar areas, students
cannot be considered representative of the broader population of mobile app users. This might affect the
applicability of the results presented. In addition, the trial app used here is an iOS app that runs only on
iPhones which means neglecting a portion of app users whose mobile devices run other mobile OS such as
Android or Windows. Therefore, we still need to be cautious with the generalizability of our findings that
might be biased towards the young and iOS population than the broader user population of mobile
applications. Future research is necessary to conduct experiments with more diverse ages and mobile OSs
to obtain more generalizable outcomes.
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Conclusion
Mobile apps have unprecedented access to sensitive personal information. This dissertation began
with a survey for the recent and relevant papers on the area of user privacy in the context of mobile apps.
The systematic review discussed the theoretical and experimental aspects of the articles from the
perspective of HCI. The review included presenting the classic theories employed to understand user
privacy-related interaction with mobile apps and the research methods employed to reach the results. In
addition, the review analyzed various design components for mobile apps interfaces that have privacyrelated implications on the way the user interacts with the app.
This study aimed to further understand the effects of mobile app design considering users’ privacy
concerns and their behavioral decisions. The main research question is whether app developers can
influence users’ privacy concerns and their disclosure behavior by introducing transparency and control
features as essential parts of app interface design.
The two design components were derived from the key concepts of Communication Privacy
Management theory, where people believe they own their privacy and have the right to control it. The theory
was used as well to design the research model for this study. Privacy research often asserts the complexity
of privacy-related studies due to the highly contextual nature of privacy concerns. In this work, we
integrated the two design elements embedded in the app’s interfaces as contextual factors that influence the
management of the user’s privacy system.
Two experiments were created to test the effects of mobile app interfaces on the user’s privacy
behavior. The first one was a lab study with a pre- and post-questionnaire where participants engaged with
a developed game app using iPods devices. The second experiment was an online experiment with a preand post-questionnaire where participants downloaded and used the app on their personal mobile devices.
We developed four versions of the app to reflect the four experimental manipulations. From the two
experimental settings, we were able to collect and analyze three different datasets.
Our study highlighted the importance of experimental manipulation perception where participants
perceive the app features as intended. The data revealed that when participants failed to notice the app
transparency notice or failed to realize that they could optionally provide personal information to the app,
measuring user’s perceptions after app interaction becomes irrelevant. The majority of the subjects who
participated in the two experiments were not able to perceive the app features as intended; therefore, most
of the hypotheses were not supported using these data. From the online experiment, we extracted data of
only participants who succeeded in perceiving both app features, which helped us precisely evaluate and
analyze the impact of designing features on user privacy concerns and their subsequent app interaction
decisions.
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Users perceived the app with a high level of trust during the interaction when the app has a
transparency feature that makes users aware of the app’s privacy practices pertaining to their disclosed
information. App developers should consider explaining what data the app collects, how it be used by the
app, and with whom the app shares it in ways that go beyond the traditional explanations included in the
privacy policies. Such declaration of app practices should be presented to the users in an intelligible way
and at the right timing. The results of this study also showed that the level of trust perception is influenced
by user control over disclosure decisions. When the app requires the user to disclose personal information
such as year of birth, gender, or email, users reported a lower level of trust perception compared to those
who were offered discretional disclosure. App developers should aim to build a high level of trust through
granting control to users to decide what personal information to disclose to promote more engagement with
the app. When the app have both features app transparency with user control, the data indicate a positive
impact of the two design elements in increasing trust perception.
Feeling intruded upon by the app is another user perception examined in this study. The results
showed an increase in intrusion perception in the app that revokes the user’s ability to control her/his
disclosure decisions. When the app enforces its users to disclose personal information, it triggers a high
level of intrusion perception compared to those who interacted with the app that allows them to practice
control over privacy-related decisions.
The two user’s perceptions towards the app were found to significantly affect the level of privacy
concerns users might have while interaction. Analyzed data showed that user’s privacy concerns are
negatively influenced by trust perception and positively influenced by intrusion perception. This finding
encourages app developers to integrate similar design elements that enhance a low level of intrusion and a
high level of trust. These results also show how the situational factors affect privacy concerns, and that
confirms the contextual nature of privacy.
In addition, our study shows no significant relationship between the level of privacy concerns and
user intention to disclose personal information. However, it has been found that the level of privacy
concerns negatively affects user’s continuance intention to reuse the app in the future. The implies that
when a user has a low level of concerns, s/he is more likely to use the app in the future. With regard to
users’ actual behavior, although prior research shows that privacy concerns is a strong predictor for user
subsequent privacy-related decisions, the findings of this study suggest that concerns pertaining to user
privacy have no impact on user decisions to disclose personal information or sharing the game score. The
qualitative analysis revealed that participants did not use the sharing feature in the app mainly because they
believed that the scores generated by the game app are not worth sharing. This specific conclusion about
user actual behavior should be reexamined in future studies in different experimental settings with different
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types of app, more noticeably differences between the experimental manipulations, or with more
participants. These alternative settings may produce different results regarding user behavior.
The goal of this dissertation was to demonstrate a methodology for gathering realistic perceptions
concerning user’s privacy-related decisions and formulate a set of viable privacy design practices that
comply with the PbD approach where protecting user privacy is essential. By developing a customized app
and testing it with users, our findings are encouraging for app developers and suggest including app
transparency and user control in order to alleviate users’ privacy concerns. Such app features pave the way
for future research to explore the potential effects of various design decisions on the users of mobile apps.
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Appendix A
Privacy Attitudes and Behavior Measures
1) Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index
Table 76: Westin’s Privacy Segmentation Index
For each of the following statements, how strongly do you agree or disagree?
1

Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used by
companies.

2

Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a proper and
confidential way.

3

Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer
privacy today.

2) CFIP (Concern for Information Privacy) Scale
Table 77: CFIP Scale
From the standpoint of personal privacy, please indicate the extent to which you, as an individual,
agree or disagree with each statement:
Subscale:
1.

Collection

It usually bothers me when companies ask me for personal information.
When companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice
before providing it.
It bothers me to give personal information to so many companies.
I'm concerned that companies are collecting too much personal information
about me.

2.

Unauthorized

Companies should not use personal information for any purpose unless it

Secondary

has been authorized by the individuals who provided the information.

Use

When people give personal information to a company for some reason, the
company should never use the information for any other reason.
Companies should never sell the personal information in their computer
databases to other companies.
Companies should never share personal information with other companies
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unless it has been authorized by the individuals who provided the
information.
3.

Improper

Companies should devote more time and effort to preventing unauthorized

Access

access to personal information.
Computer databases that contain personal information should be protected
from unauthorized access-no matter how much it costs.
Companies should take more steps to make sure that unauthorized people
cannot access personal information in their computers

4.

Errors

All the personal information in computer databases should be doublechecked for accuracy-no matter how much this costs.
Companies should take more steps to make sure that the personal
information in their files is accurate.
Companies should have better procedures to correct errors in personal
information.
Companies should devote more time and effort to verifying the accuracy of
the personal information in their databases.

3) IUIPC (Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns)
Table 78: ICIPC Scale
From the standpoint of personal privacy, please indicate the extent to which you, as an
individual, agree or disagree with each statement:
Subscale:
1.

Collection

It usually bothers me when online companies ask me for personal
information.
When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes
think twice before providing it.
It bothers me to give personal information to so many online
companies.
I’m concerned that online companies are collecting too much personal
information about me.

2.

Awareness

Companies seeking information online should disclose the way the
data are collected, processed, and used.
A good consumer online privacy policy should have a clear and
conspicuous disclosure.
It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about
how my personal information will be used.
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3.

Control

Consumer online privacy is really a matter of consumers’ right to
exercise control and autonomy over decisions about how their
information is collected, used, and shared.
Consumer control of personal information lies at the heart of consumer
privacy.
I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or
unwillingly reduced as a result of a marketing transaction.

4) Scale for Measuring Online Privacy Concern and Protection
Table 79 : Buchanan et al. Scale for Measuring Online Privacy Concern and Protection
For this part of the survey, we are interested in any privacy concerns you might have when
online. Please answer every question using the full scale provided:
Subscale:
1.

Privacy

In general, how concerned are you about your privacy while you are

Concern

using the internet?
Are you concerned about online organizations not being who they claim
they are?
Are you concerned that you are asked for too much personal
information when you register or make online purchases?
Are you concerned about online identity theft?
Are you concerned about people online not being who they say they
are?
Are you concerned that information about you could be found on an old
computer?
Are you concerned who might access your medical records
electronically?
Are you concerned about people you do not know obtaining personal
information about you from your online activities?
Are you concerned that if you use your credit card to buy something on
the internet your credit card number will obtained/ .738 intercepted by
someone else?
Are you concerned that if you use your credit card to buy something on
the internet your card will be mischarged?
Are you concerned that an email you send may be read by someone else
besides the person you sent it to?
Are you concerned that an email you send someone may be
inappropriately forwarded to others?
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Are you concerned that an email you send someone may be printed out
in a place where others could see it?
Are you concerned that a computer virus could send out emails in
your name?
Are you concerned about emails you receive not being from whom they
say they are?
Are you concerned that an email containing a seemingly legitimate
internet address may be fraudulent?

For this part of the survey, we are interested in your privacy related behavior in general and
when online. Please answer every question using the full scale provided
2.

General

Do you shred/burn your personal documents when you are disposing

Caution

of them?
Do you hide your bank card PIN number when using cash
machines/making purchases?
Do you only register for websites that have a privacy policy?
Do you read a website’s privacy policy before you register your
information?
Do you look for a privacy certification on a website before you register
your information?
Do you read license agreements fully before you agree to them?

3.

Technical

Do you watch for ways to control what people send you online (such

Protection

as check boxes that allow you to opt-in or opt-out of certain offers)?
Do you remove cookies?
Do you use a pop up window blocker?
Do you check your computer for spy ware?
Do you clear your browser history regularly?
Do you block messages/emails from someone you do not want to hear
from?
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Appendix B
HCI Journals

Journal

Author(s), Year

Title

Computers in Human

Dogruel L. et al., 2017

The Valuation of Privacy Premium Features for

Behavior

Smartphone Apps: The Influence of Defaults and

(Eight articles)

Expert Recommendations.

Fodor M. and Brem A., 2015

Do Privacy Concerns Matter for Millennials?
Results From an Empirical Analysis of LocationBased Services Adoption in Germany.

Mamonov S. and Benbunan-Fich

An Empirical Investigation of Privacy Breach

R., 2015

Perceptions Among Smartphone Application Users.

Pentina I. et al., 2016

Exploring Privacy Paradox in Information-sensitive
Mobile App Adoption: A Cross-cultural
Comparison.

Nguyen K. et al., 2016

The Effects of Attacker Identity and Individual User
Characteristics on The Value of Information
Privacy.

Bergström A., 2015

Online Privacy Concerns: A Broad Approach to
Understanding The Concerns of Different Groups
for Different Uses.

Beldad A. and Kusumadewi M.,

Here’s My Location, for Your Information: The

2015

Impact of Trust, Benefits, and Social Influence on
Location Sharing Application Use Among
Indonesian University Students.

Kisekka V. et al., 2013
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Extent of Private Information Disclosure on Online
Social Networks: An Exploration of Facebook
mobile Phone users.

ACM Transactions on

Iachello G. and Abowd G. ,2008

From Privacy Methods to A Privacy Toolbox:

Computer-Human

Evaluation Shows that Heuristics Are

Interaction: TOCHI

Complementary.

(Two articles)
Watson G. et al, 2015

Mapping User Preference to Privacy Default
Settings.

Behavior and Information

Wang E. and Lin R., 2017

Perceived Quality Factors of Location-based Apps

Technology

on Trust, Perceived Privacy Risk, and Continuous

(Three articles)

Usage Intention.
Henke et al., 2018

Processing privacy information and decision-making
for

smartphone

apps

among

young

German

smartphone users.
Nel J. and Boshoff C., 2017

Development of Application-based Mobile-service
Trust and Online Trust Transfer: An Elaboration
Likelihood Model Perspective.

International Journal of

Zhang-Kennedy L. et al., 2016

Human-Computer Interaction

The Role of Instructional Design in Persuasion: A
Comics Approach for Improving Cybersecurity.

(Three articles)
Moore et al., 2019

Cybersecurity for Android Applications:
Permissions in Android 5 and 6.

Wang L. et al., 2016

Understanding User Behavior of Asking LocationBased Questions on Microblogs.

Foundations and Trends in

Iachello G. and Hong J., 2007

End-User Privacy in Human–Computer Interaction.

de Sa M. and Carrico L., 2011

Designing and Evaluating Mobile Interaction:

HCI
(Two Articles)

Challenges and Trends.
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International Journal of

Keith M. et al., 2013

Information Disclosure on Mobile Devices: Re-

Human Computer Studies

examining Privacy calculus with Actual User

( Four Article)

Behavior.
Visuri et al., 2019

Understanding smartphone notifications’ user
interactions and content importance.

Renaud and Zimmermann, 2018

Ethical guidelines for nudging in information
security & privacy

Turner et al., 2019

The influence of concurrent mobile notifications on
individual responses.

IEEE Transactions on

Gasson M. et al, 2011

Normality Mining: Privacy Implications of

Human-Machine Systems

Behavioral Profiles Drawn From GPS Enabled

( One Article)

Mobile Phones

International Journal of

-

Mobile Human Computer
Interaction
( -)

Transactions on Systems,

-

Man, and Cybernetics:
Systems
(-)

Interacting with Computers

-

(-)
Human-Computer Interaction
(-)
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Appendix C
ACM CHI Conference
(33 articles)

Author(s), Year

Title

Bitton et al., 2020

Evaluating the Information Security Awareness of Smartphone Users.

Di Geronimo et al., 2020

UI dark patterns and where to find them: a study on mobile applications and user
perception.

Ebert et al., 2020

Does Context in Privacy Communication Really Matter? – A Survey on Consumer
Concerns and Preferences.

Sundar et al., 2020

Online privacy heuristics that predict information disclosure.

Zou et al., 2019

YouMight'Be Affected: An Empirical Analysis of Readability and Usability Issues in
Data Breach Notifications.

Caraban et al., 2019

23 ways to nudge: A review of technology-mediated nudging in human-computer
interaction

Chen and Sundar, 2018

This app would like to use your current location to better serve you: Importance of user
assent and system transparency in personalized mobile services.

Kleek M. et al, 2017

Better the Devil You Know: Exposing the Data Sharing Practices of Smartphone Apps.

Micinski K. et al, 2017

User Interactions and Permission Use on Android.

Marforio C. et al, 2016

Evaluation of Personalized Security Indicators as an Anti-Phishing Mechanism for
Smartphone Applications.

Baarslag T. et al., 2016

Negotiation as an Interaction Mechanism for Deciding App Permissions.

Kelley P. et al., 2013

Privacy as Part of the App Decision-making Process.
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Shklovski I. et al., 2014

Leakiness and Creepiness in App Space: Perceptions of Privacy and Mobile App Use.

Tsai J. et al., 2009

Who's Viewed You? The Impact of Feedback in A Mobile Location-sharing
Application.

Patil S. et al., 2012

"Check Out Where I Am!": Location-sharing Motivations, Preferences, and Practices.

Almuhimedi H. et al., 2014

Your Location Has Been Shared 5,398 Times!: A Field Study on Mobile App Privacy
Nudging.

Lindqvist J. et al., 2011

I'm the Mayor of My House: Examining Why People Use Foursquare - a social-driven
Location Sharing Application.

Henne B. et al., 2013

Location Privacy Revisited: Factors of Privacy Decisions.

Barkhuus L., 2012

The Mismeasurement of Privacy: Using Contextual Integrity to Reconsider Privacy in
HCI.

Knijnenburg B. et al., 2013

Preference-based Location Sharing: Are More Privacy Options Really Better?

Angulo J. et al., 2015

Usable Transparency with the Data Track: A Tool for Visualizing Data Disclosures.

Kelley P. et al., 2010

When Are Users Comfortable Sharing Locations with Advertisers?

Tan J. et al., 2014

The Effect of Developer-specified Explanations for Permission Requests on
Smartphone User Behavior.

Tang K. and Siewiorek J., 2012

The Implications of Offering More Disclosure Choices for Social Location Sharing.

Shih F. et al., 2015

Privacy Tipping Points in Smartphones Privacy Preferences.

Chang D. et al., 2016

Engineering Information Disclosure: Norm Shaping Designs.

Suknot A. et al., 2014

Immaculacy: A Game of Privacy.

Benenson Z. et al., 2013

Android and iOS users' Differences Concerning Security and Privacy.

Patil S. et al., 2015

Interrupt Now or Inform Later?: Comparing Immediate and Delayed Privacy
Feedback.
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Harbach M. et al.,2014

Using Personal Examples to Improve Risk communication for Security & Privacy
Decision.

Alharbi K. et al., 2014

Android Apps Consistency Scrutinized.

Ismail Q. et al., 2015

Crowdsourced Exploration of Security Configurations.

Patil, S. et al., 2014

Reflection or action?: How feedback and control affect location sharing decisions.
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Appendix D
Specialized Journals

Journal

Author(s), Year

Title

Pervasive and Mobile

Bettini C. and Riboni D., 2015

Privacy Protection in Pervasive Systems: State of

Computing

the Art and Technical Challenges.

(Four articles)
Hung S. et al., 2015

Real-time and Intelligent Private Data Protection for
the Android Platform.

Finnis J. et al., 2012

A Location-based Policy-specification Language for
Mobile Devices

Pennekamp et al., 2017

A Survey on the Evolution of Privacy Enforcement
on Smartphones and the Road Ahead

Computer standards and
interfaces

Dye S. and Scarfone K., 2014

A Standard for Developing Secure Mobile
Applications.

(One article)
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Appendix E
Simulation results (1)

#Cards
(n*2)

Board Configuration

Mean (µ)

Standard
Deviation(s)

1

8 pairs
16 Cards

A
E
H
D

B
F
G
C

C
G
F
B

D
H
E
A

63.80
63.80

24.76
24.76

2

8 pairs
16 Cards

A
C
E
G

A
C
E
G

B
D
F
H

B
D
F
H

66.34
66.34

26.40
26.40

3

8 pairs
16 Cards

A
C
E
F

G
A
C
E

H
G
B
D

F
H
D
B

63.43
63.43

25.01
25.01

4

8 pairs
16 Cards

A
F
A
D

B
D
E
G

C
G
E
B

C
H
F
H

63.66
63.66

24.43
24.43

5

8 pairs
16 Cards

A
A
E
E

B
B
F
F

C
C
G
G

D
D
H
H

64.06
64.07

24.68
24.68
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Simulation results (2)

#Cards
(n*2)

1

2

3

14 pairs
28 Cards

14 pairs
28 Cards

14 pairs
28 Cards

14 pairs
28 Cards
4

Board Configuration

Mean (µ)

Standard
Deviation(s)

196.88
196.10
196.06

58.78
58.81
58.74

196.11
196.00
196.10

58.83
58.78
58.89

A
E
I
M
L

B
F
J
N
K

C
G
K
N
J

D
H
L
M
I

H
D

G
C

F
B

E
A

A
C
E
G
I
K
M

A
C
E
G
I
K
M

B
D
F
H
J
L
N

B
D
F
H
J
L
N

A
E
G
I
I
H
D

J
A
E
G
H
C
L

K
J
B
F
C
L
M

D
K
N
B
F
M
N

196.01
196.11
196.04

58.79
58.81
58.82

A
H
A
I
C
G
D

B
D
E
K
N
E
I

J
G
L
J
L
B
K

C
N
F
H
M
M
F

195.95
196.01
195.96

58.73
58.85
58.76
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6

14 pairs
28 Cards

A
A
E
E
I
I
M

B
B
F
F
J
J
M

C
C
G
G
K
K
N

D
D
H
H
L
L
N

195.96
196.06
196.08

58.72
58.74
58.76
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Appendix F
Lab Recruitment Flyer

Website Posting in the CIS.Sona System
Title of Study: User Behavior in Mobile Apps
Brief Description: In this study, participants will be asked to attend a lab session and explore a game
app installed on iPod devices. Participants will try the app, test its functionality, and examine different
features provided by its interfaces. At the end of the session, participants will be asked to complete a
survey.
Description:
This study investigates the influence of app screens design on user decisions made while interacting
with the app. Participants are asked to engage with a game app downloaded onto an iPod device, interact
with it, and indicate their opinions by completing an online questionnaire. Please sign up for a lab timeslot
depending to your preferences and availability and make sure you show up on time to the session. The
lab is located in VC11-175 and you will be asked to sign up the attendance sheet with your sonaID.
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Appendix G
User Consent Form for Study 1 ( Lab Study )

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Dr. Raquel Benbunan-Fich1
Arwa Alawajy2
1Baruch College - Paul

H. Chook Department of Information
Systems & Statistics

2Graduate

Center-Department of Computer Science

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study:
Principal Investigator:
Faculty Advisor:

User Behavior in Mobile Apps
Arwa Alawajy, PI
PhD Student in Computer Science Department
Dr. Raquel Benbunan-Fich, Advisor
Associate Professor of Information Systems

You are being asked to participate in this research study because of your enrollment in the CIS2200
subject pool.
Purpose:The purpose of this research study is to explore the implications of interface design of a
game app on user interaction decisions.
Procedures: If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to explore a
game app, engage with various app screens and complete an online questionnaire. There are no
right or wrong answers. Please provide truthful and accurate responses.
Time Commitment: Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 1 hr.
Potential Risks or Discomforts: The common potential risks of internet-based research is the breach
of participants’ confidentiality, however, in this study, this risk is minimized by not storing any identifiable
information that could be traced back to a specific participant. Instead, each participant would be
assigned to a random object ID to serve research-purposes.
Besides that, the risks from participating in this study are no more than the risks associated with testing
new mobile apps and taking online surveys. You can choose not to participate, or you are free to
withdraw at any time. If you choose to withdraw from the study at any point, there is no penalty.
Potential Benefits: You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study. The
benefits for science and society include better understanding of user behavior and the development
of guidelines to improve mobile app design to ultimately serve user’s needs.
Alternatives to Participation: Alternatives to participating in the research study include signing up
for other research studies and/or complete an essay to earn the required credits. Please check the
FAQ section of the cis.sona website for more detail about these alternatives or please contact Prof.
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Isak Taksa (CIS subject pool administrator) if you have any questions about approved
alternatives. Your participation in this study is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time.
Payment for Participation: You will not receive any monetary payment for participating in this research
study. However, you will receive 2 points (=1 hour), which is the amount of participation needed to
fulfill the requirement of the CIS Subject Pool.
New Information: You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect
your willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality: While the app in use, the data will be temporarily stored in an online server. At the
conclusion of the experimental session, the data will be downloaded and saved offline in passwordprotected computer files in one of Baruch’s faculty offices. The offline data contains no personally
identifiable information but a random object ID for each participant.
We will protect your confidentiality by using only your numeric SONA ID to record your participation in
this study and assign credit. Then, neither your SONA ID nor any other
personally identifiable information would be retained.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of research
may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research records
provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information about you.
Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by name and will only
report aggregated findings.
Participants’ Rights:
• Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there
will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
• You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time, without
any penalty.
Questions, Comments or Concerns: If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the
research, you can contact:
Prof. Raquel Benbunan-Fich at 646-312-3375, or rbfich@baruch.cuny.edu
Arwa Alawajy at aalawajy@gradcenter.cuny.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns
that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research
Compliance Administrator at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu. Alternatively, you may write to:
CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Attn: Research Compliance Administrator
205 East 42nd Street
New York, NY 10017
Online Consent:
By clicking the 'Accept' button below you state that you understand the terms of this research study as
stated above, you attest to the fact that you are at least 18 years old, and that your participation is
completely voluntary. If you do not agree to participate in the research, please click 'Decline' button
below.
Accept __
Decline __
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Appendix H
Index Card Used in Study 1

Write the following link in (Internet Explorer:

) browser: http://tiny.cc/BeaMind

Follow the instructions on the screen.
Please make sure you try two rounds of the game.

Enjoy!
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Appendix I
Full Questionnaire

Please enter your SONA ID to proceed:

Beside you, you will find a printed consent form, please read it CAREFULLY before proceeding. When
you finish, please respond to this question by choosing "ACCEPT" if you agree to participate in this study,
otherwise choose "DECLINE" :
•

ACCEPT

•

DECLINE

Thank you for agreeing on participation in this study, please answer the following questions:
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BeaMind is a classic matching game for mobile devices where a player has to match a pair of the same
pattern by turning over two cards at a time.

The goal is to match all the cards in the board. You will be given a demo version to try first, then you will
be asked to play two times of the large board.
The app examines the player's recall ability, therefore, the pace is relaxing with no time limits.

Now, please follow these steps:
1- Take the iPod from your table, find an app called "BeaMind", open it and follow its screens till the end.
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2- When finishing, please make sure you have completed app screens and got this screen below,
otherwise you have to continue using the app.
3- Raise your hand to proceed with the survey.

214

215

216

217

IF (NO):

218

219

Major in school:

220

221

222

End of the questionnaire.
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Appendix J
Online Recruitment Flyer

Website Posting in the CIS.Sona System
Title of Study: User Behavior in Mobile Apps
Brief Description: In this research study, participants will be asked to attend a zoom session and explore
a game app installed on their iPhone devices by following the researcher’s instructions. Participants will
test the app’s functionality, and examine different features provided by its interfaces. At the end of the
session, participants will be asked to complete a survey.
Description:
This research study investigates the influence of app screens design on user decisions made during the
interacting with the app. Participants are asked to experiment with their iPhone devices and examine the
interfaces functionality and indicate their opinions by completing a questionnaire. Participants are
required to have iPhone devices and a computer/laptop to participate in this study. Please sign up for a
Zoom session timeslot depending to your preferences and availability and make sure you show up on
time to the session.
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Appendix K
User Consent Form for Study 2 (Online Study)

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Title of Research Study: User Behavior in Mobile Apps
Principal Investigator: Arwa Alawajy, PI
PhD Student in Computer Science Department
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Raquel Benbunan-Fich, Advisor
Associate Professor of Information Systems
You are being asked to participate in this research study because of your enrollment in the
CIS2200 subject pool.
Purpose: The purpose of this research study is to explore the implications of interface design of a game
app on user interaction decisions.
Procedures: If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we
will ask you to explore a game
app, engage with various app screens and complete an online questionnaire. There are no right or
wrong answers. Please provide truthful and accurate responses. The app’s link would be offered via
email and Zoom meeting sessions as well for any technical assistance you might have to get the app
downloaded on your iPhone.
Time Commitment: Your participation in this research study is expected to last for a total of 1 hr.
Potential Risks or Discomforts: The common potential risks of internet-based research is the breach
of participants’ confidentiality, however, in this study, this risk is minimized by not storing any identifiable
information that could be traced back to a specific participant. Instead, each participant would be
assigned to a random object ID to serve research-purposes. Besides that, the risks from participating in
this study are no more than the risks associated with testing new mobile apps and taking online surveys.
You can choose not to participate, or you are free to withdraw at any time. If you choose to withdraw
from the study at any point, there is no penalty.
Potential Benefits: You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research study. The
benefits for science and society include better understanding of user behavior and the development of
guidelines to improve mobile app design to ultimately serve user’s needs.
Alternatives to Participation: Alternatives to participating in the research study include signing up for
other research studies and/or complete an essay to earn the required credits. Please check the FAQ
section of the cis.sona website for more detail about these alternatives or please contact Prof. Isak Taksa
(CIS subject pool administrator) if you have any questions about approved alternatives. Your participation
in this study is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time.
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Payment for Participation: You will not receive any monetary payment for participating in this
research study. However, this study adopts this compensation procedure:
Two points (=1 hour), for complete participation.
One point for incomplete participation.
Note: 2 points is the amount of participation needed to fulfill the requirement of the CIS Subject Pool.
New Information: You will be notified about any new information regarding this study that may affect
your willingness to participate in a timely manner.
Confidentiality: To get access to the app, you will provide your email address. This email address
would be used only to send the app link. Once the experiment concludes, no traces for the email address
would be retained. While the app in use, anonymized data will be temporarily stored in an online server.
At the conclusion of the experimental session, participation data (without emails) will be downloaded and
saved offline in password-protected computer files in an external hard-drive. The offline data contains no
personally identifiable information but a random object ID for each participant.
We will protect your confidentiality by using only your numeric SONA ID to record your participation in
this study and assign credit and using your email only for sending the app’s link and Zoom meeting links
(if needed). Then, neither your SONA ID nor emails or any other personally identifiable information would
be retained.
The research team, authorized CUNY staff, and government agencies that oversee this type of research
may have access to research data and records in order to monitor the research. Research records
provided to authorized, non-CUNY individuals will not contain identifiable information about you.
Publications and/or presentations that result from this study will not identify you by name and will only
report aggregated findings.
Participants’ Rights: Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to
participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. You can decide to withdraw your consent and stop participating in the research at any time,
without any penalty.
Questions, Comments or Concerns: If you have any questions, comments or concerns about the
research, you can contact:
Prof. Raquel Benbunan-Fich
at 646-312-3375, or rbfich@baruch.cuny.edu
Arwa Alawajy
at aalawajy@gradcenter.cuny.edu
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or you have comments or concerns
that you would like to discuss with someone other than the researchers, please call the CUNY Research
Compliance Administrator
at 646-664-8918 or email HRPP@cuny.edu.
Alternatively, you may write to:

226

CUNY Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research

Online Consent:
By clicking the 'Accept' button below you state that you understand the terms of this research study as
stated above, you attest to the fact that you are at least 18 years old, and that your participation is
completely voluntary. If you do not agree to participate in the research, please click 'Decline'.
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Appendix L
Instructions to Prepare the Phone
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Appendix M
Instructions to Access the App
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